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'Legal analogical reasoning - the interplay between legal theory and artificial intelligence' 
Master of Jurisprudence 1997 
This thesis examines and critiques attempts by researchers in the field of artificial 
intelligence and law to simulate legal analogical reasoning. Supported by an analysis of 
legal theoretical accounts of legal analogising, and an examination of approaches to 
simulating analogising developed in the field of artificial intelligence, it is argued that 
simulations of legal analogising fall far short of simulating all the is involved in human 
analogising. These examinations of legal theory and artificial intelligence inform a 
detailed critique of simulations of legal analogising. It is argued that simulations of legal 
analogising are limited in the kind of legal analogising they can simulate - these 
simulations cannot simulate the semantic flexibility that is characteristic of creative 
analogising. This thesis argues that one reason for current restrictions on simulations of 
legal analogising is that researchers in artificial intelligence and law have ignored the 
important role played by legal principles in legal analogising. It is argued that 
improvements in simulations of legal analogising will come fi'om incorporating the 
influence of legal principles on legal analogising and that until researchers address this 
semantic flexibility and the role that legal principles play in generating it, simulations of 
legal analogising will be restricted and of benefit only for limited uses and in restricted 
areas of the law. 
Building on the analysis of legal theoretical accounts of legal reasoning and the 
examination of the processes of analogising, this thesis fiarther argues that legal 
theoretical accounts of legal analogising are insufficient to account for legal analogising. 
This thesis argues that legal theorists have themselves ignored important aspects of legal 
analogising and hence that legal theoretical accounts of legal analogising are deficient. 
This thesis offers suggestions as to some of the modifications required in legal theory in 
order to better account for the processes of legal analogising. 
Legal analogical 
reasoning - the interplay 
between legal theory 
and artificial 
intelligence. 
The copyright of this thesis rests 
with the author. No quotation 
from it should be published 
widiout the written consent of the 
author and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
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1 Introduction 
The law can be extremely complex and producing reasoned arguments in response to 
legal problems can be laborious and time consuming. In his recent booi<:, 'The Future of 
Law', Susskind notes this complexity and the acute problems it causes in what he calls a 
'hyper regulated' society. ^  According to Susskind 
we are all subject, in our social and working lives, to a body of legal rules 
and principles that is so vast, diverse, and complicated that no one can 
understand their full applicability and impact.^ 
In this situation, one might turn to computers for assistance. 
In the introduction to his work investigating the automatic generation of precedent-based 
arguments, Ashley outlined a hypothetical scenario.^  In this hypothetical an associate in a 
New York law firm is sitting in his Wall Street Office. It is 5:55pm and he has just been 
confronted by a partner who requires a well argued and referenced legal memorandum by 
the next morning. The associate has exactly one hour and twenty minutes to research and 
write the memorandum before a crucial engagement. Pressed for time, the attorney 
resorts to his computer. After the attorney has described the facts of the dispute, the 
computer helpfully outlines the arguments that (a)the attorney can make for his client, 
(b) what the likely responses to those arguments will be from the opposition, and 
(c) suggested hypotheticals indicating how the arguments for the plaintiff and defence 
could be respectively strengthened and weakened. For each of these, a list of authorities 
is provided which can be cited in support of the arguments. Armed with this computer 
program, the legal memorandum was rapidly and painlessly prepared. 
Unfortunately the program that Ashley envisaged was a hypothetical program. However, 
a program that automatically locates authorities, constructs arguments for a position 
based on those authorities and anticipates likely counter arguments would be of 
immeasurable value. Indeed a program which automates some of the tasks that lawyers 
perform may becoming a necessity. Susskind argues that 
^Susskind R.E. , The Future of Law. Facing the Challenges of Infonnation Technology (1996) Oxford 
University Press, 13. 
2lbid. 
^Ashley Kevin D., Modelling Legal Argument: reasoning with cases and hypotheticals (1990) MIT 
Press, Ch. 2. 
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current methods for managing legal materials (dominated by paper and print) 
are not capable of coping with the quantity and complexity of the law which 
now governs us."* 
Unfortunately the production of computer programs of the sort envisaged by Ashley 
remains a goal tantalisingly out of reach. According to Susskind we are currently 
experiencing a 'technology lag', 
our ability to use computer technology to capture, store, retrieve, and 
reproduce data, wildly surpasses our ability to use technology to help 
analyse, refine and render more manageable the mass of data which data 
processing has spawned.^  
While computers are good at processing data, they are currently little help in managing 
all important knowledge. Dealing with hyper regulation requires the development of 
knowledge processing techniques.^ The field of 'artificial intelligence and law' is 
concerned with developing and improving legal knowledge processing techniques. 
A central strand of research in artificial intelligence and law is the simulation of legal 
reasoning. Analogical reasoning is an important form of legal reasoning. This research 
scrutinises and critiques attempts by researchers in the field of artificial intelligence and 
law to construct computer systems that simulate legal analogical reasoning. In the 
following chapters it is argued that attempts to simulate legal analogical reasoning only 
achieve a trivial simulation of human legal analogical reasoning. Attempts to simulate 
legal analogical reasoning fail to capture the essential element of creativity that the 
perception of legal analogies involves. It is argued that one reason for the failure of 
research in artificial intelligence and law to successfiilly simulate all that is involved in 
legal analogical reasoning is that researchers have ignored important insights about legal 
analogising developed by legal theorists. Legal theorists argue that legal principles play a 
crucial role in legal analogising. Researchers in artificial intelligence and law have almost 
totally ignored the importance of legal principles in legal analogising. Consequently, 
approaches to simulating legal analogising developed by researchers in artificial 
intelligence and law are restricted in the type of analogising they can simulate. Systems 
are limited to comparatively uncreative analogising. 
'^ Susskind, above n 1. 
^Ibid, 58. 
%id 59, 
Secondly, it is argued that legal theoretical accounts of legal analogising focus solely on 
one narrow aspect of legal analogising. Legal theoretical accounts of legal reasoning 
focus on providing 'rational reconstructions' for legal analogies. Informed by an 
examination of research into analogical reasoning undertaken in fields such as 
psychology, cognitive science and artificial intelligence, this research argues that legal 
theoretical accounts of legal analogising fail to fiilly account for the process of legal 
analogising. Legal theory leaves many important aspects of legal analogising unexplored. 
It is argued that ignoring these aspects of analogising undermines attempts to provide 
rational reconstructions for legal analogies. This requires a reconception of theories of 
legal analogising. 
This research proceeds in nine parts. Following this introduction, chapter 2 briefly 
introduces the concept of analogical reasoning and analogising. Chapter 3 reviews major 
legal theoretical accounts of legal analogical reasoning. Chapter 4 shows why legal 
theoretical accounts of legal analogical reasoning are insufficient in that they ignore an 
important aspect of legal analogical reasoning. This chapter argues that reformulated 
theories of legal analogising are required. Chapter 5 examines general approaches to 
simulating analogical reasoning developed by researchers in artificial intelligence. 
Chapter 5 is used as the basis for the examination undertaken in chapter 6 which reviews 
and discusses attempts to simulate legal analogical reasoning undertaken by researchers 
in artificial intelligence and law. Chapter 7 discusses the limitations in attempts to 
simulate legal analogical reasoning that were highlighted in chapter 6 and discusses how 
improvements can be made in attempts to simulate legal analogical reasoning. Chapter 8 
returns to the topic of legal theory and to the argument presented in chapter 4 that legal 
theoretical accounts of legal analogical reasoning are insufficient. Chapter 8 briefly 
explores how legal theoretical accounts of legal analogical reasoning need to be 
reconsidered in light of their insuflficiencies. This examination concludes in chapter 9 
which summarises the arguments made during this research. 
2 Preliminary clarif ications 
When examining the concept of analogy a usefial starting point would be a definifion of 
what an 'analogy' is. Amongst other things, such a definition would discuss how the 
concept of analogy relates to the concepts of 'analogical reasoning' and 'analogical 
problem solving'. Such a definition would discuss whether analogical reasoning is even a 
valid source of reasoning. It would describe how analogies occur, what analogies are 
used for and how analogical reasoning relates to other forms of human reasoning. Such a 
definition would also determine how the topic of analogy relates to the topic of 
metaphor.'^  A short examination of the literature existing under the heading 'analogy' 
reveals what a huge task this would be. Investigafions of analogy arise in fields as diverse 
as theology, philosophy, linguistics, psychology, literature, cognitive science, artificial 
intelligence and law.^ A definition of analogy would have to account for the concept of 
analogy as it is used in all of these diverse fields. Moreover, such a definition would also 
need to account for the changing conception of analogy through time, from perhaps the 
earliest discussion by Greek philosophers to the conceptions of analogy investigated by 
current researchers in artificial intelligence.^ 
This research is much less ambitious than this. Wide ranging discussions of analogy and 
analogical reasoning are provided elsewhere. ^ '^  This research is concerned with the 
restricted field of legal analogical reasoning and attempts that have been made to 
simulate legal analogical reasoning. As such this research focuses on accounts of legal 
analogical reasoning provided by legal theorists and attempts made be researchers in the 
field of artificial intelligence and law to simulate legal analogical reasoning. 
Despite the diversity of research which occurs under the name of analogy, at a broad 
level there is consensus amongst recent research as to what constitutes analogy. 
Essentially analogy is a 'mapping between elements of a source domain and a target 
^ E.g.: Gentner Dedre, Falkenhainer Brian and Skorstad Janice, 'Viewing Metaphor as Analog}'' p. 171, 
in (Helman D.H.) (Ed) Analogical Reasoning: Perspectives of Artificial Intelligence. Cognitive Science, 
and Philosophy (1988) Kluwer. 
^ For interesting collections of work examining analogical reasoning see: Ortony A. and Vosniadou S., 
Similarity and analogical reasoning (1989) Cambridge University Press and Helman David H., 
Analogical reasoning: Perspectives of Artificial Intelligence. Cognitive Science and Philosophy (1988) 
Kluwer. 
^ Hoffman R.R., 'Monster analogies' (1995) 16 AI Magazine 11, 15. 
E.g., see the authorities above n 8, 
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d o m a i n . M o r e intuitively, analogy and analogical reasoning are a way to use 
knowledge about old problems when reasoning about new problems. For example, with 
knowledge that one German shepherd is friendly we reason that another German 
shepherd is f r iendly .With knowledge that one car starts when the right key is inserted 
in the steering column and turned clockwise we reason that that another car will start 
when the right key is inserted into the steering column and turned clockwise. Similariy in 
law. We know when particular behaviour is negligent, for example, by referring to 
precedents where a court has determined negligence was present. 
The particular focus of this research is on attempts to 'simulate' legal analogical 
reasoning. But what precisely is being simulated? Is it only the observable results 
achieved when a person reports engaging in analogical reasoning? With this conception, 
if a person reports that 'A is analogous to B' then if a computer program can be created 
which when presented with the same information reports 'A is analogous to B', this 
computer program is said to simulate analogical reasoning. Alternatively, simulating 
analogical reasoning could be understood to mean the attempt to program a computer to 
recreate the mental processes that occur inside a person's mind when they report 
themselves as engaging in analogical reasoning. In this examination the term 'simulation' 
is used in the former sense. A computer program will be referred to as simulating 
analogical reasoning i f the program produces the same analogy as does a person 
presented with the same information. 
However, while this view of simulating analogical reasoning does not stipulate that 
reproducing mental processes is by definition necessary, as a practical matter 
reproducing the mental processes performed by people when they engage in analogical 
reasoning may provide the only visible path to achieving the results of that reasoning. It 
is known that certain mental processes engaged in by people produce analogies. I f 
alternative means can be devised to achieve the results produced by people when they 
reason analogically, these alternatives could be used to simulate analogising. In the 
absence of such alternative means however, the mental processes engaged in provided 
the only known path to simulating analogising. Simulating analogical reasoning may 
11 Hall Rogers P., 'Computational Approaches to Analogical Reasoning: A Comparative Analysis' 
(1989) 39 Artificial Intelligence 39, 40. 
1^  Sunstein Cass R., 'On Analogical Reasoning' (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 741 herafter 'On 
Analogical Reasoning', 743. 
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often involve the attempt to simulate the processes engage in by people when they reason 
analogically however, it will not here be defined in this way. Hence understanding the 
processes involved when people reason analogically is extremely informative in 
attempting to produce a computer program that simulates analogical reasoning. 
Despite broad consensus as to what constitutes analogy, there is great diversity amongst 
accounts of analogical reasoning. In the next chapter, accounts of analogical reasoning 
provided by legal theorists are examined. 
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3 Legal theory and analogical reasoning 
Legal reasoning takes many forms. In various ways legal reasoning appears to be 
deductive, to be inductive, to be abductive and to be analogical.'^ It is sometimes argued 
that legal reasoning involves other forms of reasoning. For example it is said that legal 
reasoning involves the application of 'top-down general theories' and the search for 
'reflective equilibrium'.These various forms of reasoning will not be examined further. 
This discussion will focus on the place of analogical reasoning within legal reasoning. It 
is argued that legal theoretical accounts of legal analogical reasoning focus on one 
narrow aspect of legal analogical reasoning. Legal theoretical accounts of legal 
analogical reasoning focus on providing 'rational reconstructions' for analogies and do 
not examine important aspects of legal analogical reasoning. However, in that it focuses 
on one aspect of legal analogical reasoning, legal theory provides limited guidance for 
attempts to simulate legal analogising. 
Analogical reasoning permeates legal reasoning.The use of analogical reasoning in law 
is a central pillar of the legal system. Cross states that it 
is a basic principle of the administration of justice that like cases should be 
decide alike, 
While it might inferred from this statement that analogical reasoning is only relevant 
when reasoning with cases, to do so would be fallacious. MacCormick notes that 
'analogy is used both in case and statute law'i'' and says that it 
Golding Martin P., Legal reasoning (1984) Alfred Knopf hereafter 'Legal reasoning', ch 2; Brewer 
S., 'Exemplary reasoning - semantics, pragmatics, and the rational force of legal argument by analog)'' 
(1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 923, 942-9. 
Sunstein 'On Analogical Reasoning', above n 12, 749-54. 
Contra Posner Richard A., The Problems of jurisprudence (1990) Harvard University Press, who 
argues that analogical reasoning is merely reasoning by induction, 87-9. C.f: Golding 'Legal 
reasoning', above note 13, 44 who argues that induction is just a form on analogy. A more sustained 
criticism of the place of legal analogical reasoning has recently been provided by Alexander: Alexander 
Larry, 'Bad Beginnings' (1996) 145 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 57. Alexander's criticism is 
directed at both descriptive and normative theories of legal analogical reasoning. To the extent Uiat 
Alexander criticises descriptive accounts of legal analogical reasoning for failing to fully account for the 
processes of legal analogising, the arguments presented here are in accord witli Alexander, However, to 
the extent that Alexander argues that analogical reasoning should not be applied in law, this research 
seeks to show why such arguments are unhelpful. 
Cross Rupert, Precedent in English Law (1977) Clarendon Press, 4. 
MacCormick N., Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) Oxford University Press hereafter 'Legal 
Reasoning', 193. 
is false to suppose that there is an essential difference between statute and 
common law as to the flinction of arguments from analogy, i^ 
In this light, it would be wiser to read Cross's statement about 'like cases' as referring to 
'like circumstances'. This was noted early in English jurisprudence, Blackstone stated 
that i f 
any new and unwonted circumstances shall arise, then, if any-thing analogous 
has happened before, let the case be adjudged in like manner, proceeding a 
similibus ad similia. i ^ 
Given the pervasive nature of analogical reasoning in law, it is surprising that, as 
Sunstein concludes, 'The legal culture lacks a description of its own most characteristic 
way of proceeding. 
3.1 The goal of theories of legal reasoning 
When examining a theory of legal reasoning, a flmdamental question is 'exacfly what is 
the theory of reasoning seeking to explain?' Is the theory attempting to explain how we 
reason - the particular steps we engage in during reasoning? Is the theory seeking to 
explain why we reason in particular ways - that some reason is more 'intuitive' or more 
'natural'? Is the theory seeking to explain why we should or should not reason in 
particular ways? Or is the theory seeking to do something else, or perhaps a combination 
of all of these things? To various extents theories of legal analogical reasoning explore all 
of these questions. However, as will become apparent, theories of legal analogical 
reasoning provide very little explanation as to how we reason analogically. Legal theory 
provides very little guidance as to the processes that occur in the mind during legal 
analogising. 
The disinterest within legal theory as to the mental processes that occur during legal 
reasoning can be traced back at least to the jurist Wasserstrom. According to 
Wasserstrom, in law it is necessary to distinguish between the processes by which 
solutions to problems are created and the processes by which solutions to problems are 
justified.2i Wasserstrom argued that in law processes of creation are irrelevant and that 
Ibid 194. As Levi demonstrates, analogical reasoning is also central in interpretation of the 
constitution: Levi E.H. , An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949) University of Chicago Press. 
1' Cited in Cross, above n 16, 24. 
Sunstein 'On Analogical Reasoning', above n 12, 741. 
•^ 1 Wasserstrom R.A., The Judicial Decision (1961) Stanford University Press, 26-7, ch 2. 
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only processes of justification need be investigated and explained. Inherently intertwined 
with examinations of the processes of creation and the processes of justification are 
questions as to what it means to reason 'rationally' and to be 'objective' in law. 
According to the distinction between processes of creation and processes of justification, 
providing an account of how results are created is unimportant i f it is possible to give 
and account of why those results are justified. According to this conception of legal 
analogical reasoning, any of the personal input, the influence of personal views and 
values that occurs in law occurs during processes of creation. Wasserstrom argued that 
these personal aspects of reasoning can validly be ignored because legal propositions are 
only acceptable to the extent they can be justified, in which case that fact that they are 
legally justified makes it irrelevant that they may also be personally felt. 
The legacy of Wasserstrom's distinction between processes of creation and processes of 
justification is evident in theories of legal analogical reasoning. Theories of legal 
analogical reasoning do not attempt to explain how legal analogies are created. It is 
argued in the next chapter that this distinction between processes of creation and 
between processes of justification is itself problematic. However, for present purposes 
the distinction provides a usefial framework within which to examine theories of legal 
analogical reasoning. 
3.1.1 A multitude of legal theories 
As MacCormick states, a 'theory of legal reasoning requires and is required by a theory 
of law.'22 Problematic for an investigation of theories of legal analogical reasoning is that 
theories about the nature of law abound. Every legal theory either expressly or implicitly 
supplies its own theory of legal reasoning. Each of these theories of legal reasoning in 
turn either expressly or implicitly dictates what is involved in legal analogical reasoning 
and the role analogical reasoning plays in law. Consequently, theories about the nature of 
legal analogical reasoning abound. In this context a comprehensive examination of 
theories of legal analogical reasoning would require an examination of every existing 
theory of law. This is not possible in a work of this restricted length. Instead, the work of 
several leading jurists is surveyed for the accounts provided of legal analogical reasoning. 
22 MacCormick 'Legal Reasoning', above n 17, 229. 
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Given the wide acceptance o f the distinction between processes o f creation and 
processes o f justification, it is perhaps unsurprising that legal theories of analogical 
reasoning have almost nothing to say about the creation of analogies. They are silent as 
to the process by which concepts and ideas arise in the mind and the processes by which 
they are related and an analogy created.Further, legal theory only partially explains the 
process o f justification. Legal theory only partially explains how and why legal analogies 
are justified. 
3.2 The creation of analogies 
What prompts the creation o f particular analogies? Why do we see injury caused by 
defectively produced underpants^'' as analogous to injury caused by a decomposing snail 
in a bottle o f ginger beer?^^ What are the processes which lead us to this conclusion? 
In seeking to understand the processes by which an analogy between two situations 
arises, that 'blinding flash of insight' in which the analogy between situations is 
perceived, jurisprudential literature unfortunately provides no guidance. A consequence 
of the general acceptance o f Wasserstrom's distinction is that processes of creation are 
rarely discussed. 
Levi provides the most famous examination o f the nature o f legal analogical reasoning 
which he argues occurs in three steps: 
1. similarity is seen between cases, 
2. the rule o f law inherent in the first case is announced; and 
3. the rule o f law is made appHcable to the second case.^ ^ 
-^^  For a discussion of some of the considerations relevant here see: Golding Martin P., 'A Note on 
Discovery and Justification in Science and Law' p. 109, in (Aamio Aulis and MacConnick D. Neil) (Eds) 
Legal Reasoning (1986) New York University Press herafter 'A Note', 119-21. This was also something 
discussed by Frank; Frank Jerome, Law and the Modem Mind (1949) Stevens & Sons Limited, 104. 
24 Grant V Australian Knitting Mills [1936] AC 85. 
25 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562. 
26 Levi, above n 18, 1. Burton Steven J., An introduction to law and legal reasoning (1985) Little, 
Brown & Co, 26-39 gives a similar taxonomy. Levi's view has been criticised by Murray James R., 'The 
Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning' (1982) 29 UCLA LAW Review 833, 848-50 and also by Sunstein 
'On Analogical Reasoning', above n 12, footnote 63 and Cross, above n 16, 182 footnote 2. The 
substance of these criticisms differ. This exploration of analogy is in accord with these criticisms in 
arguing that Levi's examination of analogy leaves many questions unaddressed. Levi's examination is 
nevertheless commendable for its clarity. 
11 
According to Levi, the 'finding o f similarity or difference is the key step in the legal 
reasoning process.'^'^ However, while Levi provides several detailed examples to support 
his thesis, these examples provide very little insight as to how this finding of similarity is 
achieved. Levi concludes that the finding of similarity is a fijnction of the individual 
judge.2^ 
Following Levi, noted jurists provide similarly scant discussion o f the processes by which 
the finding o f similarity is achieved. When discussing the doctrine of stare decisis. Cross 
merely states that the 'discovery o f the ratio decidendi o f the previous case is primarily a 
psychological problem.'2? Similarly MacCormick is content to state that acts 
are not determined by logic, they are determined by the choices of agents, 
and by whatever, i f anything, that determined those choices. 
More explicit, i f ultimately just as unhelpfial is Hutcheson. Hutcheson opaquely states 
that the result o f cases, and by implication the creation of analogies, is determined by 
judges 'hunching out' their decisions.^' Jerome Frank argued that these hunches were the 
result o f the particular judge's personal i ty .Frank concluded that since cases are 
decided according to personal opinions, prejudices and hunches not articulated in judicial 
decisions this undermined the objectivity of the law. Indeed, it is was in response to 
Frank's attack on the objectivity o f law, an attack based on the inability to articulate and 
explain why particular positions are arrived at, that Wasserstrom proposed the distinction 
between processes o f creation and processes of justification. 
In this context, Kennedy has provided an interesting discussion. In examining the 
processes o f adjudication, Kennedy argues that judges and lawyers have a particular 
viewpoint towards individual cases, which he labels 'how-I-want-to-come-out'.^'' As the 
name suggests, this viewpoint indicates how a judge or lawyer would like the case to be 
2^ Levi, above n 18, 2. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Cross, above n 16, 187. 
MacConnick 'Legal Reasoning', above n 17, 33. 
31 Hutcheson Joseph C , 'The Judgement Intuitive' (1929) 14 Cornell Law Quarterly 274, 278. 
32 Frank, above n 23, 103. See Part One Ch XII for a discussion of this process. Similar views are held 
by the jurists cited in Wasserstrom, above n 21, 20-1. 
33 Wasserstrom, above n 21, 25-31. 
Kennedy Duncan, 'Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomonoiogy' (1986) 36 
Journal of Legal Education 518, 518. 
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resolved. According to Kennedy, legal reasoning is a matter of trying to make 'the law' 
and 'how-I-want-to-come-out' converge with each other.35 Kennedy's theory is 
interesting for the importance it places on people's views and feelings about cases in 
affecting how they interact with and interpret the law yet without concluding that legal 
results are determined by such views and feelings. Like those jurists examined above 
however, Kennedy does not discuss the basis by which 'how-I-want-to-come-out' is 
arrived at and although he describes a number o f factors which influence change in 'how-
I-want-to-come-out'3^ he does not describe the processes by which change occurs. 
After examining the characteristics, vaHdity and uses of legal analogical reasoning, 
Sunstein asks two key questions: 'What is the relationship between cognition and 
emotions in law?' and 'How does analogical reasoning involve different cognitive and 
affective capacities?'3'^ Unfortunately, although perhaps understandably faced with the 
silence highlighted above, Sunstein does not attempt to answer these important 
questions. 
Apart f rom broad examinations such as provided by Levi, it can thus be seen that legal 
theory lacks a detailed description of how analogies are created. In one sense this is 
unsurprising. I f Wasserstrom's distinction between processes of creation and processes 
o f justification is accepted then how analogies are created becomes unimportant. 
However, it is argued in the following chapter that in legal analogical reasoning 
processes o f creation and processes o f justification are not as clearly separable as 
Wasserstrom suggests. This means that a theory explaining how legal analogies are 
created becomes more interesting and more important and it makes the current lack of 
such a theory all the more stark. 
In order to create a computer program that simulates legal analogical reasoning it is 
necessary for that program to create legal analogies. Legal theory provides little 
guidance. Other disciplines such as psychology, cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence investigate how analogies are created.3« Attempts to simulate legal analogical 
35 Ibid 557. 
36 Ibid 548-58. 
3"^  Sunstein 'On Analogical Reasoning', above n 12, footnote 108. 
38 For useful collections of work in tliese fields see the autliorities cited above n 8. 
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reasoning can draw upon this research. This possibility is explored in subsequent 
chapters. 
While legal theory is uninformative about the processes by which analogies are created, 
following the distinction between processes of creation and processes o f justification, 
legal theory abounds with discussion about the role and substance of legal justification. 
3.3 Justification 
The scarcity o f legal theory considering the processes involved in the creafion of 
analogies is in stark contrast to legal theory that examines justification in law. The 
importance o f justification in law is readily apparent. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
provide an insightfiil discussion. According to Perelman disagreement is possible even 
when there is agreement on the general standards to be applied, for while 
we can all invoke certain universal values like truth, justice and beauty; we all 
agree that they exist.... our agreement lasts only so long as we remain on the 
level o f generalities. ... The fact that all admire and respect truth, justice and 
beauty does not mean that all agree on what is to be qualified as being true, 
just and beautifijl.^^ 
When differences o f opinion arise it is simply because multiple interpretations of a 
situation are possible.'*'' 
According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, what we qualify as being true, just and 
beautifiil is the result o f our personal hierarchy of values, a hierarchy imposed by the 
need to make choices between the simultaneous pursuit o f several values.'" I t is because 
we make choices within our own hierarchy of values that the need for justification arises. 
For i f law were completely deterministic where results followed deductively from facts 
and legal rules then justifications could be completely reconstructed from the facts and 
the legal rules. This is not the case in legal reasoning, our hierarchy o f values determines 
what analogies we create and how we use them. 
Perelman Chaim, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argiunent (1963) Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
66. 
Perelman Chaim and Olbrechts-Tyteca L . , The New Rlietoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (1969) 
University of Notre Dame Press, 59. 
'" Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, above n 40, 82. 
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It is the conclusion that we each have a hierarchy of values that is to some extent 
different that leads Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca to reject 'classic' logic as a model of 
human reasoning. As Perelman states, the rules o f logic demand that 
the same signs preserve always the same meaning without which the most 
self evident logical laws cease to be valid.^ ^2 
Whenever proofs are questioned recourse to argument is unavoidable.''3 As Perelman 
makes clear 
Legal reasoning is thus a very elaborated individual case of practical 
reasoning, which is not a formal demonstration, but an argumentation aiming 
to persuade and convince those whom it addresses'*'' 
The means by which such persuasion is achieved is largely through the giving of reasons 
for a position. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca strictly 
legal reasons are adduced only for the purpose o f justifying the decision to 
another audience.''^ 
However, while Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca demonstrate the importance of 
justification in law, Wasserstrom argued it was the only process of importance. In the 
weahh o f literature discussing justification in law^^ it is Wasserstrom's conception that is 
widely adopted. For example, MacCormick states 
the essential notion is that of giving ... good justifying reasons for claims 
defences or decisions. The process which is worth studying is the process of 
argumentation as a process of justification.'*'^ 
As a system and process o f argument, justification is central to the law. Only justifiable 
arguments are acceptable. However, the implication that processes of justificafion are the 
only processes worth studying, that processes o f creation can be validly ignored is a view 
that is challenged in the next chapter. 
In a system involving conflicting values, and choices between those values, the need to 
justify analogies can readily be appreciated. Regardless o f how we initially arrive at an 
42 Perelman, above n 39, 126. 
43 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, above n 40, 8. 
44 Perelman, above n 39, 129. 
45 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, above n 40, 43. 
46 See e.g. Wasserstrom, above n 21; MacConnick 'Legal Reasoning', above n 17; Dworkin Ronald, 
Taking Rights Seriously (1977) Gerald Duckworth & Co; Kennedy, above n 34; Burton Steven J., 
Judging in Good Faith (1992) Cambridge University Press. For an examination of reason giving in law 
and what this involves see: Schauer Frederick, 'Giving Reasons' (1995) 47 Stanford Law Review 633. 
4^ ^ MacCormick 'Legal Reasoning', above n 17, 15. 
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analogy the creation o f analogies involves choices as to what similarities and differences, 
amongst the multitude o f ways in which situations are similar and different, are an 
acceptable basis on which to create and analogy. As Hart states, 
any set o f human beings will resemble each other in some respects and differ 
f rom each other in others.'*^ 
However, not all similarities and differences are important, the 
problem for the law is: When wil l it be just to treat different cases as though 
they were the same? A working legal system must therefore be willing to 
pick out key similarities and to reason from them to the justice o f applying a 
common classification.''^ 
Until it is established what similarities and difference are relevant and until it is 
established why it is justified to focus on and stress particular similarities and differences, 
the imperative 'Treat like case alike' must remain an empty form.^^ 
The relevance o f particular similarities and differences is estabHshed through argument. 
Consequently, analogies need to be justified. MacCormick goes so far as to say that it is 
doubtful whether it is possible to understand case law without an adequate theory of 
justification.5' In this light the narrow focus of jurisprudential accounts of legal 
analogical reasoning can be appreciated. Drawing upon Wasserstrom's distinction, jurists 
are almost exclusively concerned with exploring the 'rational fo rce ' " of analogies in law. 
For example Brewer discusses why judges should be interpreted as structuring analogies 
with deductive 'analogy warranting rules'. According to Brewer this is necessary to 
satisfy liberal 'rule o f law' ideals which in turn explains why analogies are justified. 
According to Golding, analogies should be analysed as involving five steps which 
together clarify why analogies are justified.5" MacCormick regards analogical reasoning 
as a form of reasoning with principles and analyses analogical reasoning in terms of how 
reasoning with legal principles can be justif ied.Jurisprudential accounts of legal 
analogical reasoning focus on the 
''8 Hart H.L.A., The Concept of Law (1961) Oxford University Press, 155. 
''^  Levi, above n 18, 3. 
50 Hart, above n 48, 155. 
5' MacCormick Neil, 'Why Cases have Rationes and what these are' p. 155, in (Goldstein Laurence) (Ed) 
Precedent in Law (1987) Clarendon Press. 
52 Brewer, above n 13, 928. 
53 Ibid 992. 
5'' Golding 'Legal Reasoning', above n 13, ch 3. 
55 MacCormick 'Legal Reasoning', above n 17, ch VII. 
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'formal ' reasons adjudicators offer for deciding a case on way rather than 
another. 56 
However, while a theory of justification may be necessary to understand case law, it is 
not itself sufficient. While the importance of justification is evident, this should not imply 
that processes o f creation are unimportant. Indeed, as argued in the following chapter, 
understanding the processes by which analogies are created is itself essential to 
understanding the processes by which analogies are justified. 
While legal theory clearly establishes the importance of justifying analogies, legal theory 
is less clear as to what justification consists o f At the most abstract level an analogy can 
be justified by saying that it is the result o f the formal principle o f justice that requires 
'treating like cases aHke'.5'' This however, avoids this issue as it provides no guidance in 
concrete cases as to when cases will be regarded as relevantly similar.5^ What is needed 
is theory that indicates when we regard it as justifiable to regard individual cases and 
aspects o f a case as similar. 
A theme commonly emphasised by jurists is the need for coherence within the legal 
system.59 Accordingly, justification is an attempt to view the law as a 
consistent and coherent body of norms who's observance secures certain 
valued goals which can intelligently be pursued all together.''^ 
Within this framework, a justification must fit coherently within the existing legal system 
and correspondingly, a justification can be regarded as the explanation of a decision that 
fits most coherently within the existing legal system. 
Theorists differ however, on the precise criteria that are appHed when constructing 
coherent arguments. According to MacCormick, analogies 'only make sense i f there are 
reasons o f principle underlying them'.^i Consequently arguments by analogy are 
56 Lucy William N.R., 'Criticizing and constructing accounts of legal reasoning' (1994) 14 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 303, 305. 
5"^  Cross, above n 16. 
58 Hart, above n 48, 155. 
59 E.g. MacCormick 'Legal Reasoning', above n 17; Dworkin, above n 46; Burton, above n 46; 
Kennedy, above n 34. As discussed below, jurists differ however, on what is involved in tliis 
requirement. 
6*^  MacCormick 'Legal Reasoning', above n 17, 106, ch VII. 
61 Ibid 186. 
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essentially arguments about principles.'52 Whether it is justifiable to draw a particular 
analogy in a particular set o f circumstances, or more fundamentally, whether the 
principle underlying the analogy applies in a particular set of circumstances is determined 
by consequentialist arguments.^^ 
Cross provides a similar description. According to Cross, whether situations are similar 
or different is a matter o f the 'desirability'*''' of so regarding them, 
everything wil l depend on whether the judge considers that the rule by which 
the previous case was decided is one that should be extended or restricted.^5 
However, Cross does not specify when so regarding situations will be desirable. Stone is 
more specific on this point arguing 
this necessarily involves advertence to factors o f justice and social policy ...^^ 
Similarly, Hart states that we are guided by many complex factors including the aims and 
purposes o f the legal system,^'' moral principles'^ and common sense.'^ 
In a controversial theory, Dworkin argues that when reaching a decision, one has to 
consider the principles that underlie the law.™ The decision that coheres best with all 
existing legal knowledge is the justified decision.'^' In this respect Dworkin's theory of 
law and legal reasoning is much like many others. An interesting aspect of Dworkin's 
jurisprudence is that he regards there as being only one right answer to legal disputes, 
one answer that is most justified.''2 w h i l s t jurists emphasise the importance o f principles, 
the claim that such principles determine unique solufions is controversial.''^ 
62 Ibid 161. 
63 Ibid 192. Briefly, a consequentialist argument is an evaluative form of argument in wliich the 
consequences of making a ruling one way or another are considered important: ibid 105. 
64 Cross, above n 16, 25. Citing Cohen. 
65 Ibid 187. 
66 Stone Juhus, Legal System and Lawyer's Reasonings (1964) Stevens & Sons Limited, 316. 
6"^  Hart, above n 48, 124. 
68 Ibid 200. 
69 Ibid 122. 
0^ Dworkin, above n 46, 26. 
Ibid 116-7. 
'2 Dworkin, above n 46. 
^3 Contra Dworking, above n 46. C.f Sartorius Rolf, 'The Justification of the Judicial Decision' p. 127, in 
(Aarnio Aulis and MacConnick D.Neil) (Eds) Legal Reasoning (1992) New York University Press who 
argues that there may not always be a right decision but since there is no way to tell whether there is a 
right decision in a particular case, judges should act as if the case before them has a right decision. 
However, it is unclear why a judge should act as if there is a right decision in the situation where it is 
felt that the law does not bind. In contrast, Lyons David, 'Justification and Judicial Responsibility' p. 145, 
in (Aarnio Aulis and MacCormick D. Neil) (Eds) Legal Reasoning (1992) New York University Press, 
simply says that if there are right moral answers then there may be right legal answers also. 
How tightly the requirement o f coherence binds is a point of important divergence 
amongst jurists. In contrast to Dworkin's 'right answer' thesis, according to Kennedy, 
when you try to make a case come out as you would like you feel the laws influence as a 
restriction on the arguments you can make and the results you can achieve. On this view 
the law restricts what is possible. However, Kennedy leaves unanswered whether the law 
ever prevents a decision based solely on to how you want a case to come out.''4 
More expHcit than Kennedy are other jurists within the critical legal studies movement 
some o f whom argue that law does not bind at all; that it is so indeterminate that it 
allows any decision to have the appearance of coherence.''5 gygn on radical critical 
examinations o f law however, justification is regarded as important and involves an 
attempt to refer to law in an attempt to adopt the authoritative cloak o f the law in order 
to better persuade. Persuasion is achieved through constructing a coherent framework of 
laws, principles and perhaps other standards, in which to fit the result that is reached. 
Whether law does or does not allow any decision to be reached and to nevertheless have 
the appearance o f legal justification is a interesting jurisprudential quesfion, but it is not 
one that wi l l be explored flirther. I t is peripheral to the present examination. However, 
the question is informative for another reason. As Dworkin acknowledges it is only the 
hypothetical Hercules who can find the decision that coheres best with existing legal 
knowledge."^6 poj- fallible humans, the search for coherence stops short o f the decision 
that coheres best with all existing legal knowledge. However, why do we then feel 
something to be justified despite not being able to show that it is coherent with all 
existing legal knowledge? I f we do not have any 'rational' reason, in the sense of a 
reason that fully coheres with the law, we are left with scope for choice. Not being able 
to demonstrate which justification and thus which result coheres best, we must choose 
between possible multiple justifications each o f which coheres with parts of legal 
knowledge. 
^4 Kennedy, above n 34, 548. 
^5 See the authorities cited in Burton, above, n 46, 10 fooUiote 21. 
"^ 6 Dworkin, above n 46, 129-30. 
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Because they do not operate unconstrained and because the values the influence these 
choice are informed by more widely held community values it may be undesirable to call 
these choices 'personal'.'''^ Nevertheless, a choice is exercised and theories of legal 
justification do not explain why one choice is made rather than another. In this sense, 
theories o f legal justification do not fully explain how justifications are reached. Theories 
of legal justification indicate what criteria are applied when constructing a justification. 
However, theories o f justification do not explain how or why particular choices are 
exercised when choosing amongst several possible results and justifications. 
The analogies we create and apply in law are influenced by the overall purposes that we 
perceive the legal system as trying to achieve, these assessments occur in a whole body 
of knowledge and theory that we use to make sense of the world.'^^ When deciding 
between competing classifications our evaluation inherently involves considerations of 
the consequences o f each classification on our model o f the world and in this way the 
existence and application o f analogies is individually determined. However, it does not 
occur unconstrained: in law the analogies we create are restricted by the necessity that 
they be justifiable and by the requirement that such justification cohere with the law.''^ 
3.4 Conclusion 
From the above examination, jurisprudential accounts of legal analogical reasoning can 
be seen to have several shortcomings. Fundamentally, these accounts they do not provide 
a comprehensive theory o f legal analogical reasoning. The reason for this stems from the 
widespread acceptance o f the distinction drawn by Wasserstrom between processes of 
creation and processes o f justification. Jurists argue that i f it is possible to explain why 
analogies are justified then it is unimportant to investigate the processes by which 
analogies are created. Consequently legal theory focuses on theories of justification. 
However, theories o f justification do not fully explain how decisions are justified. 
Justification rest on an element o f choice. Theories of justification do not explain why 
particular choices are exercised. For this reason, legal theory does not fully explain the 
processes o f justification. Moreover, as discussed in the following chapter, in its 
Bell John, 'The Acceptability of Legal Arguments' p,45, in (MacCormick Neil and Birks Peter) (Eds) 
The Legal Mind: Essays for Tony Honore (1986) Clarendon Press. 
MacCormick 'Legal Reasoning', above n 17, 103. 
'^ ^ Alexy Robert, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (1989) Clarendon Press, 212. 
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application to legal analogical reasoning the distinction between processes of creation 
and processes o f justification is not absolute. In legal analogical reasoning process of 
creation and processes o f justification interact. This interaction further undermines the 
validity o f ignoring processes o f creation in legal analogising. 
To create a computer program that simulates legal analogising it is necessary for that 
program to create analogies and to justify those analogies. Legal theory indicates why 
justifying analogies is important and indicates what the substance of justification 
involves. However, legal theory does not explain the processes by which legal analogies 
are created and does not fully explain the processes by which legal analogies are justified. 
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4 Re-examining the distinction between processes of creation and 
processes of justification 
In the previous chapter, theories o f legal analogical reasoning were examined. This 
examination highlighted a key distinction in theories of legal reasoning. When examining 
legal reasoning, legal theorists distinguish between processes o f creation and between 
processes of justification. Legal theory focuses on examining how legal results, and legal 
analogies are justified. The processes by which legal analogies are created is regarded as 
unimportant. 
However, it is argued in this chapter that the distinction between processes of creation 
and between processes o f justification is not an absolute one. In legal analogising 
processes o f creation influence processes o f jusfification and processes of justificafion 
influence processes o f creation. That processes o f creation interact with processes of 
justificafion in legal analogising highlights that theories of legal analogical reasoning are 
incomplete. This interacfion has implications for attempts to create computer systems 
that simulate legal analogical reasoning. The implications o f this interaction for attempts 
to simulate legal analogising and for theories of legal analogical reasoning is discussed in 
subsequent chapters. 
4.1 The privileging of theories of justification 
The distinction championed by Wasserstrom between processes of creation and between 
process o f justificafion in legal reasoning suggests legal analogical reasoning occurs, on a 





Figure 1: The linear conception o f legal reasoning 
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Theories o f legal analogical reasoning are wholly concerned with examining the formal 
reasons offered to support legal analogies. In a context in which the distinction between 
processes o f creation and processes of justification is accepted, it is understandable that 
the logical structure o f legal analogies, as reconstructed from judicial decisions, is all that 
is investigated. However, as will become apparent, the interaction between processes of 
creation and processes o f justification undermines the exclusive attention paid to 
examinations o f processes of justification. 
While Levi's conception o f legal reasoning can be criticised for failing to indicate what 
the finding o f similarity involves, an apparently more precise definition of analogy can be 
provided as per Golding (figure 2). 
i . x has characteristics F, G... 
i i . y has characteristics F, G... 
i i i . x also has characteristic H. 
iv. F, G... are H-relevant characteristics. 
v.Therefore, unless there are 
countervailing considerations, 
y has characteristic H. 80 
Figure 2: A reconception o f legal analogical reasoning 
Whilst Levi's account o f legal reasoning left unclear what will be regarded as similar for 
the purposes o f a legal analogy, Golding's account specifies, through premise (iv), what 
characteristics are relevant to establishing similarities. Golding's account thus specifies 
what characteristics are to be compared for the purpose o f creating analogies. Knowing 
what characteristics are relevant for the purposes of creating an analogy it is hence 
possible to determine when an analogy is justifiable. An analogy between precedents or 
between a precedent and a problem is justifiable i f the precedent and the problem share 
relevant characteristics. However, a number of questions remain with Golding's account. 
For instance, how is it known that x has characteristics F and G? How is it known that y 
has characteristics F and G? How is it known that x has characteristic H? How is it 
known that characteristic H is important? How is it known that characteristics F and G 
are relevant to H? How is it known whether there are countervailing considerafions? 
0^ Golding, above n 13, 107. Based on Golding's work Brewer has provided a similar conception, 
Brewer, above n 13, 966. Brewer's conception of analogy differs however in that it places even more 
weight on the deductive aspects of analogy: Brewer, above n 13, footnote 135. 
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Golding does not discuss how particular characteristics are perceived in particular 
circumstances. Golding does not discuss how 'x ' and 'y ' are perceived to have 
characteristics 'F ' , ' G ' and ' H ' . However, in specifying what characteristics are 
'relevant' premise (iv) determines what characteristics are searched for in problems and 
precedents. Premise (iv) thus provides an important pointer to the way in which legal 
analogies are created. 
According to Golding premise (iv) rests in a fundamental way on underlying 
considerations o f principle.^i I f premise (iv) rests on considerations o f principle then it is 
these considerations o f principle which ultimately determine which characteristics are 
relevant and thus focused on when assessing precedents and problems. This view that 
legal principles play an indispensable role in legal analogising is strongly advocated by 
other jurists. For example, MacCormick argues that 
no clear line o f distinction can be drawn between argument from legal principle and 
argument from analogy. Analogies only make sense i f there are reasons of principle 
underlying them.'82 
4.2 The interaction between processes of creation and processes of 
justification. 
However, i f analogies ultimately rest on considerations o f principle this has impHcations 
for the analogies we construct. Returning to Golding's scheme for analogy, with a 
different governing principle, a different characteristic H ' , may be regarded as relevant in 
precedent x. Thus, different characteristics, F' and G', in precedent x would be relevant 
to establishing H ' . Consequently different characteristics would also be relevant in 
problem y (figure 3). 
81 Ibid. More precisely, Golding states that premise (iv) will rest on considerations of principle or policy. 
A distinction between policy and principle is not important for present purposes - even if such a 
distinction is sustainable c.f Dworkin, above n 46, 22-3 and MacCormick 'Legal Reasoning', above n 
17, ch 10. For the sake of simplicity these two together are referred to under the tenn 'principle'. What is 
emphasised is that premise (iv) will rest in a more fundamental way on an evaluative standard. 
82 MacCormick 'Legal Reasoning', above n 17, 186. 
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Principle A Principle B 
i.x has characteristics F, G... i.x has characteristics F', G'... 
ii.y has characteristics F, G... ii.y has characteristics F', G'... 
iii.x also has characteristic H. iii.x also has characteristic H. 
iv.F, G... are H-relevant characteristics. iv.F', G ... areH'-relevant characteristics. 
v.Therefore, unless there are v.Therefore, unless there are 
countervailing considerations. countervailing considerations. 
y has characteristic H y has characteristic H. 
Figure 3: Competing analogies 
That the adherence to different principles can result in the creation of different analogies 
has impHcations for the processes by which analogies are created. Uhimately these 
principles determine the way in which situations are perceived and hence the analogies 
that are created. Golding leaves unclear what is meant by a 'characteristic'. It is unclear 
whether a 'characteristic' is something abstract or is a factual characteristic. In both 
situations though, principles determine the way situations are perceived. I f a 
characteristic is regarded as something abstract, such as whether 'reasonable care' was 
exercised, the presence or absence of this characteristic has to be established by specific 
facts. However the influence o f a different principle, requiring different abstract 
characteristics to be established, will in turn require different facts to establish these 
abstract characteristics. Hence principles influence which facts are perceived as important 
and unimportant. Alternatively, i f characteristics are regarded at the factual level, 
principles again influence what facts are regarded as relevant. Governed by Principle A, 
facts F and G are required. Governed by principle B however, facts F' and G' are 
required. Ultimately, the principle that governs the analogy determines what facts are 
relevant to establishing the analogy. 
That principles influence the construction of analogies is supported by research on 
analogical reasoning from areas outside law. This research highlights that our goals 
intimately affect the analogies that we create.^3 Anecdotal evidence for the influence of 
principles on the construction o f analogies is also provided by reports from judges and 
83 See chapter 5 and the discussion of analogy therein. 
25 
jurists who note the phenomena that a decision 'Just won't write.'84 A decision won't 
write because it is not feh justifiable. This forces a re-examinafion o f the problem, it 
prompts the creation o f a new, tentative solufion. The need for justification affects the 
solutions that are created and proposed. 
Principles influence which facts are required to establish an analogy. Stated alternately, 
with a particular set o f facts, which precedents are regarded as analogous is influenced 
by the principles that the reasoner adheres to. The focus when constructing legal 
analogies, from the generahsation we say governs the analogy, to the characteristics used 
to demonstrate that the generalisation applies, to the particular facts of cases which 
demonstrate the presence of those characteristics, are all dependent on the principles to 
which the reasoner adheres. I f different principles are adhered to then a different 
generalisation may be regarded as relevant between two precedents, different 
characteristics may be regarded as relevant to establishing that generalisation and 
different facts may be sought to demonstrate the presence of these characteristics. 
That the principles which a reasoner adheres to influences the analogies that the reasoner 
constructs undermines the linearity o f legal reasoning suggested by the distinction 
between processes o f creation and processes of justification. The justification of legal 
propositions ultimately rests on considerations of legal principle.85 Legal principles 
underlie the justifications for legal propositions. However, as demonstrated above 
principles influence the construction o f legal analogies. This indicates a link between the 
processes o f justification and the processes o f creation. The analogies that are created 
are influenced by the principles adhered to and which underlie the justificafion that will 
be offered for the analogy. 
In legal analogical reasoning, just as processes of justification influence processes of 
creation, processes o f creation influence processes of justification. While a scheme for 
analogy such as Golding's can be used to demonstrate that principles influence the 
creation o f analogies, such a scheme obscures an important aspect of this process. 
Principles do not exist pre-packaged to be applied in the determination of problems. 
84 E.g.: Wald Patricia M., 'The Rlietoric of Results and the Results of Rlietoric: Judicial Writings' (1995) 
62 University of Chicago Law Review 1371, 1375. 
85 See discussion, above ch 3. 
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Intertwined with the influence of principles on legal analogical reasoning is the role that 
analogising plays in determining the scope of principles themselves. As Sunstein states, 
although analogical reasoning depends on principles, analogical reasoning 
is an important part of the development of those principles. ...We cannot 
know what it is that we think until we explore a range of cases. Principles are 
thus both generated and tested through confrontation with particular cases. 
The application of principles itself results in change to those principles. This is a subject 
explored in depth by jurists.^'' 
Thus, while for the purposes of reconstruction it can be said that 
Principle A supports the inference that F, G ... are H-relevant characteristics; or 
Principle B supports the inference that F', G' ... are H'-relevant characteristics 
this leaves unanswered from where principles A and B arise. It is argued that the 
principles which underlie analogies, and which can be referred to as supporting an 
analogy in its reconstruction, are the result of the interaction of and compromise between 
other principles. The application of principles during legal analogising changes the 
conception of those principles. 
That the scope of principles is refined and demarcated in their appHcation in concrete 
situations demonstrates a link between processes of creation and processes of 
justification in legal analogical reasoning. The justification of legal propositions depends 
in part on the principles that a reasoner adheres to. However, the scope of these 
principles is dependent on their application during the construction of analogies. Hence 
Sunstein 'On Analogical Reasoning', above n 12, 775. Levi noted this early on stating Uiat tlie 'rules 
change as the rules are applied': Levi, above n 18, 3-4. 
E.g.: Brewer, above n 13; Golding 'Legal Reasoning', above n 13; Sunstein 'On Analogical 
Reasoning', above n 12; MacCormick 'Legal Reasoning', above n 17; Levi, above n 18. To the extent 
that theorists accept that tlie application of principles in individual cases influences the scope of those 
principles it is ironic that they nevertlieless accept tlie distinction between processes of creation and 
process of justification. As argued in chapter 8, the interaction between processes of creation and 
processes of justification undermines the exclusive focus on process of justification. 
In this context it is interesting to consider the relationship between analogical reasoning and 
reasoning by 'reflective equilibrium'. Brewer argues that reflective equilibrium, the 
process of reflective adjustment between specific examples ... and general normative principles is a 
common and vitally important instance of example-based reasoning. 
Brewer, above n 13, 938-9, citations omitted. In contrast, Sunstein concludes that while analogical 
reasoning and tlie search of reflective equilibrium have much in coimnon they are also sufficiently 
different as to be irreducible to one another: Sunstein 'On Analogical Reasoning', above n 12, 781-3. It 
is not the purpose of this discussion to explore this issue in depUi, however die debate emphasises the 
important role that the application of principles in concrete situations plays in modifying tiiose 
principles. 
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the way that analogies are perceived influences the justifications that are offered for 
those analogies. 
4.3 Demonstrating the interaction between processes of creation and 
process of justification. 
The interaction between the processes of creation and the processes of justification that 
occurs in legal analogical reasoning is demonstrated with reference to Donoghue v 
Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562. This case has been chosen simply because it provides a 
particularly clear demonstration of the influence of principles on legal analogical 
reasoning. 
In Donoghue v Stevenson 
the appellant drank a bottle of ginger-beer, manufactured by the respondent, which a 
friend had bought from a retailer and given to her. The bottle contained the 
decomposed remains of a snail which were not, and could not be, detected until the 
greater part of the contents of the bottle had been consumed. As a result she 
alleged, and at this stage her allegation must be accepted as true, that she suffered 
from shock and sever gastro-enteritis.^^ 
At the time the case was decided, it was unclear whether an injured party could claim 
against the manufacturer of a product causing injury in the absence of any contractual 
relationship between them. Their lordships in Donoghm v Stevenson referred to 
numerous cases, these cases having differing results. Commenting on the law, Lord 
Salmon has noted 
[hjere is an age long conflict of theories which is to be found in every system 
of law. "A man acts at his peril" says one theory "A man is not liable unless 
he is to blame" answers the other. It will not surprise ... to find that between 
these theories a middle way, a compromise has been found.^° 
The influence of these two principles can be seen on the opposing judgements of Lord 
Buckmaster and Lord Aitkin. 
«9 [1932] A.C. 562, 566. 
90 Read V J Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] A.C. 156, 180. 
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Lord Buckmaster dissented in the case and would have denied the appeal. According to 
Lord Buckmaster, the general principle governing such cases was that the 
breach of the defendant's contract with A. to use care and skill in and about the 
manufacture or repair of an article does not itself give any cause of action to B. 
when he is injured by reason of the article proving to be defective.^' 
Two exceptions were contemplated 
( l ) In the case of an article dangerous in itself; and (2)where the article not in itself 
dangerous is in fact dangerous by reason of some defect or for any other reason.^ ^ 
According to Lord Buckmaster no one could 'suggest that ginger-beer was an article 
dangerous in itself'^^ Further, the second exception rested on the 'obligation to warn', 
the concealment of which is in the 'nature of f r aud ' .Lord Buckmaster considered there 
to be no indication of fraud in the present case. 
Thus, regarding the general situation as governed by contract and admitting only strict 
exceptions, Lord Buckmaster refused the appeal. The facts could not be analogised to 
any of the precedents cited by counsel in argument because the bottle of ginger-beer was 
not regarded as an inherently dangerous item and nor was there any evidence on which 
to estabUsh fraud. 
In contrast, the majority opinion of Lord Aitkin rested on the much wider statement that 
you 
must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure you neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? 
The answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act 
that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being affected when I am 
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. 
With this conception, the examination undertaken by Lord Aitkin focused on different 
characteristics than did the examination of Lord Buckmaster. Lord Aitkin focused on 
9' Donoghue v Stevenson, 569. Quoting Lord Summer in Blacker v Lake & Elliot Ltd 106 L.T. 533, 
536. 
92 Ibid, 569, 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid, 580. 
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things such as whether the product was 'used immediately' and whether there was a 
'reasonable opportunity of inspection' - whether there was a 'proximate relationship'.^^ 
It is readily apparent that this is a search for a different type of characteristic, which will 
require different facts to prove or disprove, than is the search for a product that is 
'inherently dangerous' or for 'fi-aud'. With the examination focused in this way. Lord 
Aitkin regarded the case as analogous to several precedents and found for the appellant. 
Clearly, the different conceptions of the principles thought by their Lordships to govern 
the problem resulted in the construction of different analogies with different precedents. 
Lord Buckmaster's view that principles of contract governed resulted in a series of 
analogies to cases involving 'inherently dangerous' items or involving fi-aud. Lord 
Aitkin's view that 'sufficient attention' must be given 'to the general principle which 
governs the whole law of negligence'^'' resulted in the problem being regarded as 
analogous to several precedents favouring the plaintiff The principles that their lordships 
adhered to determined how they perceived the problem. These principles determined 
what precedents were relevant, what characteristics were relevant in those precedents 
and the problem and what facts were relevant to establishing those characteristics in the 
precedents and the problem. 
As the judgements in Donoghue v Stevenson demonstrate, the analogies drawn between 
cases, and ultimately the interpretations of the facts upon which those analogies rest 
depend on the legal principles to which the reasoner adheres. As Justice Wald has stated 
the facts can - and indeed must - be retold to cast a party as an innocent victim or an 
undeserving malefactor, to tow the story line into the safe harbour of whatever 
principle of law the author thinks should control the case.^ ^ 
However, the principles which Lord Buckmaster and Lord Aitkin applied did not exist a 
priori to be applied in the analogies their Lordships proposed. Analogical reasoning is an 
important way in which the scope of principles is refined and demarcated. Donoghiie v 
Stevenson also illustrates how principles interact and are compromised during legal 
analogical reasoning. 
96 Ibid, 582. 
97 Ibid, 594. 
98 Wald, above n 84, 1386. 
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As Lord Salmon has noted, this area of law demonstrates a conflict between the two 
principle that "A man acts at his peril" and "A man is not liable unless he is to blame."99 
The opposing judgements of Lord Buckmaster and Lord Aitkin each express a different 
compromise between these principles. Neither judgement applied either principle in fijll. 
Lord Buckmaster's requirement that a contract is generally necessary to found liability 
can be regarded as strongly influenced by the principle that 'a man is not liable unless he 
is to blame'. However, the acknowledgement of exceptions in cases involving 'inherently 
dangerous' objects or fraud is a small concession to the principle that 'a man acts at his 
peril.'loo in contrast, Lord Aitkin reached a different compromise between these 
principles - this compromise itself having come to be called the 'neighbour principle'. 
Lord Aitkin placed more influence on the principle that 'a man acts at his own peril.' 
However, Lord Aitkin did not fully apply this principle and the neighbour principle is a 
succinct expression of the balance to be drawn between the principle that 'a man acts at 
his peril' and the principle that 'a man is not liable unless he is to blame.' Thus each 
judge was influenced by both principles though neither applied either principle in totality. 
It was the dynamic interaction between and influence of these principles that resulted in 
two different conceptions of principle which ultimately founded the different analogies 
that were argued in Donoghue v Stevenson. The case thus succinctly illustrates the way 
that processes of creation interact with processes of justification in legal analogical 
reasoning. 
Legal principles both underlie legal justifications and influence the creation of analogies. 
Adhering to different principle, or with a different conception of principles, different 
analogies may be created. Hence aspects of the processes of justification influence 
processes of creation in legal analogical reasoning. However, the legal principles that an 
reasoner adheres to are themselves ahered during the creation of legal analogies. A 
reasoner's conception of principles is influenced by the application of those principles. 
Legal principles are refined and compromised as they are applied. Since justifications 
depend on legal principles, with a different conception of those principles, different 
99 Read v J. Lyons & Co Ltd, 180. 
'"0 It could be argued that all Lord Buckmaster was actually doing was re-affinning a line of old cases, 
he was not thinking about principles at all. Apart from the question of why Lord Buckmaster focused on 
the particular cases that he did, even if tliis is accepted, it is argued that this line of old cases expresses 
the compromise between principles discussed above. 
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justifications may be required. Hence, aspects of the processes of creation of legal 
analogies influence aspects of the processes of justification of those analogies. 
4.4 Reconceptualising legal analogical reasoning 
The distinction between processes of creation and processes of justification suggests that 
these processes occur separately in legal analogising. However, it has been informally 
shown that in legal analogical reasoning processes of creation affect processes of 
justification and that processes of justification affect processes of creation. 
The interaction between the processes by which analogies are created and the processes 
by which analogies are justified undermines the linearity of legal reasoning that is implied 
by the distinction between these processes. Given the mutual interaction and influence 
between processes of creation and processes of justification in legal analogical reasoning, 
the distinction between process of creation and processes of justification, and the 
linearity of reasoning that it implies, require modification in their application to legal 
analogical reasoning. A modified conception of legal analogical reasoning should 
acknowledge the interaction between the processes of creation and the processes of 





Figure 4: The interaction of creation and justification 
Such a revised conception of legal analogical reasoning has several consequences for 
theories of legal analogising. Foremost, such a revised conception undermines the 
validity of legal theory's exclusive focus on justification in legal analogising. Once the 
influence of processes of creation on processes of justification is acknowledged it 
becomes impossible to study comprehensively justification without also investigating 
processes of creation. This is a topic that is discussed in more depth in chapter 8. While 
such a conception of legal analogical reasoning indicates that reasoning is more complex 
than suggested by Wasserstrom, it does not undermine the argument that justification is 
extremely important in law. Such a conception of legal analogising does however, place 
more importance on understanding the processes of creation themselves. A more 
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complex conception of the processes of legal reasoning is required - one which 
acknowledges and explains this interaction. 
Having argued for a view of legal analogical reasoning in which analogising is dependent 
on legal principles, it must be briefly emphasised what is not being argued. It is not 
argued that any plausible analogy can be created between a problem and any chosen 
precedent. Nor that the adherence to different principles will necessarily lead to the 
creation of different analogies. Nor that people always fundamentally disagree about 
analogies that are created in particular legal situations. For many reasons there is 
agreement within the legal system and there are constraints on what people do. To again 
quote Justice Wald, 
I do not mean to suggest there are not real constraints in the process itself judges 
cannot run roughshod over the factual findings of lower bodies or the relevant law. 
Their discretion in deciding the outcome in the first place is constrained by the 
degree to which they can (reasonably) mold the facts and the law to tell a coherent 
story. 
It is argued that within constraints the construction of different analogies in law is in part 
driven by the principles that the reasoner adheres to. 
Further, it is not argued that legal analogical reasoning always involves an interaction 
between processes of creation and processes of justification. In this context 
psychological research is informative. According to Gentner, when discussing analogy it 
is necessary to distinguish between different types of similarity.'02 Gentner argues that 
there is a difference between 'mere appearance matches' and 'true analogies.''"^ In mere 
appearance matches the finding of similarity is constituted solely by correspondences 
between attributes of objects.Gentner argues however, that the similarity in true 
analogies is based on more abstract relationships.The use of the term 'analogy' in 
'0 ' WaJd, above n 84, 1388. 
Gentner Dedre, The mechanisms of analogical learning' p. 199, in (Ortony A. and Vosniadou S.) 
(Eds) Similarity and Analogical Reasoning (1989) Cambridge University Press, 206-8. This is a point 
also made by Rumelhart: Rumelhart David E . , Toward a microstructural account of human reasoning' 
p.298, in (Ortony A. and Vosniadou S.) (Eds) Similarity and Analogical Reasoning (1989) Cambridge 
University Press hereafter 'Toward a microstructural account', 301. 
103 Centner, above n 102. 
'04 For example, in the statement 'The glass tabletop gleamed like water' Gentner argues tliat the 
similarity depends on the facts that botli tlie glass tabeltop and tlie water are shiny, 'little beyond 
physical similarity is shared between the tabletop and water': ibid 207. 
'05 In such similarities a 'common relational system holds for the two domains': ibid. 
33 
legal theory is certainly not used in the restricted sense argued for by Gentner. However, 
Gentner's discussion does highlight a useful aspect of the finding of similarity which 
underlies analogising. The finding of similarity ranges from the less evaluative to the 
more creative and abstract. Some legal analogies may rest on comparatively 
straightforward assessments of similarity. The similarities between two precedents both 
involving drivers stopped for driving erratically and then arrested for driving with a blood 
alcohol content above the legal limit is comparatively straightforward. The similarity 
between the injury caused by the decomposing snail in Donoghue v Stevenson and the 
injury caused by the defectively manufactured underpants in Grant v Australian Knitting 
Mills is less obvious and involves the perception of more abstract relationships. It is 
argued that it is in the perception of such abstract relationships that the interaction 
between processes of creation and between processes of justification is most apparent. It 
may thus be that the interaction between processes of creation and process of 
justification is more apparent at the appellate level than at trial level. This interaction may 
be more apparent in certain areas of law than in others. This interaction may also be 
more evident during particular stages of development in the law than at others. However, 
any complete theory of legal analogical reasoning must account for the mutual 
interaction between processes of creation and processes of justification that can occur in 
legal analogical reasoning. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Legal theoretical accounts of legal analogising are based on a distinction between 
processes of creation and justification. These accounts focus solely on processes of 
justification. However, in legal analogising the distinction between processes of creation 
and processes of justification is not absolute. As is discussed in chapter 8, this 
undermines the exclusive focus on processes of justification in theories of legal 
analogising. The interaction between processes of creation and processes of justificafion 
also has implications for attempts to simulate legal analogising. These implications are 
explored in chapter 6 and chapter 7 which review and critique attempts to simulate legal 
analogising. Before examining these impHcations however, general approaches to 
simulating analogical reasoning developed in the field of artificial intelligence are 
examined. 
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5 Artificial intelligence and analogical reasoning 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapters 3 and 4, theories of legal reasoning were examined in order to understand the 
processes involved in legal analogical reasoning. In this chapter, approaches to 
simulating analogical reasoning developed in artificial intelligence are examined. This 
examination discusses the three major approaches by which analogical reasoning is 
simulated in artificial intelligence: case-base reasoning, computational analogy and neural 
networks. It is argued that current approaches developed in artificial intelligence only 
provide a very shallow simulation of human analogical reasoning. Current approaches to 
simulating analogical reasoning are subject to several shortcomings that prevent them 
from simulating anything beyond straightforward matching Simulations of analogical 
reasoning are severely restricted by their inability to determine similarities between 
situations. To date, research on simulating analogical reasoning has not fully addressed 
the implications of the 'semantic flexibility' that is characteristic of analogical reasoning. 
It is argued that this semantic flexibility underlies current restrictions on simulations of 
analogising. 
The approaches discussed here to simulating analogical reasoning underlie approaches to 
simulating legal analogical reasoning that are examined in the next chapter. Hence 
simulations of legal analogising are subject to the same limitations as are the approaches 
to simulating analogising examined here. In order to better understand the limitations in 
simulations of legal analogising, and hence how these limitations might be addressed, it is 
necessary to closely examine these general approaches to simulating analogical 
reasoning. After briefly discussing the role of analogy in artificial intelligence, case-based 
reasoning, computational analogy and neural networks are examined in turn. 
5.2 Simulating analogising 
Before examining approaches to simulating analogical reasoning, a clarification in 
terminology is worthwhile. In the artificial intelligence literature there is confiasion 
between the terms 'case-based reasoning' and 'analogical reasoning'.'06 One distinction 
'06 Aamodt Agnar and Plaza Enric, 'Case-Based Reasoning: Foundational Issues, Methodological 
Variations, and System Approaches' (1994) 7 Artificial Intelligence Communications 39, 43-4. Indeed a 
moratorium on tlie use of the term analogy has been proposed: Dejong Gerald, 'Comments on Part II: 
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that is often made between these terms is that 'case-based reasoning' involves reasoning 
with experiences that are confined to a single domain, whereas 'analogical reasoning' 
refers to reasoning involving experiences drawn from different domains.However, this 
does not seem a solid distinction. According to Riesbeck and Schank, two leading 
researchers in artificial intelligence, the essence of case-based reasoning is simply 
reasoning from experience and remindings of all types including 'across contextually 
bounded structures' are covered by the term case-based reasoning.'*^8 Numerous 
researchers however, confine the term 'case-based reasoning' to reasoning from 
experiences confined to the same domain and in contrast utilise the term 'analogy' for 
reasoning involving experiences that come from distinct domains. 
Defining analogy according to whether the experiences reasoned with are from the same 
domain can be problematic. It is to some degree arbitrary to distinguish where one 
domain begins and another ends. For example, does noting a similarity between the play 
'Romeo and Juliet' and the play 'West Side Story' involve reasoning with cross-domain 
knowledge? In one sense not, after all both works are plays and are thus in the same 
domain. However, in another sense the plays are in quite different domains. One is a 
love-story set in medieval Venice performed without music, while the other is a musical 
set in modern New York. Rather than getting overly tangled in this terminology, the 
pragmatic approach suggested by Aamodt and Plaza is helpful. Aamodt and Plaza 
suggest that work on analogy in artificial intelligence has focused on the particular 
problem of determining under what criteria cases can be regarded as similar.'"' Research 
in case-based reasoning, while of necessity examining what similarity between cases 
involves, also examines wider issues. 
Adopting this distinction, the terms 'case-based reasoning' and 'analogical reasoning' are 
used in this discussion simply to identify research that itself identifies itself as belonging 
to one of these research traditions. 
The role of explanation in analogy; or, The curse of an alluring name' p.346, in (Ortony A. and 
Vosniadou S.) (Eds) Similarity and Analogical Reasoning (1989) Cambridge University Press. 
1"'^  Aamodt and Plaza, above n 106, 43-4. 
Riesbeck and Schank, above n H I , 19. 
'"9 Aamodt and Plaza, above n 106, 40. In this context Aamodt and Plaza confusingly refer to case-
based reasoning as a form of 'intra-domain analogy', ibid 40. Holyoak and Thagard too have claimed 
that CBR is a form of intra-domain analogy, Holyoak Keith J. and Thagard Paul, 'Analogical Mapping 
by Constraint Satisfaction' (1989) 13 Cognitive Science 295, 318. 
'^ '^  Aamodt and Plaza, above n 106, 44. 
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A widespread approach to simulating inteUigence that is adopted in artificial intelligence 
is fundamentally based on the premise 'that the knowledge of an expert can be embodied 
in a set of rules,'"' Numerous systems have been created on this premise, including 
systems in law,"^ Jhe accuracy of this premise however, is increasingly questioned. The 
view that human knowledge can be accurately stated as a set of rules implies that 
reasoning is only a matter of applying rules and that problem solving always involves 
resorting to first principles and logical deductions made from those principles. "3 An 
increasing amount of psychological evidence indicates that this is not how human 
reasoning operates."'' Rather than always reasoning from first principles, people refer to 
past experiences when solving new problems. As Riesbeck and Schank state, the problem 
is that it 
is tempting for experts to cite rules that they follow, but it is often the case that each 
rule has many exceptions. In fact, in very difficult cases, where the situation is not so 
clear cut, experts frequently cite previous cases that they have worked on that the 
current case reminds them of 
For this reason, Riesbeck and Schank argue that this 'conception of the nature of human 
reasoning' is wrong. "^ 
Research on simulating analogising has arisen in response to this perceived inability of 
rule-based approaches to capture all that is involved in human reasoning. In this vein 
Riesbeck and Schank argue that 
[c]ase-based reasoning is the essence of how human reasoning works. People reason 
from experience. ""^  
Before embarking further, one clarification is necessary. To lawyers, the very term 'case-
base reasoning' is laden with meaning. Legal cases are vital in the common law and 
' " Riesbeck Christopher K. and Schank Roger C , Inside case-based reasoning (1989) Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc, 2. 
' '2 One of the earliest and most often cited examples is: Sergot M,, Sadri F., Kowalski R., Kriwaczek F., 
Hammond P. and Cory T., 'The British Nationality Act as a Logic Program' (1986) 29 Communications 
oftheACM370. 
' '3 Riesbeck and Schank, above n 111,9. 
i''* Kolodner Janet, Case-Based Reasoning (1993) Morgan Kaufmann, 27. See generally the collection 
of essays in Ortony and Vosniadou, above n 8. 
" 5 Riesbeck and Schank, above n 111, 10, 
" 6 Ibid 2, 
"^ Ibid 7, 
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lawyers use legal cases when reasoning about legal problems. However, when used in 
artificial intelligence the term 'case' has much wider meaning than that of a legal case. 
The term 'case' refers generally to any experience. As such case-based reasoning is not 
generally directly concerned with reasoning with legal cases or legal precedents. 
However, the application of case-based reasoning to the legal domain is examined in the 
following chapter. 
5.3 Case-based reasoning 
A thorough review of the literature on case-based reasoning is impossible in the space 
available here."^ Instead this discussion will focus on two key problems inherent in case-
based reasoning. These two problems are (i)representing cases in a computer 
manipulable form, and (ii)finding similar cases. An analysis of these two problems 
highlights the restrictions on case-based reasoning as a means to simulate analogical 
reasoning. 
The central idea in case-based reasoning is straightforward, 
[a] case-based reasoner solves new problems by adopting solutions that were used to 
solve old problems. 119 
Within this broad framework however, case-based reasoning systems vary widely. 
Systems have been created in diverse areas and to perform diverse tasks.'^ '^  Systems vary 
according to the degree they operate independently of human supervision.'^i Amongst 
this diversity however, all case-based reasoning systems involve several common steps 
(figure 5). 
See Kolodner, above n 114, for a detailed discussion of the field including discussion and 
explanation of numerous case-based reasoning systems. A detailed categorised bibliography of the 
literature relevant to case-based reasoning has recenfly been produced: Marir Farhi and Watson Ian, 
'Case-based reasoning - a categorized bibliography' (1994) 9 The Knowledge Engineering Review 355. 
The first international conference on case-based reasoning was held in Sesimbra, Portugal on October 
23, 1995 and the proceedings of this conference provide an interesting cross-section of current research 
in case-based reasoning. 
' '9 Riesbeck and Schank, above n 111, 25. 
Amongst other tilings, case-based reasoning systems have been created that engage in planning, 
diagnosis, design, and justification: Kolodner, above n 114, 77, 87. 
Automated reasoners accept a problem description and tiien produce a solution, human involvement 
is limited to providing feedback on tlie solution: Kolodner, above n 114, 60. In contrast, aiding and 
advisory systems interact with people to help them solve problems: Kolodner, above n 114, 60. Aiding 
and advisory systems are a largely unexplored application of CBR: ibid. 
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Figure 5: The general case-based reasoning path 
Building a case-based reasoning system requires choosing how to tackle each of these 
issues. The choices that are made determine the abilities of the system that is created. 
While all of these issues are important, how cases are represented in a case-based 
reasoning system, and the methods used to determine similarities between cases are 
together the two most important and difficult issues in case-based reasoning. These two 
issues determine the ability of a case based reasoning system to simulate analogical 
reasoning,'23 
5.3.1 Representing cases 
The behaviour of a case-based reasoning system is fundamentally dependent on the cases 
it has access to. For a case-based reasoning system to perform usefully the system must 
contain useful cases and the system must be able to access those cases at appropriate 
times. Obtaining the cases to put in a system may itself be problematic. Even when an 
expert in the field in which the system is being constructed is available, elicifing the 
appropriate cases from the expert and eliciting the appropriate aspects of those cases 
from the expert may be diflficuh.'24 
Kolodner, above n 114, figure I . l , 18.. A largely similar figure is provided by Riesbeck and Schank, 
above n 111, figure 2.1, 32. 
'23 Together these two issues determine the solutions adopted for the other issues. For a good detailed 
discussion of the remaining issues, see Kolodner, above n 114; Aamodt and Plaza, above n 106. 
'24 Kolodner, above n 114, 550-3. 
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More problematic is making that knowledge useable by a computer. At present 
computers are not able to understand natural language.'^ ^ It is not possible to simply 
connect a microphone into a computer, or present a computer with a page of text and 
have the computer automatically and independently extract the knowledge presented to 
it. Rather, knowledge must be interpreted by a 'knowledge engineer''^6 ^}jo converts the 
knowledge into a form that computers are capable of manipulating. This is problematic 
however, as it is extremely difficult to represent the full complexity, richness and 
flexibility of human knowledge in a computer manipulable formP'' Making human 
knowledge amenable to computer manipulation is also extremely time consuming. For 
efficiency it is desirable to include only those cases and only those aspects of cases which 
are useful to the case-based reasoning system. However, it is difficult to separate that 
knowledge that might be useful from the knowledge that might not be useflil. 
Researchers in case-based reasoning have developed guidelines to aid in this task.'^ ^ 
Even with such guidelines though, designers must make flindamental choices about what 
cases to include in a system and what knowledge to include in those cases.'^ 9 Thus, case-
based reasoning systems necessarily involve a trade-off between the number of cases 
contained in the system and the amount of knowledge represented in each of those cases, 
and between the amount of work needed to create and maintain the system. Even the 
most sophisticated case-based reasoning systems operate with shallow representations of 
knowledge.'3'^ Case-based reasoning systems containing large numbers of cases have less 
detailed knowledge of those cases and perform less reasoning with those cases than do 
Natural languages are to be contrasted with programming languages. Programming languages have 
limited vocabularies which are in turn well defined. Natural languages in contrast have large numbers of 
terms often with ambiguous meanings. See generally: Shapiro Stuart C , Encyclopedia of Artificial 
Intelligence (1990) Wiley. 
'^ •^  A knowledge engineer is a person who acts as an intermediary between an expert in a particular field 
and a computer. It is the task of a knowledge engineer, flu-ough interviews and discussion, to elicit 
knowledge from the expert and dien convert that knowledge into a form tliat is manipulable by a 
computer: ibid. 
^^"^  For and interesfing attempt to do this Uiough refer to the C Y C project. Perhaps the best source of 
informafion about the C Y C project is the world wide web site: http://www.c)'C.comy. 
'^ ^ Kolodner, above n 114, chapter 5. According to Kolodner, tliose cases flie 'teach something 
fiindamental to the goals of the reasoner' should be included in the system, ibid 13. The aspects of cases 
that should be recorded are: (l)the problem situation/description (2)the solution, and (3)outcome, ibid 
147. 
Kolodner, above n 114, 14, 160. 
'•^ •^  Case-based reasoning systems are sometimes referred to as 'deep' and 'shallow' in the case-based 
reasoning literature. 'Deep' systems are systems tiiat have some representation of general knowledge 
apart from the actual knowledge contained in cases. However, 'deep' and 'shallow' are relative terms 
and even in 'deep' case-based reasoning systems, the deptii of knowledge is far less tiian in human 
knowledge. 
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systems with smaller numbers of more detailed cases,'3' As discussed in more detail in 
the examination of computational analogy, the difficulty in representing the richness and 
flexibility of human knowledge in computer manipulable form restricts the kind of 
analogising that case-based reasoning systems can simulate. 
Once the cases, and the aspects of cases have been chosen for a case-based reasoning 
system, for the system to be useful it must be able to retrieve those cases at appropriate 
times. The case-based reasoning system must determine when cases are similar. Case-
based reasoning requires that labels be assigned to cases that are placed into a case-based 
reasoning system. Essentially, these labels operate as an index to the cases in system. 
Like an index in a book, which attempt to provide and indication of the contents of a 
book, these labels attempt to indicate the contents of cases.'32 Reflecting this similarity, 
and the difficulty in choosing labels for use in a case-based reasoning system, this task is 
called the 'indexing problem'.'33 
The difficulty in choosing indexes arises because cases can serve multiple purposes. It 
cannot be pre-determined with certainty all fijture situations in which cases might be 
usefial. Cases can be similar based on the sharing of surface similarities or they can be 
similar based on shared deeper similarities, such as the plans or goals the cases 
exemplify. 134 The indices assigned to a case must designate all the ways in which cases 
could be regarded as similar. The choice of indexes to be used in a system and the 
assignment of particular indexes to particular cases are both choices that must be made 
by the creator of the case-based reasoning system.'35 While researchers in case-based 
reasoning have developed guidelines for choosing indexes,'3^ ultimately the system 
designer must choose what indexes are thought most appropriate for all future situations 
and uses. The usefialness of the system will depend on these choices. 
' 3 ' Indeed, according to Kolodner, the biggest technological issue in case-based reasoning is 'scale-up'. 
While case-based reasoning has proved interesting in the laboratory, applying it in the 'real-world' poses 
problems: Kolodner, above n 114, 572, 
'32 Ibid 193, 
'33 Ibid. There are actually several aspects to tliis problem. First, it is necessary to assign labels to cases 
when they are entered into the system to ensure they can be retrieved at appropriate times, ibid. 
Secondly, the cases in the system must be organised so that they can be retrieved efficiently, ibid. 
Finally, retrieval algorithms must be written to retrieve the appropriate cases, ibid. 
'34 Ibid 196. 
'35 Ibid 249. 
'36 Ibid ch 6 and ch 7. 
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The operation of case-based reasoning systems is thus flindamentally dependent on the 
cases that it is decided to place in a system, on the amount of information that it is 
contained in each case and in the choice of indices used to index those cases. The choices 
made for each of these involve trade-offs between the comprehensiveness and 
expressiveness of the cases contained in a system and between the time and effort needed 
to construct a system. 
5.3.2 Determining similarities 
Once it has been decided how to represent cases in a case-based reasoning system, and 
how to index those cases, techniques are needed to determine which cases in the system 
are similar. Retrieving all the cases, and only those cases that are similar to a problem is 
the goal of all case-based reasoning systems. The huge problem, however, is determining 
all the subtle ways in which cases can be similar.'^^ The methods used in case-based 
reasoning to determine similarities are comparatively crude. 
Case-based reasoning systems use four main techniques to assess similarity: 
1. matching shared indexes, 
2. using common sense heuristics, 
3. using a causal model, 
4. matching indexes that share structural roles.'^ ^ 
These techniques range from the most simple to the most complex. As will become 
apparent however, even the most complex approaches to determining similarities are 
incapable of simulating the subtleties displayed by people in their assessments of 
similarity. 
Noticing cases share common indexes is the simplest method to determine similarity. For 
example the two cases in figure 6 are similar in several ways. 
Indeed, the problem is slighfly more complicated flian 'simply' retrieving similar cases. It may be 
necessary to rank those cases in some order of similarity: ibid 321. This has its own issues and problems: 
ibid ch 9. The problems surrounding detennining rankings of similarity will not be discussed here as 
these issues are similar to those surrounding the determination of similarity - the problems relating to 














Figure 6: Comparing common attributes 
Such a case representation would allow Case 101 to be retrieved when assessing the new 
problem situation as both cases involve vegetarian cuisine. In this respect both case 101 
and the problem are similar. However, this approach misses many important aspects of 
similarity that can exist between cases. For example, focusing on the ingredients of the 
cases in figure 6, the two cases appear different. One case involves a recipe which 
contains snow peas while the other case involves a recipe which contains broccoli. In this 
respect the two cases appear different. However, in another respect the two cases are 
similar - both cases involve recipes containing green vegetables. As Kolodner notes, for 
the matching of shared indices to work as a method for determining similarity, it must be 
possible to completely and unambiguously index cases - this is not always possible.''"' 
Simply matching indices is thus a crude means to determine similarity. 
To overcome some of the problems inherent in relying on matching based on shared 
indices, common-sense heuristics can be used. Such heuristics attempt to capture 
common-sense knowledge about how objects match. For example knowing that snow 
peas and broccoh are both green vegetables allows a guess that a recipe that uses one is 
similar to a recipe that uses the other.'''^ Por example suppose a third case exists (figure 
7). 
Adapted from Kolodner: ibid 333. 
Kolodner, above n 114, 332-4. Cases can actually have overloaded as well as unfilled slots. 
Ibid 335-6. 







Figure 7: A new recipe 
According to the 'green vegetable' heuristic proposed above, this case is different to the 
cases in figure 6 because it does not involve a green vegetable. However, for some 
recipes mushrooms can be substituted for snow-peas. Hence these two cases are in this 
sense similar. The drawback with heuristics is that they are only useful to find similarities 
which are foreseen by the designer of the system and thus specified in a heuristic. Apart 
from being hugely dependent on the foresight of the designer of the system, given that 
situations resemble each other and differ from each other in multitude of ways, it is 
doubtful whether it is even possible to a priori express all the ways in which cases can be 
similar. 
More complex than using heuristics is the use of a model of the domain in which the 
case-based reasoning system is being built. Such a domain model can be used to aid the 
determination of similarity. For example, in medial case-based reasoning systems a 
theoretical model of the physiology of the human body can be used to improve matching 
between cases .When domain models are available they can improve case-based 
reasoning systems. However, detailed and non-controversial domain models are not 
always available. 
The most flexible, and most complex, method to determine similarities between cases is 
to match indices that perform the same abstract role in cases. For example, at first glance 
football and chess appear to involve few similarities. Football involves two teams in 
opposition - chess involves two individuals in opposition. Football involves a large 
playing field on which the teams play - chess involves a small board covered in chess 
pieces. However, at a more abstract level the games are similar. Both chess and football 
Ibid 336-46. 
i^ -* Ibid 336-46. 
i'*^ The lack of a non-controversial domain model is a particularly acute problem in law. 
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are competitive games involving two opposing sides governed by a set of rules .While 
football and chess share few surface similarities, many abstract aspects of the two games 
are similar. It is investigating methods of determining such abstract similarities between 
cases that research in computational analogy has focused, i'*'' However, as seen in the 
following examination of computational analogy, there is no universal means to 
determine abstract similarities between cases. Methods developed to determine abstract 
similarities are comparatively crude. 
The ability of case-based reasoning systems to simulate analogising is thus inherently 
limited by the abiHty to determine similarifies between cases. While generally applicable 
techniques exist to determine similarities between cases, these methods are crude and 
unsubtle. More subtle methods can be employed for specific areas where heuristics or 
domain models are available. However, as will become evident during the examination of 
computational analogy below, no broadly applicable method exists to determine abstract 
similarities. This inabihty to determine abstract similarities and differences limits the 
ability of case-based reasoning systems to simulate analogical reasoning. Case-based 
reasoning systems are limited to simulating analogising that depends on similarities that 
are pre-defined by the creators of the system. Case-based reasoning systems cannot 
simulate the subtle determinations of similarity that occur in creative analogising.'''^ 
5.4 Computational analogy 
The techniques employed in case-based reasoning to determine similarities between cases 
are either shallow or highly application dependent. The most sophisticated techniques 
developed to determine similarities between cases have been developed by researchers in 
computational analogy. Research on computational analogy has focused on investigating 
the general circumstances in which situations can be regarded as similar. This section 
examines computational approaches to analogical reasoning. It is argued that even the 
sophisticated general strategies for determining similarifies that have been developed 
146 Kolodner, above n 114, 340-1. 
14'^  Aamodt and Plaza, above n 106, 44. 
14^ Johnson-Laird argues that computers cannot be programmed in a way guaranteed to perform creative 
analogising: Jolmson-Laird Philip N., 'Analogy and the exercise of creativity' p.313, in (Ortony A. and 
Vosniadou S.) (Eds) Similarity and Analogical Reasoning (1989) Cambridge University Press. However, 
stating that there is no guaranteed way to program a computer to perforin creative analogising is a ver>' 
different from stating that computers can never perform creative analogising. It would be interesting to 
see Johnson-Laird's comments on the work of FARG, who's programs intuitively do appear to simulate 
aspects of what is involved in creative analogising. 
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during research on computational analogy are only crude simulations of the human ability 
to determine similarities between situations. Hence computational analogy is only 
capable of providing a crude simulation of human analogising. 
As with case-base reasoning, a comprehensive review of computational analogy is 
impossible in the space available here.'''^ Approaches to simulating analogical reasoning 
are extremely diverse in amongst other things the particular aspect of analogy 
investigated, in the implementation environment chosen to conduct the investigation and 
in the domain used to demonstrate the particular approach.'^ o Jo aid comparison Hall 
suggests an abstract framework which any relatively complete account of analogical 
reasoning would conform with: 
1. recognition of similarity between situations, 
2. elaboration of a mapping between two situations, 
3. evaluation of the mapping in some context of use, and 
4. consolidation of the analogy so that it can be usefully re-used in other 
contexts. 
Thagard provides a further criteria for comparison: the way in which knowledge is 
represented. Unsurprisingly these five criteria mirror the important issues in case-
based reasoning. As in the examination of case-based reasoning this discussion will focus 
on examining the techniques used to represent knowledge in computer systems that 
attempt to simulate analogical reasoning and the strategies adopted in these systems to 
recognise similarities between situations. 
Analogies and the similarities that underiie analogies can be analysed according to their 
structural, pragmatic and semantic elements.'" The following discussion will focus on 
1'*^  For a usefiil, though not comprehensive, review of the field see Hall, above n i l . Notably Hall's 
review lacks detailed discussion of Centner's structure mapping theory, work by Holyoak and Thagard, 
neural network approaches to analogy or the approach pioneered by the Fluid Analogies Research 
Group, see this chapter below for a discussion of each of these. For useful discussions of many systems 
and analogy generally, see the collections in: Ortony and Vosniadou, above n 8, and Helman, above n 8. 
Hall, above n 11, 42-3. 
15' This is a slightly simplified version of the criteria provided by Hall: ibid 43. Bumstein gives a 
similar but slightly expanded conception 179-80. For the purposes of the present examination it is not 
necessary to consider all the detail discussed by Burnstein. 
'52 Thagard Paul, 'Dimensions and Analogy' p. 105, in (Helman D.H.) (Ed) Analogical Reasoning: 
Perspectives of Artificial Intelligence. Cognitive Science, and Philosophy (1988) Kluwer, 109-11. 
'53 Holyoak and Thagard, above n 109, 304; At other times Holyoak and Thagard refer to 'similarity', 
'structure' and 'purpose': Holyoak Keith and Thagard Paul, Mental leaps : analogy in creative thought 
(1995) MIT Press, 5-6. It is clearer however to adopt the tenninology of FARG and refer to constrains of 
'similarity' as 'semantic' constraints: Hofstadter Douglas and The Fluid Analogies Research Group, 
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three recent and influenfial approaches to simulafing analogical reasoning. These three 
approaches are the Structure Mapping Engine, the Analogical Constraint Mapping 
Engine and the group of systems developed by the Fluid Analogies Research Group 
(FARG). Each of these three systems emphasises one of the three aspects of similarity 
proposed by Holyoak and Thagard. While many more systems than these exist the major 
issues surrounding the simulation of analogical reasoning can be highlighted and critically 
discussed using this examination. 
5.4.1 Structural criteria 
One of the most famous and ofl:en discussed simulations of analogical reasoning is the 
Structure Mapping Engine. Underlying the Structure Mapping Engine is a theory of 
analogy which proposes that analogies are governed by the principle of'systematicity' ."4 
Broadly, this principle asserts that analogies are based on the sharing of attributes which 
exist in a common relational s t ructure.For example, Gentner discusses the analogy 
between heat flow and water flow illustrated in figure 8. 
Silver 
Warm coffee 
Figure 8: Heat flow is analogous to water flow 
Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer Models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought 
(1995) Basic Books. 
154 Gentner, above n 102, 201. 
More precisely, Gentner states that: 
1. correspondences between relations between objects in a situation, rather than attributes of 
objects, and 
2. relations that are part of a coherent interconnected system are preferred. 
Ibid 201. 
156 Ibid 202. 
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It is claimed that when people create analogies they ignore surface details such as that 
both water and coffee are liquids, that both water and coffee have flat tops and that the 
water is stored in a transparent beaker. 15'? Rather, it is claimed that people prefer more 
'systematic', more abstract similarities between situations. According to Gentner, 
knowing that the greater pressure in the beaker causes water to flow into the vial 
through the pipe, by analogy it can be concluded that the greater temperature in the 
coffee causes heat to flow into the ice cube through the silver bar.i5^ The principle of 
systematicity is purely structural. Both the use of the analogy and the objects being 
reasoned with are regarded as irrelevant. The principle of systematicity thus appears an 
extremely concise way of expressing what is involved in the concept of'similarity'. I f the 
theory of analogy underlying the Structure Mapping Engine is an accurate reflection of 
human analogising then it presents a huge advance in attempts to simulate analogical 
reasoning. 
The Structure Mapping Engine has been presented with numerous problems and its 
authors claim it produces sophisticated analogies in each situation. When presented with 
a computer manipulable representation of the situation illustrated in figure 8, according 
to Gentner the Structure Mapping Engine produces the analogy that 'heat flow is like 
water flow.'i59 Producing an analogy between heat flow and water flow is an impressive 
feat. Even for a person concluding that heat flow is like water flow is a non-trivial 
analogy. Creating this analogy requires knowledge and insight into the behaviours of 
both heat and water and the concepts of pressure, temperature and causation. However, 
the claim that the Structure Mapping Engine is an accurate model of human analogical 
reasoning requires careflil consideration. This claim is examined in more detail after 
examining a second recent and often discussed computerised analogical reasoning 
system. 
5.4.2 Pragmatic criteria 
The Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine^^o developed by Holyoak and Thagard is in 
many ways similar to the Structure Mapping Engine. However, Holyoak and Thagard 
argue that to successfully simulate analogical reasoning, semantic and pragmatic 
157 Ibid 221-31. 
'58 Ibid 213. 
159 Ibid 212-5. 
160 Holyoak and Thagard, above n 109. 
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constraints on reasoning must also considered - structural criteria are insufficient.'^i 
According to Holyoak and Thagard, structural criteria are by themselves insufficient 
because such criteria are not sufficiently restrictive. Holyoak and Thagard argue that 
there are ofl;en many abstract relafional similarities between situations and some method 
is needed to choose between them in order to analogise. Holyoak and Thagard argue that 
in analogical reasoning this choice is determined by the goals a reasoner is attempting to 
achieve and by the semantic content of the concepts being reasoned about. For example, 
a reasoner might be searching for an analogy between the solar system and the atom, 
which would make and analogy involving these concepts more likely. Similarly, a 
reasoner might know a priori that two things are similar, such as heat flow and water 
flow again making an analogy involving these more likely. Mitchell and Hofstadter also 
argue that the principle of systemaficity is by itself insufficient 1^2 - there are many, 
perhaps innumerable, possible systematic correspondences between situations and the 
only way to choose between them is through an understanding of semantic meaning, i^^ 
Holyoak and Thagard's model of analogy claims to capture the interaction of the 
structural, semantic and pragmatic elements that constitutes analogising.'64 This theory 
of analogy is implemented in the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine. 
In their discussion of the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine Holyoak and Thagard 
provide numerous examples of analogies they argue were created by the system. For 
example, the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine was presented with the same water 
flow/heat flow analogy as used to demonstrate the Structure Mapping Engine. According 
to Holyoak and Thagard the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine also produced the 
analogy that water flow is like heat flow.'65 The precise details of how the Analogical 
Constraint Mapping Engine operates will not be discussed here. However, as with the 
Structure Mapping Engine, the claim that the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine is 
capable of simulating analogising requires scrutiny. 
'61 Ibid 296. 
162 Mitchell Melanie and Hofstadter Douglas, 'Perspectives on Copycat: Comparisons witli Recent Work' 
p.275, in (Hofstadter Douglas and Fluid Analogies Research Group) (Eds) Fluid Concepts and Creative 
Analogies: Computer models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought (1995) Basic Books, 280. 
163 Ibid 281. 
'64 Holyoak and Thagard, above n 109, 304. 
165 Ibid 333-7. 
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5.4.3 Restrictions of the Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical 
Constraint Mapping Engine 
The necessity of translating human knowledge into computer manipulable form to enable 
analogising was emphasised in the discussion of case-based reasoning. A central problem 
with this requirement is that it is extremely difficuU to represent the complexity, richness 
and flexibility of human knowledge in computer languages. One method by which 
knowledge is provided to computers is by using predicate calculus. Predicate calculus is 
a method for representing human knowledge in computer manipulable form. Using 
predicate calculus, knowledge about the situafion illustrated in figure 8 can be provided 
to a computer. For example the statement 'LIQUID(water)' is used to state that water is 
a liquid and the statement 'FLOW(beaker, vial, water, pipe)' is used to state that water 
flows from the beaker to the vial through the pipe.i^^ Both the Structure Mapping 
Engine and the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine operate using predicate calculus 
representations of situations. This requirement imposes enormous practical limits on the 
ability of these programs to simulate analogical reasoning. 
Both the Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine 
appear able to perform impressive feats of analogical reasoning. They apparently reason 
with and draw analogies between complex real world situafions. However, when 
examining these and other analogical reasoning systems great care must be taken to 
avoid reading 
far more understanding than is warranted into strings of symbols - especially 
words - strung together by computers, i^'^ 
Seeing pictures of beakers filled with water and cups filled with hot coffee invokes a rich 
imagery about such things as water, coffee, heat, hquids, and metal. A strong critic of 
these approaches to simulating analogical reasoning, Hofstadter states 
a lot of implications follow in the minds of many if not most readers, such as 
these: computers - at least some of them - understand water and coffee and 
so on; computers understand the physical world; computers make analogies; 
1*^ 6 See the representations in: Gentner, above n 102. 
16"^  Hofstadter call this the 'ELIZA' effect after the famous program, 'ELIZA', developed by Joseph 
Wizenbaum and to which many people spuriously attributed immense powers of perception an 
understanding: Hofstadter and Farg, above n 153, 157. 
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computers reason abstractly, computers make scientific discoveries; 
computers are insightful cohabitors of the world with us.i68 
In fact the information contained in programs such as the Structure Mapping Engine and 
the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine is much shallower. Both the Structure 




• FLOW(beaker, vial, water, pipe), 
• FLOW(coffee, ice, heat, bar), 
• CAUSE {GREATER[TEMP(coffee), TEMP(ice)], FLOW(heat, bar, coffee, 
ice)} 169 
The systems have no deeper representation of any of these concepts. There is no 
representation of the concept of what a Hquid is. There is no representation of the 
differences between liquids and soHds or liquids and gases. The only information that the 
Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine have is that 
explicitly provided by the creators of these systems. This is far from the rich imagery 
invoked when seeing a picture of beakers and hot coffee. 
In a recent examination of approaches to computational analogy, Hoffman notes that 
formal schemes for the computational analysis of analogy will be limited by 
(at least) the depth, breadth, flexibility, and dynamics of the world 
knowledge that they can represent.''^ '' 
Programs such as the Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical Constraint Mapping 
Engine represent very minimal knowledge, which is in turn shallow and inflexible. 
As Gentner notes, the representational decisions made when encoding knowledge 
are crucial to the operafion of the algorithm. Differences in the way things 
are construed can cause two situations to fail to match even i f they are 
informafionally equivalent.'''' 
168 Ibid, 
169 Gentner, above n 102, 211-3; Holyoak and Thagard, above n 109, 333-7. 
™ Hoffman, above n 9, 27. 
1^ 1 Gentner, above n 102, 210. 
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For example, although invoking the same meaning for readers, the use of the predicate 
GREATER[PRESSURE(beaker), PRESSURE(vial)], 
which is used to indicate that the pressure in the beaker is greater than the pressure in the 
vial, and 
LESS-THAN[PRESSURE(vial), PRESSURE(beaker)] 
which is used to indicate that the pressure in the vial is less than the pressure in the 
beaker would prevent a mapping in the Structure Mapping Engine. Programs such as the 
Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine require 
uniform and unambiguous definitions of the concepts being reasoned about. 
The need to provide rigid, uniform and unambiguous definitions for the concepts being 
reasoned about however, contradicts one of the confounding aspects of analogical 
reasoning. As Hoffman notes, 
one really important phenomenon at hand is semantic flexibility: People can 
relate anything to anything on the basis of anything, i ' ' ^ 
This flexibility is a hallmark of analogical reasoning, as Holyoak and Thagard themselves 
note, to 
propose an analogy - or simply to understand one - requires taking a kind of 
mental leap. An idea from the source analogy is carried over to the target. 
The two might initially seem unrelated but the act of making an analogy 
creates new connections, i''^ 
A humorous illustration of this is provided by Hofstadter who poses the question - 'Who 
is the First Lady of England?'I'^'i At first glance several answers might be proposed: 
Queen Elizabeth, Betty Boothroyd or Anitta Rodick for example. Each of these is a 
prominent lady. Out of these however, the Queen is perhaps the most eminent and so 
might be regarded as the First Lady. However, the term 'First Lady' is widely used in the 
United States of America to refer to the wife of the president. Who then is the First Lady 
of England? Is it still Queen Elizabeth? Tony Blair plays a role in the United Kingdom 
that is in many ways similar to the role played by Bill Clinton in the United States of 
America. Should the First Lady of England thus be regarded as Cherie Blair? The term 
172 Hoffman, above n 9, 19. 
i'^ ^ Holyoak and Thagard, above n 153, 7. 
171 Hofstadter, above n 153, 196. 
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'First Lady' implies choosing the most prominent women in the country. This implies 
choosing Queen Elizabeth. In the United States the first lady is the spouse of the 
president. This implies choosing Cherie Blair. However, in another sense Queen 
Elizabeth also plays a role in some ways reminiscent of the presidential role, so should 
her spouse be chosen? Could the First Lady of England be regarded as Prince Philip? 
While this has some nice similarities between the positions of the people involved, the 
term 'First Lady' strongly implies that a women should be chosen.•''5 Several competing 
pressures can be observed here: the pressure induced by the phrase 'First Lady' to find a 
woman to play this role; the pressure to choose the spouse of the most powerfial political 
figure; the feeling that the 'First Lady' should be just that, the most powerfiil or popular 
lady in the country. According to Hofstadter, whom is eventually chosen is determined 
by the resuh of the interplay between these pressures and what is felt involved in the 
concept of'First Lady'. With foreseeable stretching, the concept could be allowed to slip 
and cover Prince Philip as being England's First Lady. 
As FARG convincingly argue, there is a fiindamental problem with the way knowledge is 
represented in systems such as the Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical 
Constraint Mapping Engine. The way knowledge is represented is extremely brittle. It is 
difficult to see how systems such as the Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical 
Constraint Mapping Engine, and others that rely on pre-defined static representations of 
knowledge can capture the fluidity, illustrated above, that is the hallmark of analogical 
reasoning. Importantly, solving this problem is not a matter of the mere addition of a 
greater amount of ever more detailed knowledge about the objects represented in the 
system. i''6 while this may help, some way is still needed to select the important 
similarities out of the virtually infinite number of ways in which things can be similar or 
different. 177 
Holyoak and Thagard argue that this is possible in the Analogical Constraint Mapping 
Engine through the imposition of semanfic and pragmatic constraints. In the Analogical 
Constraint Mapping Engine, semanfic and pragmatic constraints on analogical reasoning 
175 For a subtle twist on this example see Hofstadter: ibid. 
176 Hofstadter Douglas and French Robert, 'Tabletop, BattleOp, Ob-Platte, Patelbat, Belpatto, Platobet' 
p. 3 23, in (Hofstadter Douglas and Fluid Analogies Research Group) (Eds) Fluid Concepts and Creative 
Analogies: Computer models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought (1995) Basic Books. 
'77 Hoffman, above n 9, 21. 
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are imposed in an apparently straightforward manner. A semantic constraint is imposed 
by the programmer simply by stating 'SIMILAR <concept-I><concept-2><degree>'.'7*' 
This is supposed to reflect an estimated numerical degree of similarity between two 
concepts.'79 Pragmatic constraints are imposed by the programmer stating 
'IMPORTANT <element>' or 'PRESUMED <hypothesis>' which are respecfively 
designed to reflect that a certain element is regarded as important and that a certain 
hypothesis is regarded as correct.'^o Designating inputs as similar, important or 
presumed means that the concepts so designated are more likely to be involved in the 
analogy produced by the system. While this certainly imposes semantic and pragmatic 
restraints, it is subject to the same objection as is the representation of knowledge in 
general. This method of representing semantic and pragmatic constraints is inflexible. As 
illustrated in the question 'Who is the First Lady of England?' what aspects of situations 
are regarded as important in an analogy and what aspects of situations are regarded as 
similar in an analogy can change during analogising. Holyoak and Thagard's proposals 
ignore this fundamental aspect of flexibility that is inherent in analogical reasoning. 
While the Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine 
appear able to create impressive analogies this is because these systems are provided 
with solely the information necessary to create the analogy desired and they are provided 
this information in the precise form necessary to create the analogy that is desired. In 
reahty, knowledge does not come neatly pre-packaged in this way. Any computer system 
that performs analogical reasoning must have more flexible knowledge representation 
mechanisms. 
Gentner's proposed solution to this brittleness is to add tools that can re-represent 
knowledge.1^1 Such tools 
would allow us to model the use of analogy in reconstructing one situation in 
terms of another, i^^ 
Despite scepticism at the plausibility of such a scheme'this possibility will not be 
examined further because the Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical Constraint 
178 Holyoak and Thagard, above n 109, 313. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
'8 ' Gentner, above n 102, 210. 
'«2 Ibid 211. 
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Mapping Engine do not ufilise such knowledge re-representation tools. These systems 
are limited to finding correspondences between the representafions initially provided by 
the creators of the system. This is implausible in a complete model of analogical 
reasoning. 
The Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine face 
several other problems as complete and accurate models of analogical reasoning. When 
humans create analogies they do so with experiences selected from a massive memory of 
experience. Out of this mulfitude of experiences, those experiences that are similar are 
selected. In stark contrast both the Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical 
Constraint Mapping Engine are presented at the outset with precisely those two 
experiences which will form the final analogy. The huge complexity in simply finding the 
episode with which to analogise is avoided. In presenting just those experiences 
necessary to create the final analogy, and in a representation highly amenable to the 
analogy, lacking almost any extraneous diverting information, the complexity of the task 
is massively reduced. With the necessary informafion conveniently presented, the 
Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical Constraint are able to simply calculate all 
possible correspondences between the situations, and choose the most systematic 
through brute force search.'^ 4 ^ cognifive model, this is highly implausible. In 
decomposing the concept of similarity into structural, semantic and pragmatic aspects, 
Gentner and Holyoak and Thagard provide valuable insights into the processes of 
analogising. However, the approaches to implementing these constraints and to 
represenfing the knowledge used in analogising trivialise the difficulty involved in 
retrieving a source candidate from memory and elaborating the similarity. It is doubtfial 
whether these methods would be viable i f a greater number of richer experiences were 
available. 
5.4.4 Conceptual fluidity and analogy making 
In contrast to the approaches to simulating analogical reasoning presented above, 
Hofstadter, Mitchell, French, Defrays and other members of FARG have developed a 
183 Chalmers David, French Robert and Hofstadter Douglas, 'High-level Perception,Representation,and 
Analogy: A Critique of Artificial-intelligence Methodology' p. 169, in (Hofstadter Douglas and Fluid 
Analogies Research Group) (Eds) Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer models of the 
Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought (1995) Basic Books, 185-9. 
184 Mitchell and Hofstadter, above n 162, 284. 
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very different model of analogy making. At the heart of this model is the view that the 
analogies people create are fundamentally dependent on the way in which people 
perceive the situations that they are analogising about.'^5 Entailed in this idea are a 
number of others, including: 
1. concepts, which are at the heart of analogies are fluid and slippable, 
2. slippages in concepts are induced by pressures present when perceiving a 
situation, and 
3. analogies eventually produced emerge from the interaction of the pressures 
that cause conceptual sHppages. 
The members of FARG argue that it is interplays of pressures on our conceptual 
categories and the resulting changes in our concepts, as discussed in the question 'Who 
is the First Lady of England?', that underlie all analogy making. As such any attempt to 
simulate analogical reasoning must simulate the conceptual fluidity inherent in the 
perception of analogies. According to the members of FARG, for this reason attempts to 
simulate analogising based on the use of rigid knowledge representations are bound to 
fail. The members of FARG have produced several computer models of analogy making 
based on their underlying philosophy.'^6 None of these implementations are examined in 
depth. However, the common idea underlying all these implementations are outlined. 
Underlying the FARG's work on analogy is a belief that analogical reasoning 
fundamentally involves changes in the content of and relation between concepts that are 
being reasoned about. According to FARG it is simulating the semantic flexibility that is 
inherent in analogising that is central to simulating analogical reasoning. Consequently, at 
the centre of the FARG's architecture is a model of the concepts which are being 
reasoned about. However, these concepts and the relations between these concepts are 
not rigidly deflned - they can change as an analogy is perceived and constructed. In the 
FARG architecture concepts are stored in an interconnected network in which links 
between objets indicate a relation between those objects. The 'length' of the links 
between objects can change, indicating that these objects are becoming more 
'85 Hofstadter Douglas and Mitchell Melanie, 'The Copycat Project: A Model of Mental Fluidit>' and 
Analogy Making' p.205, in (Hofstadter Douglas and Fluid Analogies Research Group) (Eds) Fluid 
Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought (1995) 
Basic Books, 210. 
'86 For an overview see: Hofstadter, above n 153, 95. 
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conceptually similar or more conceptually dissimilar. i87 The operation of the FARG 
architecture is thus inherently dependent on the model that is created of the concepts in 
the domain being reasoned about. This is noted by Hofstadter who states that the 
concepts modelled must be 'Platonic concepts' that are relevant to the domain, i^^ 
For example the Copycat program attempts to create analogies between strings of 
alphabetic letters, i^^ Given that the string of letters 'abc' is analogous to the string of 
letters 'abd', what string of letters is analogous to ' i jk '?'9o Central to the Copycat 
program is its 'SHpnet' of concepts relevant to the Roman alphabet. '9 ' A portion of the 
Slipnet used in Copycat is shown in figure 9. 
successor ^ - ^ successor 
redecessor redecessor predecessor predecesso predecess 
letter-category 
successor ^ successor successor successor 




Figure 9: A portion of Copycat's slipnet 
187 Hofstadter and Mitchell, above n 185, 212. 
188 Ibid 211. 
'89 Mitchell Melanie, Analogy making as perception (1993) M T Press. 
190 Ibid 11. 
'91 Since concepts are linked in a network and the relations between objects can change - the objects 
'slip' towards or away from on another - this network of Platonic concepts is thus called a 'Slipnet': 
Hofstadter and Mitchell, above n 185, 211. The terminology for each of these components differs in the 
Numbo program. However, the roles played are the same. 
'92 Simplified from: Mitchell, above n 189, 47, 
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The Slipnet in Copycat stores not only the twenty six alphabetic letters themselves, but 
also a few simple relations between the letters, such as that the letter 'b' succeeds the 
letter 'a' and that the letter 'b' precedes the letter 'c'. 
As an analogy is perceived and constructed, concepts in the Slipnet are used to construct 
a representation of the problem. The particular representation that is constructed 
indicates how the program 'perceives' the analogy. Notably, the way in which a 
particular representation is perceived influences the relationships between concepts in the 
Shpnet. In turn, concepts in the Slipnet that are active make it more likely that these and 
related concepts will influence the way in which the situafion is perceived. Using this 
approach the 'top-down' pressures imposed by general knowledge of a domain to 
perceive a situation in a particular way combine with the 'bottom-up' pressures imposed 
by the particularities of the circumstance being reasoned about. FARG argue that 
through the interaction of these pressures emerges the way a situation is finally perceived 
and an analogy created.'93 
The importance of top-down and bottom-up pressures in analogising has been noted by 
other researchers in analogy. i94 By modelling the interaction of these top-down and 
bottom-up pressures a much more fluid and flexible form of analogical reasoning is made 
possible. How concepts relate to the actual problem and to each other is allowed to 
dynamically evolve. Rather than being lumbered with brittle problem-representafions 
hand-coded into the system, the FARG architecture is able to fluidly adapt knowledge 
for use in particular situations. 
The approach to analogical reasoning developed by FARG displays and innovafive way 
to simulate the semantic flexibility that is a hallmark of analogical reasoning. This 
approach to simulating analogising suggests a partial way to overcome the rigidifies in 
the representations of knowledge that plague systems such as the Structure Mapping 
Engine and the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine. However, such problems are still 
present in the FARG architecture. The operation of the FARG architecture is crucially 
•93 Hofstadter, above n 153, 92 calls tliis a 'parallel terrace scan'. 
i^'i E.g. While Hofstadter refers to the parallel terrace scan, Holyoak and Thagard refer to 'biderectional 
search': Holyoak Keith J. and Thagard Paul R., 'A computational model of analogical problem solving' 
p.242, in (Ortony A. and Vosniadou S.) (Eds) Similarity and Analogical Reasoning (1989) Cambridge 
University Press, 244. 
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dependent on the concepts that are placed in the Slipnet and on the relations that it is 
chosen to define between those concepts. As Hofstadter notes, these have to be 'Platonic 
concepts'. In the areas in which the architecture developed by FARG has been applied, 
such as creating analogies between strings of alphabetic letters, Platonic concepts may be 
comparatively easy to determine. It is far from a straightforward task however, to 
determine what the Platonic concepts might be in wider areas. For instance, to return to 
the analogy between water flow and heat flow. What should the Platonic concepts be 
considered to be? Should 'water' and 'heat' be regarded as Platonic concepts? Or should 
more fiandamental concepts such as 'fluid' be used? Should the concept 'beaker' be 
included? It is difFicuh to consider any of these concepts as Platonic as they can all be 
broken down into numerous other interrelated concepts. Unfortunately FARG provide 
no guidelines as to how Platonic concepts are to be chosen. All the implementations of 
the architecture developed by FARG have been in 'micro-domains','^^ small relatively 
well defined areas in which the Platonic concepts are comparatively obvious. While the 
members of FARG argue that the underlying structure is universally applicable'^ '^  no 
'real-world' implementation has yet been created. 
As a complete model of analogising the architecture developed by FARG has several 
other limitations. Hofstadter lists five improvements that could be made to the 
architecture. Perhaps the most salient for present purposes is that the architecture has 
no memory. It does not store past experiences or retain any trace of the analogies that it 
creates. This is a fijndamental aspect of human analogical reasoning that any complete 
model of analogising would have to address. To utihse past experiences however, 
involves addressing fiarther issues, such as how usefijl experiences are retrieved from 
memory and how they are utilised, in conjunction with the perception of the current 
situation, to create an analogy. The FARG architecture does not address such issues. 
Hofstadter and Mitchell, above n 185, 211. 
Hofstadter, above n 153, 86. 
Chalmers, French and Hofstadter, above n 183, 191. 
This should not be interpreted as an argument tliat the 'real-world' domains commonly chosen for 
research into analogical reasoning result in more realistic models of analogy, only that tlie wider 
applicability of the architecture remains to be demonstrated. 
Hofstadter, above n 153, 315-8. 
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While not a complete model of analogical reasoning the architecture developed by 
FARG, provides a sophisticated model of the fluid application and change in concepts 
that occurs as analogies are created. 
5.5 Neural networks and analogising 
The final approach to simulating analogical reasoning that is briefly discussed is based on 
the use of neural networks. Neural networks are structures inspired by the structure of 
the human brain. Frustrated by the slow progress made by traditional artificial 
intelligence, some researchers argue that to simulate intelligence it is necessary to more 
closely simulate the structure of the human brain. Neural networks are composed of 
neurodes, which are models of biological nerve cells, linked together in an intertwined 




Figure 10: General structure of an artificial neural network 
Neural networks generally consist of an input layer, at which the network is presented 
with information, hidden layers, and an output layer at which the network provides a 
result. Researchers are interested in neural networks because amongst other reasons, 
they are good at tasks involving the classification of patterns.Further, neural networks 
can be made to generalise their inputs. When presented with a series of patterns, neural 
networks will group patterns together. Thus when presented with input, neural networks 
classify that input in terms of these general groups. Analogising can be regarded as a 
form of pattern classification. Given a description of a problem, finding an analogous 
case is a matter of finding a case with a similar description, or a general class to which 
2^'' For a good introduction to the uses of neural networks and tlieir uses see. Caudill Maureen and 
Butler Charles, Naturally intelligent systems (1990) MIT Press. 
201 See generally: ibid. 
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the description belongs. In performing classification neural networks thus appear usefirl 
for simulating analogical reasoning. 
All possible uses of neural networks to simulate analogical reasoning will not be 
discussed in detail here. There is a vast literature on the construction and use of neural 
networks.202 However, one major problem with simple approaches to simulafing 
analogising using neural networks, approaches which underlie the use of neural networks 
to simulate legal analogising, is that like the above discussed approaches to simulating 
analogising these uses of neural networks ignore the semantic flexibility inherent in 
analogising. 
The difficulties for neural network based simulations of analogising resulting from 
semantic flexibility is demonstrated by referring to a proposal by Rumelhart, one of the 
most famous researchers in neural networks. Rumelhart has proposed a model of 
analogical reasoning in which neural networks are central.According to Rumelhart, a 
neural network could be used to simulate analogical reasoning by requiring it to retrieve 
cases which share ever more abstract attributes.204 When the neural network retrieves 
cases based solely on shared abstract attributes, according to Rumelhart the network 
would be simulating analogising. For example, imagine trying to discover the analogy 
between sailing on stormy seas and marriage.205 When experiences are retrieved based on 
non-abstract features, straightforward similar situations are recalled, e.g. an experience 
of sailing on stormy seas on week or one month ago. Under Rumelhart's proposals, 
while the neural network has retrieved similar experiences it has not analogised. The 
similarity between the episodes is not abstract. However, i f experiences were retrieved 
that share abstract features, for example experiences that 'have their highs and lows' then 
the experience of marriage would be recalled. In such a situation the neural network is 
said to have created an analogy. 
202 For a detailed early examination of the field see: Rmnelhart David, McClelland James and The PDP 
Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructiu-e of Cognition (1986) 
MIT Press 
2"^ Rumelhart 'Toward a microstructiu-al account', above n 102. 
Ibid 301-6 
205 This example was proposed by Dejong: Dejong, above n 106, 349. 
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However, this account of analogical reasoning has been crificised on a number of 
grounds.2*^ ^ While the sharing of abstract similarities is an important aspect of 
analogising, Rumelhart gives no indication of the means by which the network will 
distinguish abstract similarities from non-abstract similarities. Implicit in Rumelhart's 
proposals is the pre-categorisation of attributes by the creator of the system into those 
that are abstract and those that are non-abstract. However, as highlighted in the above 
discussion of the semantic flexibility inherent in analogising, it is during analogising itself 
that those attributes which are abstract and those attributes which are less abstract, 
emerge. The pre-classification of attributes into those that are abstract and those that are 
not abstract thus misrepresents an important aspect of analogising. 
While neural networks are used in many more ways than discussed above, as is seen in 
the next chapter, the use of neural networks to simulate legal analogising operates in the 
way described above. This application of neural networks in the simulation of analogising 
is insufficient to simulate all that is involved in analogising. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Having examined three major approaches to simulating analogical reasoning developed in 
artificial intelligence it is apparent that artificial intelligence has not yet succeeded in 
developing a comprehensive and convincing model of analogical reasoning. Research 
diverges as to the very concept of what an analogy is and the processes by which 
analogies are created. 
One of the major difficulties with simulating analogical reasoning is successfully 
simulating the semantic flexibility which is characteristic of analogical reasoning. Dealing 
with the semantic flexibiUty inherent in analogising raises complex issues about the way 
that human knowledge is to be represented in computer manipulable form. The 
architecture developed by FARG, with its ability to fluidly and dynamically interpret 
situations and construct analogies based on these interpretations, displays and excifing 
approach to simulating semantic flexibility. However, the FARG architecture has only 
Dejong, above n 106, 349; Hofstadter Douglas and McGraw Gary, 'Letter Spirit: Aesthetic 
Perception and Creative Play in the Rich Microcosm of the Roman Alphabet' p.407, in (Hofstadter 
Douglas and Fluid Analogies Research Group) (Eds) Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: Computer 
models of the Fundamental Mechanisms of Thought (1995) Basic Books, 466. 
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been applied in a small number of situations and is potentially limited by the need to 
choose Platonic concepts to be used by the architecture. The approaches to simulating 
analogising discussed here underlie attempts to simulate legal analogising. As discussed 
in the following chapters, approaches to simulating legal analogising are restricted by 
their inability to accommodate the semantic flexibility inherent in legal analogising. 
Simulations of legal analogising are thus limited in the kind of legal analogising that can 
be simulated. 
However, while research in artificial intelligence has not succeeded in simulating the fiill 
complexities of analogical reasoning, case-based reasoning does demonstrate techniques 
by which cases sharing surface similarities, less abstract and creative similarities than 
those characteristic of creative analogising, can be retrieved and used in problem solving. 
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6 Artificial intelligence and legal analogical reasoning 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined approaches to simulating analogical reasoning developed 
in artificial intelligence. This chapter examines attempts to simulate legal analogical 
reasoning by researchers in the field of artificial intelligence and law. Informed by the 
examination of theories of legal analogical reasoning undertaken in chapter 3 and chapter 
4 and by the examination of computational approaches to simulating analogising 
provided in the previous chapter it is argued that current attempts to simulate legal 
analogical reasoning only provide a shallow imitation of human legal analogical 
reasoning. It will be seen that attempts to simulate legal analogising are confronted with 
problems in representing legal knowledge and in simulating the semantic flexibility 
demonstrated in legal analogising. Simulations of legal analogising are currently limited 
to simulating straightforward matchings between precedents. This critical examination 
forms the basis for subsequent chapters which examine how approaches to simulating 
legal analogical reasoning might be improved as well as examining how research in 
simulating legal analogical reasoning informs on jurisprudential accounts of legal 
analogising. 
6.2 The split between reasoning and information retrieval 
In the field of artificial intelligence and law, two major branches of research relevant to 
analogy are evident. The first of these branches is intimately concerned with simulafing 
the processes and results of human legal reasoning. The second branch of research is 
concerned not with simulating legal reasoning itself but with providing the information 
necessary for reasoning, the statutes, cases, regulations and other information needed to 
decide legal controversies. This branch of research is concerned with information 
retrieval. 
Prima facie, only research concerned with simulating legal reasoning is relevant to an 
examination of attempts to simulate legal analogical reasoning. However, as will be 
discussed, information retrieval is itself a task which overlaps with legal reasoning. Some 
of the techniques developed by researchers in this area are thus relevant in attempts to 
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simulate legal analogical reasoning. For this reason, each of these branches of research is 
examined in turn. 
6.3 Artificial intelligence and law, and legal reasoning 
Numerous computer systems have been built which attempt to simulate aspects of legal 
reasoning. As with computer systems constructed to simulate analogical reasoning, 
computer systems constructed to simulate legal reasoning are extremely diverse. Systems 
can be distinguished by the tasks they perform207 and the particular context they operate 
in.208 Such distinctions are undoubtedly necessary however, analogical reasoning is 
crucial to legal reasoning. Hence, whatever task a system performs and whatever context 
a system operates in, the better the ability of that system to simulate legal analogical 
reasoning, the better will be the ability of that system to perform in its particular context. 
Consequently, this chapter will focus on the approach taken to simulating legal 
analogical reasoning. 
There are several approaches to simulating legal analogical reasoning. These approaches 
closely reflect the approaches adopted in artificial intelligence generally to simulafing 
analogical reasoning and are examined in turn. 
6.3.1 Analogy in a formalism. 
It is ironic that a widely adopted approach to simulating legal analogising is based on the 
use of producfion rules and logics to formalise the ratio decidendi of precedents.209 
Underlying these attempts to simulate legal analogising is the view that legal precedents 
contain an unambiguous ratio decidendi which can be applied to new problems. Legal 
20"^  Visser Pepijn R.S., Knowledge Specification for Multiple Legal Tasks: A Case Study of the 
Interaction Problem in the Legal Domain (1995) Kluwer Law International, 6 
Lambert Kenneth A. and Grunewald Mark H., 'Legal Theory and Case-Based Reasoners: The 
Importance of Context and the Process of Focusing' p. 191, in The Third International Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of tlie Conference (1991) ACM Press. 
209These approaches have been adopted in numerous systems e.g.: Weiner Steven S., 'CACE: Computer-
Assisted Case Evaluation in the Brooklyn District' p.215, in The Second International Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1989) ACM Press; Yoshino Hajime, 
Haraguchi Makoto, Sakurai Seiichiro and Kagayama Sigeru, 'Towards a Legal Analogical Reasoning 
System: Knowledge Representation and Reasoning Methods' p. 110, in The Fourtli International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1993) ACM Press; Nitta 
Katsumi, Shibasaki Masato, Sakata Tsuyoslii, Yamaji Takahiro, Xianchang Wang, Ohsaki Hiroshi, Tojo 
Satoslii, Kokubo Iwao and Suzuki Takayuki, 'New HELIC-II: A Software Toll for Legal Reasoning' 
p.287, in The Fifth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of tlie 
Conference (1995) ACM Press. 
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analogising is regarded solely as the application of the ratio decidendi of precedents to 
new problems. For example, in Donoghue v Stevenson Lord Aitkin stated that 
a manufacturer of products which he sells in such a form as to show that he 
intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left 
him, with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the 
knowledge that absence of reasonable care in the preparafion or putting up 
of the products will result in injury to the consumer's life or property, owes a 
duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.^ io 
From this passage the following rule could be constructed: 
I f (manufacturer of products) and 
(sold in form showing he intends them to 
reach the ultimate consumer in the form which 
they left h im) and 
(knowledge that absence of reasonable care 
wil l result in injury to consumer's life or 
property) 
T h e n (manufacturer owes a duty to the 
consumer to take reasonable care) 
Figure 11: Formalisation of a ratio decidendi 
Representing cases in this way appears a simple way to capture the notion of ratio 
decidendi and seems to provide a simple implementation of the idea that 'like cases 
should be decided alike'. Similar precedents are simply regarded as those precedents in 
which the pre-requisites of the formalism are satisfied. However,, there are at least two 
objections to this approach to simulating legal analogising. First, this approach to legal 
analogical reasoning is jurisprudentially suspect. Secondly, this approach essenfially 
reduces analogical reasoning to a form of deductive reasoning. 
The use of formalisms to simulate legal analogical reasoning is based on the 
jurisprudential view that the rule for which cases stand can be unambiguously extracted 
from precedents themselves.^'' The essential notion is that precedents have specific 
holdings for which they stand and that these holdings can be explicitly and satisfactorily 
210 [1932] A.C. 562, 599. 
2 " Alternatively it has been argued that these rules should be formulated based on the idea of 'deep 
structure': Smith J.C. and Deedman C , 'The Application of Expert Systems Technology to Case-Based 
Law' p. 84, in The First International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the 
Conference (1987) ACM Press. This has been applied in subsequent systems e.g.: MacCrimmon Marilyn 
T., 'Expert Systems in Case-Based Law: The Hearsay Rule Advisor' p.68, in The Second International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1989) ACM Press; 
Kowalski Andrezj, 'Case-Based Reasoning and tlie Deep Structure Approach to Knowledge 
Representation' p.21, in The Third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: 
Proceedings of the Conference (1991) ACM Press. 
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expressed using formalisms. For numerous decades however, jurists such as Stone have 
emphasised the difficulty in determining the ratio of precedents. 212 According to Stone 
precedents have mulfiple, perhaps conflicfing rationes}^^ When applying a precedent one 
of those rationes must be chosen. Existing systems do not attempt to represent these 
multiple rationes. Hence this approach to formalising the ratio of precedents involves a 
large amount of choice as to which particular ratio it is chosen to formalise. Systems that 
rely on the formalisation of the ratio of precedents only have the formalisation of the 
developer's view of what proposition a precedent embodies. This misrepresents the way 
that precedents are used in law. The ratio of a case may change through time with 
subsequent applicafion and reinterpretafion.214 An inflexible statement of the proposition 
that a case is presumed to express does not reflect the flexible and changing nature of 
ratio. 
Using a formalism to represent a ratio of a precedent, and then reasoning only with this 
formalism, also misrepresents an important aspect of precedents and the use of 
precedents. As discussed in chapter 3 providing arguments for the propositions contained 
in precedents is extremely important. Precedents contain reports of the arguments 
supporting and detracting fi-om the various proposifions that can be regarded as the ratio 
of a precedent. The expression of a ratio of a precedent expresses the outcome of these 
arguments for the particular facts in the precedent.215 in a different situation, involving 
different facts, the ratio of the earlier precedent may not be directly applicable. However, 
the arguments and justifications from the earlier precedent may nonetheless be relevant. 
Hence, the use of cases in legal analogical reasoning involves more than reference to a 
ratio of a prior precedent. The arguments that support the ratio are extremely important. 
These arguments influence the finding that precedents are similar to each other and that 
they are similar to a problem. Approaches to simulafing legal analogical reasoning that 
rely on the formalisation of the ratio of precedents ignore an important way in which 
precedents are used in legal analogical reasoning. 
The straightforward formulafion of the ratio of cases is also problemafic in that it 
reduces analogical reasoning to deductive reasoning. This is ironic in that psychologists 
212 Stone, above n 66, 37. 
213 Ibid. 
2i4Levi, above n 18, 8-27. 
215 Ibid 5-6. 
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and cognitive scientists argue that analogical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of the 
way in which humans reason. '^^  i t was in response to the failings of rule-base attempts to 
simulate human reasoning that research in analogising arose in artificial intelligence. It 
has been said that legal expert systems should engage in the 
application of deductive logic in selection of legal rules and their application 
to the facts to be subsumed.^ ''^  
However, legal rules require the subsumption of specific facts into the general categories 
present in the antecedents of rules. Legal analogical reasoning is a method by which this 
subsumption occurs. Hence the use of such formalisms to simulate legal analogising 
ignores the very problems inherent in their own application. 
Bench-Capon in particular has defended the rule-based approach to handling open 
texture.2'8 He argues that in an environment where a computer is being used to support a 
human decision maker, rule-based representations provide useful support. This view is 
not disputed here. However, i f we ask 'How can computers be programmed to simulate 
legal analogical reasoning?', rather than to support humans in their decision making then 
this observation is less relevant. The issue then is not how computers can be used in law 
to support human decision makers, but rather whether and i f so how, computers can 
themselves be made to simulate legal analogical reasoning. The formalisation of the ratio 
of precedents is not sufficient to simulate what jurists argue to be involved in legal 
analogical reasoning. 
6.3.2 Semantic flexibility and the problem of similarity 
Simulations of legal analogising are based on approaches to simulating analogising 
developed in artificial intelligence. Researchers in artificial intelligence and law have 
utilised techniques from case-based reasoning, computational analogy and neural 
networks. However, attempts to simulate legal analogising are subject to the same 
problems, discussed in the previous chapter, inherent in these techniques. First, it is 
difficult to represent all the knowledge contained in precedents in a computer 
The work of FARG best expresses this: Hofstadter and FARG, above n 153. 
2'"^ Susskind Richard E . , 'The Latent Damage System: A Jurisprudential Analysis' p.23, in The Second 
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1989) 
ACM Press, 28. 
21^ Bench-Capon Trevor M., 'In Defence of Rule-based representations for Legal Knowledge-based 
systems' (1994) 3 Law, computers & artificial intelligence 15. 
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manipulable form. Secondly, the semanfic flexibility inherent in legal analogising results 
in crude determinafions of similarity between precedents. The following examination of 
simulations of legal analogising highlights these problems and the restrictions they 
impose on simulations of legal analogising. 
6.3.2.1 Simple matching 
The most straightforward attempt to simulate legal analogical reasoning relies on the 
simple matching of indices developed in case-based reasoning. Analogous precedents are 
regarded simply as those which share common indices. In the construcfion of such 
systems an expert lawyer in the field in which the system is being built must first 
determine those features of the field that are important to determine the outcome of 
problems.219 For example, in Dutch landlord-tenant law some of the features that 
influence the decision as to how much rent must be paid are: the age of the tenant, the 
temperature of the house and the season.220 Exisfing precedents in the area are then 
analysed to determine whether or not they exemplify the features that were identified. 
Thus, after analysis a group of precedents will exist each one classified according to the 
features it exemplifies. For example, figure 12 shows part of one case used by 
PROLEXES which operates in the are of Dutch landlord - tenant law. 
Tenant age > 65 10 
Room temperature < 13°C 20 
Season name = "winter" 15 
etc. 221 
Figure 12: Features in landlord - tenant law 
When a new problem needs to be solved it is also analysed to determine which indices it 
exemplifies. Knowing what features are important in the current problem allows 
precedents that share common indices with the problem to be retrieved. 222 Since the 
215 In slightly more complex systems, the legal expert may provide an indication of how important each 
particular index is to determining the outcome of problems. The importance of each index can be 
reflected by the assignment of a number to each index to reflect to reflect its relative importance. 
220 Walker R.F., Oskamp A., Schrickx J.A., van Opdorp G.J. and van den Berg P.H., 'PROLEXS: 
creating law and order in a heterogeneous domain' (1991) 35 International Journal of Man-Machine 
Studies 35. 56. 
221 Ibid. 
222 In more complex approaches only those precedents which share indices with the problem and where 
the aggregate value of those indices is above a certain score are retrieved. 
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problem and the retrieved precedents share indices, they are in this sense similar and 
analogous. Several systems adopt this approach to simulating legal analogical 
reasoning.223 
There are numerous difficulties with this approach to simulating legal analogical 
reasoning.224 Simulating legal analogising simply by matching indices revolves around the 
features regarded by the expert as important for determining the outcome of problems. 
This is problematic i f experts differ as to what features are important in a particular area. 
I f features that one expert regards as relevant are not included in a system then the 
system will not be able to find similarities based on that feature. I f an expert regards two 
precedents as analogous because they both share a common feature and that feature is 
not included in a system, then that system will not be able to simulate this analogy. The 
simulation of analogising is dependent on the features by which it is decided to index the 
area of law. 
A related problem results from the need to classify precedents and problems as 
containing particular features. Experts can reasonably differ as to whether precedents and 
problems exemplify individual features. However, i f a problem is classified by one expert 
as exemplifying a particular group of features, and classified by another expert as 
exemplifying an even slightly different group of features, then different precedents will be 
regarded as analogous to the problem in each situation. Again, the simulation of 
analogising is dependent on the features used to index the area of law. Matching indices 
requires precedents to be unambiguously indexed. The significance of these problems 
depends on how controversial or non-controversial is the choice of features in the 
particular area of law in which the system will operate. 
A more fundamental problem with simple index matching is that it does not account for 
the semantic flexibility that is a hallmark of analogical reasoning. In simple index 
matching the concepts that are regarded as relevant to a particular area, their content and 
223 E.g.: MacCrimmon, above n 211; Kowalski, above n 211; Walker et al, above n 220. 
224 As a practical matter it is difficult to assign meaningful numerical values to indices to indicate their 
importance and it is difficult to determine at what score precedents are to be regarded as analogous: van 
Opdorp G.J., Walker R.F., Schrickx J.A., Groendijk C. and van den Berg P H., 'Networks at Work: A 
connectionist approach to non-deductive legal reasoning' p.278, in The Third International Conference 
on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of tlie Conference (1991) ACM Press. The use of neural 
networks may ease tliese problems: ibid. 
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their relafionships with each other, are all fixed at the fime a system is created. However, 
over time the concepts relevant to a domain, the content of these concepts and the 
relationships between these concepts may all change. Some concepts become relevant 
while new concepts become relevant.225 Such changes can be incorporated within the 
index matching approach to simulating legal analogical reasoning. For example when a 
feature ceases to be relevant every precedent contained in a system could be re-examined 
and that feature removed from the precedents. When a new feature becomes relevant 
every precedent contained in the system could be re-examined to determine whether each 
precedent exemplifies the new feature. However, incorporafing such changes is fime 
consuming and involves the same problems, discussed above, as does the initial 
assignment of features to precedents. 
While this aspect of conceptual change can be accommodated in the index matching 
approach to simulating legal analogising, the semantic flexibility inherent in analogising 
cannot. In semantic flexibility, as illustrated by the question 'Who is the First Lady of 
England?', the content of concepts and the relationships between concepts changes 
during analogising. During analogising distant and unconnected concepts can come to be 
regarded as similar. Cognitive scientists argue that this aspect of conceptual change is 
fiandamental to analogical reasoning.226 As Holyoak and Thagard state, 'the act of 
making an analogy creates new connecfions.'227 The simple index matching approach to 
simulating legal analogising cannot accommodate this aspect of conceptual change. 
Hence, simple index matching can only provide a very limited simulafion of legal 
analogical reasoning. 
A final objection to current systems based on the simple index matching approach to 
simulating legal analogising is that they do not account for the environment of argument 
in which legal analogical reasoning occurs. As argued in chapter 3 and chapter 4, the 
acceptability and persuasiveness of legal analogies depends in part on the justifications 
that are provided for those analogies. Many different analogies can exist between 
situations and hence in law it is important to justify the particular analogy that is created. 
Many systems do not attempt to justify analogies that are proposed. It is left to the user 
225 Levi, above n 18, 8. 
226 E.g. see: Hofstadter and FARG, above n 153. 
227 Holyoak and Thagard, above n 153, 7. 
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of the system to infer why a problem was similar to one precedent and dissimilar to 
another precedent. This may be more acceptable in a context where a system is being 
used as an aide memoir, to guide an experienced person in their decision making. 
However, when the aim is to create a computer system that can simulate legal analogical 
reasoning, leaving the user of the system to make such inferences is insufficient. 
Hence as a means to simulate all that is involved in legal analogical reasoning, the simple 
matching of indices is insufficient. This approach, this approach is dependent on the 
choice of features that an expert in a field regards as important to that field. This can 
cause problems i f experts differ as to which features are important. More problematic, 
the simple matching of indices cannot simulate all that is involved in the semantic 
flexibility inherent in analogising. This approach to simulating legal analogising is limited 
to finding surface correspondences between problems and precedents. Further, this 
approach to simulating legal analogising does not attempt to justify legal analogies which 
are proposed. Simple index matching is thus only able to provide a shallow simulation of 
legal analogical reasoning. 
6.3.2.2 Neural networks 
In many ways attempts to simulate legal analogising using neural networks resemble 
attempts to simulate legal analogising based on simple index matching. The use of neural 
networks to simulate legal analogising is subject to many of the same objecfions as 
simple index matching. 
In artificial intelligence, researchers are interested in neural networks because these 
networks are good at pattern matching.22^ Analogical reasoning and legal analogical 
reasoning can be regarded as an aspect of pattern recognifion and pattern classification229 
As in simple index matching, precedents are analysed by an expert who selects features 
that are thought important in those precedents. For example, in the law governing theft 
some of the features relevant to determining the outcome of cases are: whether the 
defendant was acting dishonestly; whether the defendant believed they had a legal right 
to the property; whether the defendant believed the property was lost and whether the 
228 See generally: Caudill and Butler, above n 200. 
229 Sunstein 'On Analogical Reasoning', above n 12, 755-7. 
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defendant had the intention to permanently deprive the owner of the property.230 A 
neural network is constructed using these features (figure 13). 
Dishonest 
Bel ief 
B ^ '^f'" property -








Figure 13: Theft artificial neural network 
The network is then 'trained' with the precedents that have been analysed for the 
presence or absence of the features selected by the expert. 222 
Trained in this way the network will group precedents that share similar patterns of 
features together(figure 14). 
Precedent 5 
Precedent 1 J Precedent 7 
Precedent 3 ^^^V Precedent 2 
Precedent 6 
Precedent 4 
Figure 14: Neural networks group similar precedents together 
When a problem needs to be solved, it too is first analysed for the presence or absence of 
those features indicated as important by the expert. After such analysis, the problem can 
Hobson Jolm B. and Slee David, 'Indexing the Theft Act 1968 for Case Based Reasoning [CBR] and 
Artificial Neural Networks' p., in Proceedings of the Fourth National Conference on Law, Computers 
and Artificial Intelligence (1994). 
23' Tliis is a reconstruction of the network used by Hobson and Slee. 
232 In the most common form of training, a neural network is presented both witli an input pattern and 
the output that is desired when that input pattern is presented. The neural network is repeatedly 
presented with patterns until they are classified to an acceptable degree of accuracy. The neural network 
learns to associate input pattern with the output patterns. See generally: Caudill and Butier, above n200. 
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be presented to the network. When a problem is presented to a neural network that has 
been created and trained in this manner, the network will classify the problem as 
belonging to one of the general groups created during its training. The network classifies 
the problem according to the general group of precedents to which the problem is 
analogous. In this way it appears possible to use neural networks to simulate legal 
analogical reasoning. This use of neural networks has been proposed by several 
researchers.233 For example Hobson and Slee have created a neural network which 
attempts to classify cases covered by the Theft Act 1968.234 When presented with a 
problem possessing a certain combinafion of features, the network indicates which 
general legal class the problem is a member of This classification is a result of the 
training conducted with precedents. The network can thus loosely be said to classify the 
problem by 'analogy' with the precedents used to train it. 
Apart from the numerous practical problems involved in using neural networks in the 
way discussed above235 as a means to simulate legal analogical reasoning there are also 
theoretical concerns. First, as with simple index matching, the ability of a neural network 
to simulate legal analogising is dependent on the features chosen by an expert as 
important in the particular domain. This is subject to the same concerns as is the 
selection of features required by simple index matching. Further, analogical reasoning 
also involves semantic flexibility. As analogies are perceived and constructed the 
semantic content of the concepts being analogised can subfly change. Researchers who 
use neural networks to simulate legal analogical reasoning do not account for or discuss 
how such semantic flexibility can be accommodated. Moreover, neural networks operate 
as 'black boxes', they simply accept an input pattern and oracularly classify it as 
belonging to a particular class. By themselves neural networks are not able to explain or 
justify why a particular input results in a particular output.236 As in simple index 
233 E.g. van Opdorp et al, above n 224; Bench-Capon Trevor, 'Neural Networks and Open Texmre' 
p.292, in The Fourth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the 
Conference (1993) ACM Press; Hobson and Slee, above n 230; Philipps Lothar, 'Distribution of 
Damages in Car Accidents Through tlie Use of Neural Networks' (1991) 13 Cordozo Law Review 981. 
234 Hobson and Slee, above n 230. 
235 For more detail see: Aikenliead Michael, 'The Uses and Abuses of Neural Networks in Law' (1996) 
12 Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal 31. 
236 For more detail see Aikenhead, above n 235. Several approaches have been proposed to justify' tlie 
outputs of neural networks. One of the most interesting is to justify' the output of artificial neural 
networks using other mechanisms: Zeleznikow John and Stranieri Andrew, 'The Split-Up S}'Stem: 
Integrating neural networks and rule-based reasoning in the legal domain' p. 185, in The Fifth 
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1995) 
ACM Press. This approach is extremely interesting however, the systems discussed here do not 
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matching this inability to justify results and to provide the argumentative context in 
which the result is achieved renders the use of neural networks, by themselves, 
insufficient to provide a deep simulation of the processes of legal analogising. For these 
reasons there must be scepticism as to the usefulness of this means of using neural 
networks to simulate in legal analogical reasoning. As with simple index matching, this 
use of neural networks is limited to finding surface correspondences between problems 
and precedents. 
In another sense however, some of the ideas underlying neural networks may prove 
valuable in simulations of legal analogising. For example the FARG architecture is based 
on the idea of a network of interconnected Platonic concepts. The FARG architecture 
displays an interesting approach to dealing with the semantic flexibility demonstrated in 
analogical reasoning. Hence insights from the neural network paradigm could prove 
extremely valuable in simulating legal analogising. Indeed, ideas underlying neural 
networks have been incorporated in systems that perform legal information retrieval. As 
discussed below, such ideas could find application in systems that simulate legal 
analogising. However, researchers who use neural networks to simulate legal analogising 
in the manner discussed above ignore problems inherent in doing so. 
6.3.2.3 Analogy as argument 
As discussed in chapter 3, providing arguments in support of legal analogies is extremely 
important. Simulations of legal analogising based on simple index matching and neural 
networks do not accommodate this aspect of legal analogising. However, several systems 
constructed to simulate legal analogising do. These systems thus appear able to 
overcome this problem with simple index matching and neural networks. However, it will 
be seen that these approaches are still restricted by their ability to simulate the semantic 
flexibility inherent in analogising. 
The most famous approach to simulating legal analogical reasoning within an 
argumentative context was pioneered by Ashley.^ "^? It is worthwhile examining this 
approach in depth first because it appears possible to provide a sophisticated simulation 
implement such justification mechanisms. This discussion will thus be confined to discussion of the use 
of artificial neural networks other than as part of such justification mechanisms. 
•^ •'^  Ashley, above n 3. 
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of legal analogising and secondly because this approach forms the basis for many 
subsequent attempts to simulate legal analogising. 
The central aim of Ashley's work is to explore and simulate how precedents that are 
similar to a problem can be used to construct and support arguments about how the 
problem should be resolved. This mirrors the way that legal practitioners use precedents 
to construct and support arguments for particular propositions and the way in which 
alternative precedents are cited in order to undermine these arguments. Under Ashley's 
approach to simulating legal analogising, a domain of law is first analysed to determine 
what 'dimensions' are important for predicting the outcome of disputes within the 
d o m a i n . A s with features in simple index matching and neural networks, dimensions 
are what an expert in the field regards as important to determining the outcome of cases. 
Dimensions do not specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a classification but 
instead represent considerations that are relevant to constructing arguments for and 
against a classification.According to Ashley, dimensions 
are a conceptual link between various clusters of operative facts ... and the 
legal conclusions that they support or undermine.^ ^o 
For example. United States trade secrets law can be broken down into various factors 
such as: 'common-employee-paid-to-change-employers', 'exists-express-non-
competition-agreement' and 'security-measures-adopted'.^'^ Figure 15 indicates a 
precedent analysed according to the dimensions it exempHfies. The dimensions that were 
important in the precedent are indicated in the 'Dimensions List'. 
To be precise, Ashley's theory of argument is based on the use of 'factors'. When factors are 
implemented in a computer program that are approximated using dimensions; Ashley, above n 3, 37-8. 
However, for simplicity it is sufficient to here refer solely to dimensions. 
239 Ibid 112-3. 
240 Ibid 38. 
241 For a complete list of dimensions used by the HYPO program see: ibid Appendix F. 
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Case: U S M Corp. v. Maison f ^ e n e r Corp. 
S H O R T T I T L E : "USM v. Maison" 
C I T A T I O N : 379 Maas. 90 
D A T E : August 29, 1979 
P A R T I E S : 
Plaintiff Corporate-Party: USM 
Defendant Corporate-Party: Marson 
D E C I S I O N FOR: Plaintiff Corporate-Party: USM 
C L A I M S D E C I D E D : Type-of-Claim: Tyade-Secrets-Misappropriatioa 
Won by: Plaintiff Corporate-Party: USM 
D I M E N S I O N S L I S T : 
Competitive-Advantage- Gained 
Security-Measures-Adopted 
C A S E S C I T E D : 
Eastern Marble v. Roman Marble 
Healy v. Murphy 
E 4 2 
Figure 15: A top-level HYPO precedent frame 
It is these dimensions that analogising revolves around. 
The presence of some dimensions and the absence of others will strengthen the plaintiffs 
case while the presence of other dimensions and the absence of others will strengthen the 
defendant's case. According to Ashley, a precedent is a historical collection of 
conflicting dimensions to which a judge has assigned an outcome with respect to a legal 
claim.243A dispute will involve competing dimensions and since there is no 'deductive or 
mathematical process' by which to resolve the conflicts between dimensions, precedents 
are used to support arguments about how to resolve conflicting dimensions in a 
problem.244 By focusing on dimensions, arguments can be constructed for and against a 
particular classification and precedents that have shared dimensions can be cited in these 
arguments as support. 
Analogising within this framework is straightforward. A problem is first analysed for the 
dimensions it exemplifies. Precedents analogous to the problem can then be found. A 
similarity between the problem and a precedent is defined as the presence of a shared 
dimension between a precedent and the p r o b l e m . a problem and a precedent have a 
difference i f there are either unshared dimensions that lead to a different outcome than 
the desired outcome or there is a shared dimension that differs in magnitude. ^ ''^  
'^'^  Ibid 90. Note that tliis is only tlie top most frame which is actually used to represent this precedent. 
Ibid 28. 




Ashley has implemented this theory of legal analogising in the program 'HYPO'. Once a 
dispute is analysed to determine the dimensions present, HYPO is able to determine what 
claims are possibly relevant, to retrieve precedents which share similarities and 
differences and to construct arguments and hypotheticals for and against claims using 
these precedents. HYPO is a landmark in attempts to simulate legal analogical reasoning. 
The dimension based approach to simulating legal analogical reasoning has been adopted 
in numerous subsequent systems.24'7 The model of analogy as argument embodied in 
HYPO is more sophisticated than anything implemented in previous programs. By 
placing legal analogical reasoning within the context of argument the theory of legal 
analogising underlying HYPO appears to overcome the limitations of simple index 
matching and neural network approaches to simulating legal analogising. However, as a 
means to simulate legal analogising, dimensional analysis is itself subject to several 
limitations. 
In the context of analogy as argument an interesting extension to HYPO has been made 
by Skalak and Rissland in their CABARET system.248 CABARET extends HYPO by 
adding knowledge of'typical' types of arguments that are made and how precedents can 
be used to make such arguments. For example, i f a precedent does not favour a 
particular claim, one argument strategy would be to distinguish the precedent. 
CABARET has knowledge of how to make such arguments and how to cite precedents 
in support of these arguments. With explicit knowledge of such argument strategies, the 
types of argument that CABARET can make are more sophisticated than HYPO is able 
247 E.g.: Lambert Kenneth A. and Grunewald Mark H., 'LESTER: Using Paradigm Cases in a Quasi-
Precedential Legal Domain' p. 87, in The Second International Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1989) ACM Press; Vossos George, Zeleznikow Jolm, Moore 
Allan and Hunter Dan, 'The Credit Act Advisory System (CAAS): Conversion from an Expert System 
Prototype to a C++ Commercial System' p. 180, in The Fourth International Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1993) ACM Press; Murbach Ruth and Nonn Eva, 
'Similarity in Harder Cases: Sentencing for Fraud' p.236, in The Fourth International Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1993) ACM Press; Button N., Patterson 
A., Tata C. and Wilson J., 'Decision Support for Sentencing in Common Law lurisdiction' p.89, in The 
Fifth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1995) 
ACM Press; Aleven Vincent and Ashley Kevin D., 'What Law Students Need to Know to WIN' p. 152, in 
The Fourth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference 
(1993) ACM Press; McLaren Bruce M. and Ashley Kevin D., 'Context Sensitive Case Comparisons in 
Practical Ethics: Reasoning about Reasons' p.316, in The Fifth International Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1995) ACM Press. 
248 Rissland Edwina L. and Skalak David B., 'Interpreting Statutory Predicates' p.46, in The Second 
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1989) 
ACM Press; Skalak David B. and Rissland Edwina L. , 'Argument Moves in a Rule-Guided Domain' p. 1, 
in The Third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the 
Conference (1991) ACM Press. 
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to. However, the approach to analogising adopted in CABARET is essentially the same 
as in HYPO. CABARET adopts the dimensional analysis pioneered in HYPO. While an 
interesting application of dimensional analysis it does not extend the model of analogical 
reasoning embodied in HYPO. 
The dimension based approach to simulating legal analogising embodied in HYPO 
provides significant benefit over simple index matching and neural network approaches 
to simulating analogising. However, as a complete model of legal analogising this 
approach has several Hmitations.249 Dimensional analysis shares a common limitation 
with simple feature matching and neural network approaches to simulating legal 
analogising. The limitation stems from the need to select a limited number of dimensions 
with which to describe a particular area of law. As was discussed in relation to simple 
index matching and neural networks, this presents problems for simulating the semantic 
flexibility that is characteristic of analogical reasoning. Dimensional analysis is limited in 
its ability to simulate semantic flexibihty. The ability of HYPO to create analogies is 
limited to those types of legal analogy and those aspects of legal analogising in which the 
analogy revolves around matching shared dimensions. For example, HYPO can retrieve 
precedents that share the dimension 'competitive-advantage-gained'. Based on the fact 
that both these precedents a competitive advantage was gained through misappropriation 
of a trade secret, HYPO can be considered to have created an analogy with these 
precedents. As discussed in relation to simple index matching however, problems arise if 
dimensions cease to be relevant to an area or i f new dimensions become relevant. Both 
problems can be accommodated by either deleting obsolete dimensions from precedents 
or by re-analysing precedents to determine if they contain a newly relevant dimension. 
However, this is time consuming. 
More problematic, the subtle changes in the content and relationships between concepts 
that can occur during analogising cannot be accommodated by dimensional analysis. 
HYPO relies on the static classification of precedents and problems in terms of the 
dimensions used to analyse a domain. The initial set of precedents in HYPO were 
classified by Ashley. Problems presented to the system must be classified in terms of 
these dimensions by the user of the system. Once presented to the system the 
249 Ashley, above n 3, 238-46. 
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classification of precedents and problems in terms of dimensions is static. While HYPO is 
able to produce arguments for and against a position based on these classifications, all 
such argument occurs within the context of these prior classifications. 
According to Ashley, HYPO would be improved by amongst other things, allowing it: to 
reason with abstract legal predicates; to pose sophisticated hypotheticals to test the 
meaning of predicates; to argue by analogy fi'om other kinds of claims and to learn 
dimensions.250 While each of these would undoubtedly improve HYPO they are all 
indications of a deeper problem. The problem is that the model of analogy at the heart of 
HYPO is insufficient to perform more complex analogising. As Mendelson highlights, 
dimensional analysis is only usefijl in some domains of law.2^1 The problem that 
Mendelson highlights exists because in some areas of law the content of dimensions is 
fluid. As FARG argue, central to deep analogising is the abihty to reclassify situations in 
terms of the concepts relevant to a field, to re-assess the content of concepts relevant to 
a field and to re-assess the inter-relations of concepts relevant to a field. HYPO cannot 
perform any of these.252 A more sophisticated simulation of legal analogising must 
simulate the dynamic interactions and change that legal concepts undergo during legal 
analogising. A method is needed to simulate the semantic flexibility inherent in the 
assessment of similarity, 
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is in research on computational analogy that the 
most detailed work has been conducted into the conditions under which situations can be 
regarded as similar. This work has been applied in attempts to simulate legal analogising. 
One of the most interesting such systems is 'GREBE' created by Branting'253 which 
attempts to create precedent-based arguments in the area of Texas workers 
compensation law. 
250 Ibid 238. 
251 Mendelson Simon, 'An Attempted Dimensional Analysis of the Law Governing Government 
Appeals in Criminal Cases' p. 128, in The Second International Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1989) ACM Press. 
252 While the dimensions in HYPO can in some senses be regarded as tlie equivalent of the Platonic 
concepts that are central to the FARG architectiu-e, HYPO has no equivalent to tlie dynamic change in 
concepts tliat is central to the FARG architecture. 
253 See Branting Karl L . , 'Representing and Reusing Explanations of Legal Precedents' p. 103, in The 
Second International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of tlie Conference 
(1989) ACM Press hereafter 'Reusing Explanations'; Branting L. Karl, 'Reasoning witli Portions of 
Precedents' p. 145, in The Third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: 
Proceedings of the Conference (1991) ACM Press hereafter 'Reasoning witli Portions'. 
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Unhke HYPO in which matching relies on shared dimensions, GREBE utilises detailed 
representations of the precedents in the area of law in which it operates. An aspect of 
one of the leading precedents in Texas workers compensation law is show in figure 16. 
occur dur ing Meyer travel 
Meyer i n j u r y agent 
achieves 
Meyer at 








K n o w defects 
Determine 
defects 
E 5 4 
Figure 16: A GREBE case representation 
For example the section of figure 16 labelled 'A ' indicates that the injury suffered by the 
plaintiff, Meyer, occurred while Meyer was travelling. 
When a problem needs to be solved, the facts of the problem must first be converted into 
a representation of the form in figure 16. For example, a hypothetical problem involving 
a plaintiff. Smith, injured during travelling could be represented as in figure 17. 
occur d u r i n g 
S m i t h 
S m i t h t rave 
Figure 17; Hypothetical problem for GREBE 
With this representation of the problem, precedents that are similar can be found.. For 
example the portion of the hypothetical problem illustrated in figure 17 matches the 
portion of the precedent labelled 'A ' in figure 16. Both involve a plaintiff injured while 
travelling. Thus the problem and the precedent are analogous. 
254 Adapted from: Branting 'Reusing Explanations', above n 253, 106. 
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Using such similarities arguments can be constructed as to why a problem should be 
decided for the plaintiff, counter arguments can be constructed as to why the problem 
should be decided for the defendant, and precedents can be cited to support these 
arguments. In this way GREBE appears able to perform legal analogical reasoning and to 
create precedent-based argument. One problem with HYPO is that similarities can only 
be found between precedents and a problem if they share a dimension. GREBE appears 
to overcome this Hmitation by representing the detailed facts of precedents and problems. 
This appears to allow a finer assessment of similarities between cases - a similarity 
dependent on the sharing of individual facts and not just general dimensions. 
In addition, the search for similarities that GREBE undertakes is performed recursively. 
I f a relationship of similarity cannot be inferred between a problem and a precedent 
because an aspect of the problem and the precedent do not match, GREBE will attempt 
to construct an argument as to why this aspect should also be regarded as similar in the 
precedent and problem. This argument will itself rely on analogising further precedents. 
GREBE thus uses precedents not only to argue why whole situations are analogous, but 
to argue why parts of these precedents are analogous. Branting argues that often only a 
portion of a precedent is relevant to a particular dispute and so it is necessary to be able 
to reason with portions of precedents.255 HYPO cannot utilise portions of precedents in 
the construction of similarity and the building of precedent-based arguments. GREBE's 
ability to utilise portions of precedents in legal analogical reasoning is an important 
advance. However, GREBE shares numerous limitations with other approaches to 
simulating legal analogising. 
GREBE determines similarities between problems and precedents by searching for shared 
systematic relationships between representations of problems and representations of 
precedents.256 However, as discussed above during examination of the Structure 
Mapping Engine, this conception of analogising is limited. The finding of similarifies 
based on shared systematic structures is completely dependent on the way in which the 
designer of the system chooses to represent knowledge in the system. For example, the 
two representations illustrated in figure 18 would not be matched as similar. 
255 Branting 'Reasoning with Portions', above n 253. 
256 The conception of analogy embodied in GREBE is based on the work of Centner: ibid 152. 
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o c c u r d u r i n g 
— • ^ m i t l r t r ^ e ^ / 
V S m i t h i n j u r y / 
results in 
Figure 18: Problems with matching in GREBE 
Even though these two situations represent the same information, GREBE would not 
match these two situations as their structures are different. The way that precedents and 
problems are represented in GREBE is dependent on the interpretation given to them by 
the designer of the system. Like the Structure Mapping Engine on which GREBE is 
based, GREBE cannot accommodate the semantic flexibility that is characteristic of 
analogical reasoning. GREBE contains no technique to flexibly re-represent legal 
knowledge.257 Like HYPO, GREBE's ability to simulate legal analogical reasoning is 
severely limited by the inability of the program to accommodate the semantic flexibility 
characteristic of analogical reasoning. 
HYPO and GREBE are two of the most sophisticated attempts to simulate legal 
analogical reasoning. Both programs are distinguished by the use made of precedents to 
construct precedent-based arguments. However, as in approaches to simulating 
analogical reasoning generally, HYPO and GREBE are severely limited by their ability to 
determine similarities between problems and precedents. HYPO and GREBE are unable 
to accommodate the semantic flexibility inherent in analogical reasoning. 
As argued in chapter 4 one of the causes of semantic flexibility in legal analogical 
reasoning is the influence of legal principles on legal analogising. The creation of 
analogies is influenced by the principles that a reasoner adheres to. A step towards 
accommodating semantic flexibility would thus be to accommodate the influence of 
principles on legal analogising. Neither approaches based on simple index matching. 
25"^ While the way that knowledge contained in GREBE is illustrated for the purpose of readers, as in 
figure 16 may appear similar to the way knowledge is represented in a slipnet, such as in figure 9, in fact 
they are very different. A slipnet is used to represent knowledge about Platonic concepts relevant to a 
whole area, this knowledge is flexibly related. In contrast, tlie representation used in GREBE is used to 
represent knowledge about specific facts of specific precedents, tliis information is inflexibly 
represented. The representations of precedents illustrated in figure 16 are in fact equivalent to tlie use of 
predicate calculus discussed in relation to the Structure Mapping Engine and the Analogical Constraint 
Mapping Engine discussed in chapter 5. 
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neural networks, nor HYPO or GREBE have the ability to reason with the legal 
principles that underlie the law. However, researchers have proposed methods to reason 
with legal principles. Whether these proposals can improve simulations of legal 
analogical reasoning is examined next. 
6.3.3 Reasoning with legal principles. 
The inability to simulate the semantic flexibility inherent in legal analogising plagues 
attempts to simulate legal analogising. One of the causes of flexibility in legal analogical 
reasoning is the influence of legal principles. Recent research in artificial intelligence and 
law attempts to incorporate reasoning with legal principles. Diverse approaches are 
adopted in these attempts. However, as will be seen no approach fully simulates the role 
of legal principles in legal analogising. 
An increasing amount of research in artificial intelligence and law investigates the logical 
structure of legal argument. Fundamental to this work is the issue of what consttutes a 
legal argument. This research focuses on quesfions such as: when one argument is 
contrary to another argument; when one argument defeats another argument and when 
an argument provides support for another argument. This research is relevant to attempts 
to simulate legal analogising for two reasons. First, as highlighted in chapter 3 the 
arguments provided to justify legal analogies are extremely important. Secondly, as 
discussed in chapter 3, underlying legal arguments are considerations of legal principle. A 
comprehensive investigation of legal argument necessarily involves an investigafion of 
the role of legal principles in argument. Consequently, an ability to simulate the influence 
of legal principles on legal argument would benefit attempts to simulate legal analogising. 
Unfortunately, this work on argument has largely occurred without attempt to apply it to 
legal analogical reasoning, it has not been shown how such models of argument could be 
used in a legal analogical reasoning system. Further, the models of argument investigated 
in such research often appear insufficient to model the type of arguments that often occur 
in legal analogical reasoning. Primarily, this research on legal argument does not discuss 
how reasoning with principles will occur or often implicitly assumes simple mechanisms 
for such reasoning.258 While these investigations have a potentially huge role in 
258 For a more detailed discussion of these problems, see: Aikenliead Michael, 'A Discourse on Law and 
Artificial Intelligence' (1996) 5 Law Technology Journal 13. 
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simulations of legal analogising, this research currently provides little guidance for 
simulating the role of legal principles in legal analogical reasoning. 
One notable exception amongst this work that does explore legal analogising is the 
Language for Legal Discourse (LLD) developed by McCarty and Sridharan.259 
Underlying LLD is the view that to simulate legal reasoning successfully it is necessary 
to have a strong theory of the legal domain.26o LLD is extremely ambitious and involves 
modelling legal primitives such as time, causation, rights and duties.2^1 Amongst other 
things, such a theory would specify what the scope of legal concepts is, how legal 
concepts relate to each other and how legal concepts change and evolve. With such a 
strong domain theory it would be possible to determine what legal analogies are and are 
not allowable and what justifications are acceptable for those analogies. 
In LLD, legal analogical reasoning would be simulated using 'prototypes' and 
'deformations'.262 A prototype is an exemplar precedent in a domain and deformations 
are the allowable changes that can be made to that exemplar precedent in its application 
to new situations. The allowable deformations are determined by LLD. With LLD much 
more abstract forms of similarity could be created between problems and precedents than 
is possible with simple index matching, neural networks, HYPO or GREBE. Two 
situations would be similar i f both those situations exemplify the same legal concept. 
More abstractly, two situations would be regarded as similar i f the legal concepts they 
exemplify could be transformed into a common concept utilising LLD. In this way a 
large aspect of semantic flexibility would be simulated - extremely abstract similarities 
could be created which would allow complex forms of legal analogising. 
259 Many papers have been published on LLD, an early paper is: McCarty L.Thome, 'A Language for 
Legal Discourse: I. Basic Features' p. 180, in The Second International Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1989) ACM Press hereafter 'Basic Features'. A 
more recent partial implementation of L L D is discussed in: McCarty L.Thome, 'An implementation of 
Eisner v Macomber' p. 276, in The Fifth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: 
Proceedings of the Conference (1995) ACM Press hereafter 'An implementation'. 
2*^ 0 It was noted in tlte discussion of case-based reasoning tliat domain tlieories can be used to aid the 
finding of similarities between cases: see chapter 5. LLD is an ambitious attempt to build a theor>' of the 
legal domain. 
261 Interesfingly these could be regarded as legal Platonic concepts. 
262 McCarty 'Basic Feattu-es', above n 259, 184-5. 
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Unfortunately LLD remains an unimplemented proposal and so it is not possible to 
assess the workings or the problems of an implementation.263 However, Ashley raises an 
important theoretical problem with LLD, that the notion of legal primitives at the centre 
of the system is misguided.264 According to Ashley it is not possible to unambiguously 
define a set of legal primitives. Ashley argues that the content and meaning of legal 
primitives is determined in precedents on a situation by situation basis. Hence it is not 
legal primitives that determine the result of precedents, but precedents that determine the 
meaning and content of legal primitives. Ashley's criticism of LLD echoes a dispute in 
jurisprudence over whether right answers exist for legal problems.265 I f LLD can be 
specified then right answers will be determinable from it. Conversely however, if right 
answers do not exist in law, the prospects for developing LLD seem remote. 
Whatever the outcome of this dispute, it highlights an important aspect of legal 
analogical reasoning. On the one hand legal analogies are judged according to abstract 
principles that transcend the particular facts of precedents. On the other hand, the 
content of these abstract principles are themselves explored and determined on a 
situation by situation basis. Thus while it may not be possible to unambiguously a priori 
state an abstract set of legal principles by which to compose legal analogies, as argued in 
chapter 4, nor can analogising occur without regard to such principles. What is needed is 
a way to simulate the influence of abstract principle on the perception of specific 
problems and precedents and the mutual influence of those problems and precedents on 
the content and relation of abstract principles. In this sense both McCarty and Ashley's 
analyses of legal analogical reasoning are informative. Neither analogising without 
reference to higher principle, nor inflexible representations of principle are sufficient to 
capture the fluidity present in legal analogising. Unfortunately LLD does not 
demonstrate how to achieve this. 
In contrast to the attempt in LLD to create a comprehensive domain theory, several 
more modest techniques have been proposed for simulating the influence of principles on 
legal analogising. 
263 For a discussion of some of these problems see: Ashley, above n 3, 224-5. 
264 Ibid 225. 
265 Refer to the autliorities cited above, n 73. 
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An early system that incorporated knowledge of legal principles was STARE developed 
by Goldman et al.266 STARE was designed as a means to investigate the cognitive issues 
involved in the understanding of contractual problems and decisions.267 Jn pursuit of this 
aim, STARE is based upon a complex model of the storage and indexing of legal 
precedents, and their interaction with more general legal and other knowledge. In 
STARE, situations are analysed and classified according to amongst other things, their 
relation to legal principles investigated by the jurist Hofeld.268 With precedents indexed 
in this way, STARE is able to retrieve precedents that do not share surface features, but 
that relate to the same underlying principle. STARE thus appears to perform complex 
analogical reasoning. However, STARE shares limitations similar to programs such as 
HYPO and GREBE. In STARE, cases are hand coded by the programmers.2^9 Hence 
while apparently utiHsing knowledge of legal principles to aid analogising, none of the 
influence of principles in the perception of situations and the construction of analogies is 
simulated. Principles are used simply as another index within the simple index matching 
approach to simulating analogising. In ignoring the complexity involved in the analysis of 
situations and the process of interpretation and reinterpretation of situations that is 
central to analogising STARE shares all the limitations of simple index matching.2™ 
STARE does not simulate the ways in which legal principles create the semantic 
flexibility evident in legal analogical reasoning. Thus while ostensibly reasoning with 
legal principles, STARE does not simulate the influence of legal principles on legal 
analogical reasoning. 
Motivated by the inadequacies of GREBE Branting has subsequently argued that it is 
insufficient to merely represent the facts present in a case and argues that it is necessary 
to reason with the legal theory under which precedents are decided.2''i Branting has 
proposed a representation of the ratio of precedents that incorporates this idea. Under 
266 Goldman Seth R., Dyer Michael G. and Flowers Margot, 'Precedent-based Legal Reasoning and 
Knowledge Acquisition in Contract Law: A Process Model' p.210, in The First International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1987) ACM Press. 
267 Ibid 212. 
268 Ibid 214. 
269 Ibid 216. 
2''0 See discussion of the FARG architecture: chapter 5 
2''! Branting Karl L . , 'A Reduction-Graph Model of Ratio Decidendi' p.40, in The Fourth Intemational 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1993) ACM Press 
hereafter 'A Reduction-Graph'. 
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this proposal the way that facts of precedents exemplify a particular legal theory is 
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Figure 19: Representing the theory underlying precedents 
It is difficult to dispute that representing structures and relations beyond the mere facts 
of precedents is necessary to accurately reason with those precedents. Branting has 
proposed a structured way to represent the theory under which cases are decided. 
Unfortunately, Branting gives very little indication of how this theory of ratio would be 
included in a system to simulate legal analogising. Moreover, two problems are apparent. 
First, the representation of the theory under which precedents are decided is subject to 
the same limitations as is the representation of the facts of precedents in GREBE. This 
representation reflects a single interpretation of a precedent by the programmer of the 
system. A slightly different representation of the precedent, even though containing the 
same information, will not match. The representation of precedents and the theory 
underlying them is brittle and heavily dependent on choices made by the programmer 
when creating a computer manipulable representation of the precedent. 
Secondly, although the theory underlying precedents is represented, Branting does not 
discuss how those theories can be utiHsed to simulate the fluid interpretafion of problems 
272 Ibid 43. 
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and precedents. As discussed in chapter 4, legal principles influence the way that the 
facts of problems are perceived. Branting's proposal does not address this fundamental 
role of principles in legal analogising. 
Rissland, Skalak and Friedman also propose that the theory of law under which 
precedents are decided is important to their precedential effect.2^73 jhey have developed a 
program, BankXX, in which legal theories are represented.2''4 In BankXX dimensions are 
used to indicate the important elements of a legal theory and whether the presence or 
absence of these dimensions favours or discourages the application of the theory.2'^ 5 \Yith 
a representation of the legal theories underlying precedents, amongst other things, 
BankXX is able to retrieve cases that apply the same theory as well as precedents that 
share the application of similar theories.2''6 BankXX produces arguments for and against 
propositions based on the retrieval of precedents and the legal theories underlying those 
precedents.2'^ '' In this way, some of the influence of legal theories on legal analogical 
reasoning is simulated. Further, with a representation of the legal theories underlying the 
law it is possible to provide more detailed justificatory arguments for legal analogies. 
While apparently providing a sophisticated simulation of legal analogising, BankXX is 
nevertheless subject to several limitations. Primarily, the approach to analogising 
embodied in BankXX is an extension of dimensional analysis. While BankXX apparently 
extends this with a representation of the legal theories underlying precedents, these 
theories are themselves represented using dimensional analysis. Hence the 
representations of legal theory utilised in BankXX is subject to the restrictions with 
dimensional analysis discussed previously. As in HYPO, precedents must be statistically 
classifled by the creator of the system as exemplifying particular dimensions. This 
approach to simulating legal analogising does not completely capture the semantic 
2''3 Rissland Edwina L . , Skalak David B. and Friedman M.Timur, 'BankXX: A Program to Generate 
Argument through Case-Base Search' p. 117, in The Fourth Intemational Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1993) ACM Press. The relationship between a 
legal theory as proposed in BankXX and legal principles is unfortunately not elaborated. While a 
comprehensive legal tlieory would have to incorporate legal principles, the legal theor>' utilised in 
BankXX does not discuss this. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Ibid 120. 
276 Ibid 121. 
277 Ibid. In addition, BankXX contains knowledge about common 'legal stories' that are present in the 
domain and which underlie cases, ibid 120. Unfortunately the authors do not provide detailed discussion 
of how these stories are used and so tliey will no be considered further.] 
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flexibility that is inherent in analogising. Similar problems are inherent in the use of 
dimensions to represent legal theories. The dimensions that constitute a theory, and 
whether a particular precedent exemplifies one of those dimensions is a decision made by 
the creators of the system. Hence the content and scope of theories, and the relation of 
those theories to particular precedents is static. However, like legal principles, legal 
theories dynamically influence the way in which the facts of precedents are perceived. 
BankXX does not address how this will occur. While BankXX extends aspects of 
HYPO, the approach to simulating legal analogising is largely the same in the two 
programs. This approach is insufficient to simulate the flexibility characteristic of legal 
analogising. 
Berman and Hafner have proposed an approach to reasoning with legal principles similar 
to that demonstrated in BankXX.2'?^ Berman and Hafher argue that it is necessary to 
represent the teleological element present in legal reasoning, and propose an extension to 
the HYPO architecture that would incorporate this.2'^9 jf, t^jg extension, dimensions are 
linked to the legal purposes they advance and each legal purpose indicates whether it 
favours the plaintiff or the defendant(figure 20).2^0 
2''8 Berman Donald H. and Hafner Carole D., 'Representing Teleological Structure in Case-Based Legal 
Reasoning: The Missing Link' p.50, in The Fourth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
and Law: Proceedings of tlie Conference (1993) ACM Press hereafter 'Represendng Teleological 
Structure'. 
Ibid. 
280 Ibid 56. 
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Relevant Dimensions: 
Dimensionl (Purpose A ..) 
Dimension! (Purpose B ..) 











Purpose A, Favours D 
Purpose A, Favours D 
Purpose A, Favours D 
b8i 
Figure 20: Factors and legal purposes 
With this extension, deeper forms of case-matching and legal argument would apparently 
be possible. 
However, this approach to simulating legal analogising is problematic. Apart from being 
as yet unimplemented, as Berman and Hafner indicate, the purposes that underlie the law 
change over time and this method of reasoning with legal purposes does not 
accommodate this change.^ ^^ Further, the level of abstraction at which purposes are 
represented in the system has to be arbitrarily s e l e c t e d . ^ j j ^ h the representations of 
legal theories in BankXX, legal purposes are represented using dimensions and are thus 
subject to the problems with dimensional analysis discussed previously. 
Moreover, Berman and Hafner do not discuss how their proposals can be used to 
simulate the influence of legal principles in creating the semantic flexibility inherent in 
legal analogising. Berman and Hafner do suggest a way in which knowledge about the 
purposes underlying precedents could be used to simulate the manner in which the force 
of precedents changes through timc^^"* This is an interesting proposal and the change in 
Adapted from: ibid. 
2«2 Ibid 57. 
Ibid. 
Berman Donald H. and Hafner Carole D., 'Understanding Precedents in a Temporal context of 
Evolving Legal Doctrine' p.42, in The Fifth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and 
Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1995) ACM Press. 
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the force of precedents through reinterpretation is an important aspect of precedent-
based reasoning in law. However, Berman and Hafner's proposed use of legal purposes 
do not address the manner in which these purposes influence the perception of problems 
and precedents. As such, Berman and Hafner's proposals do not simulate an important 
aspect of legal analogical reasoning. 
Having examined numerous influential attempts to simulate legal analogising, it can be 
seen that researchers in artificial intelligence and law have explored a diverse range of 
approaches in these attempts. However, these simulations of legal analogising are 
shallow and brittle. Researchers in artificial intelligence and law have borrowed widely 
from artificial intelligence. However, as discussed in chapter 5 artificial intelligence is 
unable to provide a complete simulations of analogising. Systems in law relying on these 
techniques do not provide a complete simulation of legal analogising. One promising 
branch of research in computational analogy, that explored by FARG, has not been 
explored by researchers in A I and law. While far from a complete model of analogising, 
the architecture pioneered by FARG suggests numerous promising ideas for research in 
simulating legal analogising. This is examined in more detail in the next chapter. Having 
examined attempts at simulate legal analogising, one fiarther branch of research in 
artificial intelligence and law relevant to legal analogical reasoning will be examined -
legal information retrieval. 
6.4 Artificial intelligence and law, and information retrieval 
Information retrieval is a general term used to describe methods of using computers to 
retrieve stored documents relevant to a users requirements.^ ^^ when presented with a 
legal issue, lawyers ideally require all the documents, and only those documents which 
are relevant to that issue. Unfortunately, determining which documents are and which 
documents are not relevant to an issue is a complex task. This task has many overlaps 
with legal reasoning. Retrieving documents based solely on the presence of surface 
similarities is insufficient, the ability to perform conceptual searches is necessary. 
Zeleznikow John and Hunter Dan, Building intelligent legal information systems: representation and 
reasoning in law (1994) Kluwer, 29. 
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Both legal analogical reasoning systems and legal information retrieval systems require 
the determination of conceptual similarities between documents Hence, techniques 
developed in research on analogy are relevant to information retrieval. Conversely, 
techniques from information retrieval that retrieve documents based on their conceptual 
similarity are relevant to attempts to simulate legal analogical reasoning. 
6.4.1 The need for conceptual retrieval 
The simplest approach to information retrieval is to search for 'key-words' in a 
document.287 For example, searching a database of precedents for the word 'lawyer' will 
display all those precedents which contain the word 'lawyer'. However, this will not 
retrieve precedents not containing the word 'lawyer' but instead containing the words 
'practitioner', 'solicitor' or 'barrister'. The use of thesaurus can partly overcome this 
problem.288 However, this method of retrieval also retrieves cases in which one word is 
used with diverse meanings. For example, a case where a solicitor is being sued for 
negligence and a case where a solicitor is commended for their conscientiousness. This 
problem can be reduced by using Boolean operators to combine words and thus narrow 
searching.However, a fundamental problem with key-word searching is that it is 
subject to the 'Boolean lottery'.2^0 The more searches are widened to ensure all relevant 
documents are retrieved, the greater the number of irrelevant documents are also 
retrieved. The more searches are narrowed to restrict the number of irrelevant 
documents retrieved the more potentially relevant documents are not retrieved. Hence 
there is a trade-oflf between the need to recall all relevant documents and the relevance of 
the documents retrieved. It cannot be guaranteed that all but only the relevant documents 
are retrieved. What is needed is a method to retrieve documents containing only the 
concepts of interest. 
286 The overlap between information retrieval and reasoning has been noted by several researchers: e.g. 
Bing Jon, 'Designing Text Retrieval Systems for Conceptual Searching' p.43, in The First International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1987) ACM Press; 
Hafner Carole D. and Wise Virginia J., 'SmartLaw: Adapting "Classic" Expert System Tecluiiques for 
the Legal Research Domain' p. 133, in The Fourth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1993) ACM Press; Rissland Edwina L. and Daniels Jody J., 'A 
Hybrid CBR-IR Approach to Legal Infonnation Retrieval' p. 52, in The Fifth International Conference 
on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1995) ACM Press. 
287 Zeleznikow and Hunter, above n 285, 30. 
288 When a thesaurus is used, a search for 'lawyer' would also search for synonymous words such as 
'solicitor' or 'barrister'. 
289 Zeleznikow and Hunter, above n 285, 31. 
290 Ibid 35. 
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There are many approaches to conceptual information retrieval. The most 
straightforward simply involves editorially enhancing documents. Documents are read by 
an expert who assigns standardised subject classifiers to them. Indexes, such as the 
'Current Law Index' operates with such a system. Precedents and other documents are 
classified by an editorial team into subjects such as 'Negligence - professional'. With an 
indication of the concepts a document relates to, conceptual retrieval can be performed. 
Editorial enhancement also underlies numerous computer systems that perform 
conceptual retrieval. These systems in turn involve varying degrees of editorial 
enhancement. For example, Mital and Johnson argue that litigation support is a highly 
specialised task.^^i As such they outline a system that aids users in performing various 
forms of editorial enhancement. This in turn facilitates conceptual retrieval of the 
documents that have been stored in the system. More radically, Dick has argued that not 
only is it necessary that the concepts exemplified by a document be made explicit, but 
also that the arguments in those documents be made expl ic i t .According to Dick this 
better supports lawyers in the retrieval of the information required to build an argument 
in response to a problem.293 Dick however, has not provided a new technique for 
conceptual retrieval - her system still relies on the manual editorial enhancement of 
precedents. Dick's approach to conceptual retrieval is notable for the degree and kind of 
editorial enhancement used. 
The various forms of editorial enhancement all provide benefits in information retrieval 
over keyword searching. However, as a fiill means to conceptual retrieval editorial 
enhancement is limited. Editorial enhancement is limited by the ability of the editor to 
classily documents as exemplifying particular concepts. Conceptual searching can only be 
performed on those concepts which have been editorially assigned. 2 '^' However, 
researchers in analogy argue that situafions can be similar in infinite numbers of ways. 
Mital Vijay, Stylianou Agathoclis and Jolmson Les, 'Conceptual Information Retrieval in Litigation 
Support Systems' p.235, in The Third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: 
Proceedings of the Conference (1991) ACM Press. 
Dick Judith, 'Conceptual Retrieval and Case Law' p. 106, in The First International Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1987) ACM Press hereafter 'Conceptual 
Retrieval'; Dick Judith P., 'Representation of legal text for conceptual retrieval' p.244, in The Third 
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of die Conference (1991) 
ACM Press hereafter 'Representation of legal text'. 
Dick 'Representation of legal text', above n 292, 244. 
This is the same problem as arises in assigning indices in case-based reasoning, in interpreting cases 
in computational analogy and in selecting inputs for a neural network. 
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When retrieving documents, it may potentially be necessary to retrieve documents based 
on any of these similarities. Editorially enhancing documents only captures particular 
conceptual similarities between documents. It is not possible to perform conceptual 
retrieval based on similarities that an editor has not previously foreseen and classified. 
Hence the conceptual searching facilitated by editorial enhancement is limited. 
As an alternative to manual editorial enhancement, researchers have investigated the 
automatic processing of text and the automatic extraction of conceptual information 
from texts. An early system was demonstrated by Tong et. al. in RUBRIC.295 RUBRIC 
automatically located documents relating to particular concepts through the use of lexical 
rules. For example, in the area of United States mergers and acquisitions law, a rule such 
as: 
EVIDENCE friendly((SENTENCE "BOARD" "OFFER" 
"RECOMMENDED")0.9))296 
indicates that if the words 'board', 'offer', and 'recommend' occur in the same sentence 
then this strongly indicates that the document relates to a friendly take-over bid. With 
such rules, documents relating to the same concepts can be located. The lexical rules 
contained in the system determine the extraction of concepts from a piece of text. 
A similar approach to conceptual retrieval is implemented in FLEXICON..297 
FLEXICON extends the approach in RUBRIC with a large 'dictionary' of legal 
concepts.298 This dictionary is created by the creators of FLEXICON.299 in this 
dictionary each concept is linked to words or parts of words which indicate the presence 
of the c o n c e p t . W i t h this dictionary, it is argued that the concepts exemplified in a 
295 E.g. Tong Richard M., Reid Clifford A., Crowe Gregory J. and Douglas Peter R., 'Conceptual Legal 
Document Retrieval Using the RUBRIC System' p.28, in The First International Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1987) ACM Press. 
296 Ibid 31. 
297 Gelbert Daphne and Smith J.C., 'Beyond Boolean Search: FLEXICON, A Legal Text-Based 
Intelligent System' p.225, in The Third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: 
Proceedings of the Conference (1991) ACM Press hereafter 'Beyond Boolean Search'; Gelbart Daphne 
and Smitli J.C., 'FLEXICON, An Evaluation of a Statistical Ranking Model Adapted to Intelligent Legal 
Text Management' p. 142, in The Fourth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: 
Proceedings of the Conference (1993) ACM Press hereafter 'An Evaluation'. 
298 F L E X I C O N also contains more facilities tlian does RUBRIC, such as tlie ability to search for 
precedents and statute citations and tlie ability to automatically generate 'summaries' of cases. However, 
the approach to the conceptual classification of precedents in RUBRIC and FLEXICON is essentially the 
same. 
299 Gelbart and Smith 'An Evaluation', above n 297, 146. 
300 Ibid.. 
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document can automatically be extracted and conceptual information retrieval be 
performed. 
However, these means to automatically determine conceptual similarities share a 
limitation with approaches based on manual editorial enhancement. Only those concepts 
specifically defined by lexical rules or linked to words in the dictionary can be searched 
for. I f the designers of the rules in RUBRIC or the dictionary in FLEXICON omit a 
concept from the rules or from the dictionary then conceptual searching cannot be 
performed on that concept. 
Further, whilst saving time and effort in the processing of documents, the automafic 
extraction of conceptual information is subject to a limitation that editorial enhancement 
is not. For example, the following piece of text describes a hypothetical event: 
While drunk John swung from the chandeHer, which unable to support his 
bulk, detached from the ceiling. John plummeted to the floor injuring several 
people below. 
This text would be relevant to a claim of negligence against John. An editor would 
realise this and could label the piece of text as relevant to the concept of negligence. 
However, automatic text processing techniques that rely on dictionary based approaches 
to determining the concept exemplified by a piece of text would not identify this text as 
relevant to the concept of negligence. The, automafic detection of legal concepts is 
limited. 
Moreover, approaches to conceptual retrieval based on editorial enhancement and the 
automatic extraction of conceptual information do not address the semanfic flexibility 
inherent in analogising and conceptual retrieval. Which concepts a document exemplifies, 
and the relationships between concepts are both statically defined in these approaches. 
Hence these approaches cannot simulate the conceptual change in concepts that can 
occur during conceptual retrieval. 
In accommodating the flexibility inherent in analogising, a notable approach to 
conceptual retrieval is demonstrated in SCALER.^"' Like many other systems, SCALER. 
'^^ ^ Rose Daniel E . and Belew Richard K., 'Legal Infonnation Retrieval A Hybrid Approach' p. 138, in 
The Second International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference 
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relies on the editorial enhancement of documents.302 However SCALIR augments this 
with other information. SCALIR contains information about 'micro-features' of 
documents .This information records facts such as that two documents refer to 
another common document, such as the same precedent, or a common piece of 
legislation, or more simply that two documents are commonly retrieved together.30'' 
the purpose of determining similarities between documents, such information can be 
useful. For instance SCALIR's creators argue that the fact that two documents cite a 
common precedent is a good indication that those documents are about a similar 
concept. 305 
With a more subtle notion of what is covered by the concept of 'similarity' SCALIR is 
thus able to construct similarities between documents that would be beyond the other 
approaches discussed. All the information about micro-features that SCALIR contains is 
automatically extracted from documents. A system that accommodates the semantic 
flexibility inherent in analogising must be able to automatically re-assess the content of 
concepts and the relationships between concepts. While SCALIR is thus an advance in 
information retrieval, its potential lies not only in information retrieval. As the creators of 
SCALIR envision, the combination of the approaches adopted in SCALIR with 
approaches developed in research on simulating analogising suggests ways to improve 
the simulation of legal reasoning.306 More work is required however to fijUy explore the 
potential of this approach. 
Legal information retrieval is a task that has many overlaps with legal analogical 
reasoning. Utilisation of techniques developed in research on legal reasoning has been 
proposed to improve legal information retrieval systems.307 Conversely, techniques 
(1989) ACM Press, hereafter 'Legal Information Retrieval'; Rose Daniel E . and Belew Richard K., 'A 
connectionist and symbolic hybrid for improving legal research' (1991) 35 International Journal of Man-
Machine Studies I , hereafter 'A connectionist and symbolic hybrid'. SCALIR is an extension of work 
undertaken by Belew: Belew Richard K., 'A Connectionist Approach to Conceptual Infonnation 
Retrieval' p. 116, in The First International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings 
of the Conference (1987) ACM Press. 
302 Rose and Belew 'Legal Information Retrieval', above n 301, 138. 
303 Rose and Belew 'A connectionist and symbolic hybrid', above n 301, 11. 
304 F L E X I C O N also utilises a more limited for of such infonnation than is used in SCALIR. 
305 Rose and Belew 'A connectionist and symbolic hybrid', above n 301, 16. 
306 Ibid, 29-30. 
307 E.g. Hafner Carole D. and Wise Virginia J., 'SmartLaw: Adapting "Classic" Expert System 
Techniques for the Legal Research Domain' p. 133, in The Fourth International Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1993) ACM Press; Dick 'Conceptual 
Retrieval', above n 292; Rissland and Daniels, above n 286. 
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developed in legal information retrieval could be usefial in simulating legal analogising. 
However, while offering many benefits in legal information retrieval, approaches to 
conceptual retrieval currently offer limited benefit to attempts to simulate legal 
analogising. In both areas the representations of legal knowledge encoded in these 
systems is inflexible. This makes it unsuitable for simulating the flexibility demonstrated 
in analogising. However, the automatic extraction and use of micro-feature information 
demonstrated in SCALIR indicates an innovative way to determine similarifies between 
documents. This is a usefiil source of information to use in systems that simulate legal 
analogising. As the creators of SCALIR indicate, these techniques could be used in 
fiiture legal reasoning systems. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Having examined approaches to simulafing legal analogising developed by researchers in 
artificial intelligence and law it is apparent that these systems only provide a shallow 
simulafion of human legal analogising. Researchers in psychology, cognitive science and 
artificial intelligence argue that analogising is a creative act that can involve the 
perception of new connections between situafions. Systems that simulate legal 
analogising must accommodate the flexible interacfion and change in knowledge that 
occurs when analogies are constructed. Current systems that simulate legal analogising 
do not adequately accommodate this. Current attempts to simulate legal analogising only 
simulate limited aspects of legal analogising. Current simulations are limited to finding 
similarities based on straightforward correspondences between situations. This severely 
restricts the kinds of analogies that these systems can create. According to legal theorist, 
legal principles have a large influence in the perception of legal analogies. However, 
currents approaches to simulating legal analogising ignore this influence of legal 
principles on the creafion of analogies. The limitafions that this imposes on attempts to 
simulate legal analogical reasoning and some possibiHfies for improving systems that 
attempt to simulate legal analogical reasoning are examined in the next chapter. 
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7 Improving simulations of legal analogical reasoning 
The preceding examination of theories of legal analogising and of attempts to construct 
computer systems that simulate legal analogising, highlights that these attempts fall far 
short of simulafing all that occurs during human analogising. Analogical reasoning 
involves the perception of similarity between situations. Similarifies that are perceived 
between situations can be more or less abstract and more or less creative. In law, legal 
principles influence the percepfion of abstract similarifies. Attempts to simulate legal 
analogising do not account for the importance of these principles on legal analogising. 
This Hmits the kind of legal analogical reasoning that systems can simulate. In this 
chapter the limitations that exist in attempts to simulate legal analogical reasoning are 
discussed in more depth. Suggesfions are offered as to how these limitations could begun 
to be dealt with. 
7.1 Two limitations 
As discussed in chapter 4, a common distincfion drawn by jurists in theories of legal 
reasoning is between processes of creation and processes of justification of decisions. 
While this distinction is itself problematic it usefiilly highlights two limitations that exist 
in current simulations of legal analogising. Even the most sophisticated simulations of 
legal analogising adopt overly simplistic models of the processes of creation and 
processes of justification. 
7.1.1 Limitations of creation 
The perception of an analogy depends on the percepfion of similarity between situations. 
How do we come to view two situafions as similar? In current simulations of legal 
analogising this is achieved by the matching of pre-defined attributes between situations. 
I f situafions share common attributes then they are regarded as in some respect similar. 
However, this ignores a central aspect of analogising and is thus insufficient to account 
for the creation of all legal analogies. 
The central aspect of analogising that is ignored is the way in which the perception of 
problems and precedents can radically differ in different situations. Some philosophers 
suggest that situations can potentially be regarded as similar in infinite ways. The way in 
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which a situation is perceived determines the analogies that can potentially be formed 
with that situation. 
Current simulations of legal analogising ignore the importance of perception in legal 
analogising. Current simulations of legal analogising force the perception of problems 
and precedents into categories pre-defined by the creators of the particular system. Thus 
only analogies consistent with this initial perception of the environment can be created. 
Forcing situations to be perceived in particular ways restricts the type of analogising that 
is possible. Analogising is limited to determining matches between the designated 
attributes. In these simulations, analogising cannot involve similarities that are either 
more abstract or indeed less abstract than the attributes designated as important. 
Researchers such as Gentner and Rumelhart restrict the term 'analogising' to designate 
creative and abstract similarity and use the term 'mere matching' to refer to the sort of 
attribute matching which simulations of 'legal analogising' involve. While this restricted 
us of the term 'analogising' is not universally adopted, on this view it becomes difficult 
even to refer to these simulations as simulating legal analogising. 
The problems inherent in current approaches to simulating legal analogising can be seen 
in programs such as HYPO. While this discussion will focus on HYPO, the problems 
inherent in this program are also present in other programs that simulate legal analogising 
such as GREBE and those programs based on simple index matching and neural 
networks. 
HYPO is one of the most sophisticated attempts to simulate legal analogising. 
Nevertheless HYPO is extremely limited in the kind of legal analogising that it can 
simulate. The ability of HYPO to create legal analogies is limited by the inability of the 
program to perceive situations in ways other than those designated by its creator. HYPO 
relies on the breakdown and classification of the facts of problems into seemingly non-
controversial, apparently basic dimensions. These dimensions form the basis for all the 
subsequent matching and argument that HYPO performs. However, the seeming 
simplicity of the dimensions used in HYPO in many cases masks choices that must be 
made in any categorisation. For example, while determining whether 'THERE IS A 
CORPORATE PLAINTIFF' or 'THERE IS A CORPORATE DEFENDANT' may not 
be controversial, other dimensions such as 'PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT'S 
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PRODUCTS COMPETE' and 'EMPLOYEE RECEIVED SOMETHING OF VALUE 
TO SWITCH EMPLOYMENT'308 pose more diflficulfies. 
For example, hypothesise two drink manufacturers, one producing fizzy cola drinks the 
other producing fizzy lemon drinks. Do these products compete? They are different 
drinks which suggests that they are not in competifion. However, they are both 'soft-
drinks' which suggests they are in competition. What i f one manufacturer produces 
'sports-drinks'? The two drinks now appear to serve different functions, again 
suggesting that they are not in compefition. But what if sports people are shown to often 
drink cola drinks after playing sport? Are the products then in competition? Clearly the 
dimensions with which it is required to analyse situations themselves involve important 
choices and elements of perception. Similarly with the second attribute. Hypothesise an 
employee who receives a direct payment to change employment. Something of value has 
been received. What i f the employee is offered a pay rise instead of a direct payment? 
This still seems a recepfion of something valuable. However, this inference may be 
weakened i f the employee also has to adopt more responsibilities. What if an employee's 
spouse, previously unemployed, is offered a job in return for the employee changing 
employment? Or the employee's children? Has something of value then been received by 
the employee to change employment? It becomes more and more difficult to say so. 
Clearly, in some circumstances whether something of value has been received by the 
employee is a matter of perception and argument and is not a value-free classification. 
It could be argued that overcoming this difficulty is simply a matter of adding sufficiently 
detailed information, rather than using general dimensions such as 'PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANT'S PRODUCTS COMPETE' or 'EMPLOYEE RECEIVED 
SOMETHING OF VALUE TO SWITCH EMPLOYMENT'. However, Hofstadter and 
French strongly argue that as a general strategy this is inadequate.^ 09 This approach is 
subject to recursion of the original problem for the new attributes themselves.^ '^  While 
the addifion of more detailed information may reduce the problem inherent in 
categorising situations in terms of the attributes chosen by the designer of the system, a 
fundamental problem remains. Amongst those multitude of attributes used to analyse 
For a list of all the 'factual' predicates used in HYPO see: Ashley, above n 3, appendix D. 
3*^ 9 Hofstadter and French, above n 176. 
Ibid 342-51. 
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situations, it is necessary to determine which are important in a particular finding of 
similarity and what relationships exist between those attributes. It is not sufficient to have 
masses of information; the determination of similarity depends on the perception of 
relationships between pieces of information. 
Because programs such as HYPO focus on matching pre-defined attributes of situations 
the creators of such systems can a priori specify the role of each attribute in the finding 
of similarity. Once the important attributes are pre-defined, the complexity in determining 
the important attributes can be ignored. However, once it is accepted that matching pre-
defined attributes is insufficient, it becomes necessary to determine how the selection of 
particular attributes for use in analogising occurs, how the perception of particular 
relationships between attributes occurs during analogising and how these can be 
simulated. 
Donoghue v. Stevenson illustrates the problems inherent in current attempts to simulate 
legal analogising. discussed Chapter 4 highlighted how the analogies relied upon by Lord 
Buckmaster and Lord Aitkin were totally different. Their lordships perceived the case in 
totally different ways. In their different treatments of the case, Lord Buckmaster and 
Lord Aitkin focused on different attributes of the case. In part the legal principles that 
each of their lordships adhered to drove the choice of the particular attributes that each 
of their lordships focused on. As jurists examining analogy emphasise, 
when we speak of relevant similarities in the context of analyzing analogies, 
... similarities are made and not found.3" 
Amongst other things, legal principles influence how concepts are constructed, how they 
interact and ultimately how the facts of a case are classified. As Justice Wald says in her 
illuminating discussion of the processes of judging, 
[t]he conventional wisdom is that the "Facts" portion of an appellate opinion 
merely recites neutral, pre-determined "facts" found by the lower court .... 
Yet nothing could be further from the truth. When an appellate judge sits 
down to write up a case, she knows how the case will come out and she 
consciously relates a "story" that will convince the reader that it has come 
out right.312 
31 ' MacCormick 'Legal Reasoning', above n 17, 185. 
312 Wald, above n 84, 1386. 
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Attempts to simulate legal analogising that rely on the classification of facts into pre-
defined categories carmot provide a complete simulation of legal analogising. The 
influence of principles on the way the facts of cases are perceived and categorised needs 
to be accommodated. 
Programs that simulate legal analogising such as HYPO, ignore these complex aspects of 
analogising. According to Mendelson, the approach embodied in HYPO is only 
applicable in limited areas of law.^i^ Mendelson argues that this approach is more suited 
to settled and non-discrefionary areas of law. Indeed it is precisely in unsettled and 
discretionary areas of law that legal principles would be expected to be most influential 
upon reasoning. Current systems are not capable of predicting landmark cases.'''' 
Researchers in artificial intelligence and law claim to be aware of current problems with 
attempts to simulate legal analogising and the important role that legal principles play in 
analogising.Although valuable suggesfions, these approaches do not address the 
problems identified above. While Branting argues for the need to represent the theory 
under which cases are decided he does not discuss the importance of those theories in 
determining the very way that problems are perceived. The way a problem is perceived 
determines which precedents are regarded as analogous and thus is at least as important 
as knowing the theory under which precedents were decided. A similar criticism exists 
with respect to the approach adopted by Rissland and Skalak. Rissland and Skalak 
represent the legal theory under which precedents were decided. Like Branting however, 
they do not discuss the importance of these theories and legal principles on the very 
perception of problems. 
Finally, Berman and Hafner propose an extension to the approach to simulating legal 
analogising pioneered in HYPO. In this extension, factors are linked to the legal 
principles that they support, 'is in this way a system would be able to make arguments 
based on legal principles. However, this proposal is simply aimed at providing 'deeper' 
313 Mendelson, above n 251. 
'i^Hunter Dan, Representation and reasoning in law: Legal theory in tlie artificial intelligence and law 
movement. (1995) L L M Thesis, University of Melbourne, Melbourne. 
315 See the discussion of systems that simulate reasoning with legal principles, chapter 6. 
316 Bennan and Hafner 'Representing Teleological Structure', above 278. 
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justifications for analogies. Like Branting, and Rissland and Skalak, Berman and Hafner 
do not discuss the influence of principles on the very perception of legal problems. 
While some researchers in artificial intelligence and law are aware of the importance of 
legal principle in legal analogising, no research in artificial intelligence and law has 
investigated the importance of legal principles on the very perception of problems. Unfil 
researchers address the influence that legal principles have on the perception of similarity 
during analogising, simulations of legal analogising will be restricted to finding 'mere 
matches' rather than creating truly creative analogies. 
7.1.2 Limitations of justification 
The second limitation of systems that simulate legal analogising arises from the 
importance of the processes of justification in legal analogising. This limitation is closely 
related to the limitation involved in the creation of analogies discussed above. The 
limitation of justification arises because law is an argumentative endeavour. Legal 
analogies are both used to support other arguments and are themselves based on 
underlying arguments. The arguments underlying a legal analogy justify the creation of 
that analogy. Hence a legal analogy is only as convincing as the justifications that can be 
provided in support of it. It is thus essential to be able to provide, the justifications that 
underlie legal analogies. 
Approaches to simulating legal analogising, such as simple index matching and neural 
networks do not attempt to justify analogies that are proposed.3i7 To the extent that 
systems do not provided justifications for the analogies they create, they are incomplete 
simulations of legal analogising. Other systems, notably GREBE and those based around 
dimensional analysis do attempt to provide argument about the analogies they propose. 
Systems such as HYPO argue about the appropriateness of analogies drawn between a 
problem and precedents by comparing and contrasting analogies with each other. Under 
this approach, justification is based wholly on the principle that 'like case should be 
decided alike'. I f it can be shown that a problem is like a precedent, referring to the 
existence of the precedent is regarded as sufficient justification. However, the principle 
'like cases should be decided alike' justifies the outcome of a problem only once a 
317 Though work is being done on justifying the output of neural networks: Zeleznikow and Stranieri, 
above n 236 
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precedent is shown to be similar. The likeness between a problem and a precedent must 
itself be justified. Justifying why precedents and problems are alike is however, a task 
which current approaches to simulating legal analogising do not completely address. 
Limitations in current approaches to justifying analogies are closely linked to the 
limitafions on the creation of analogies discussed above. First, problems must be to an 
extent pre-classified as displaying certain attributes. Systems cannot provide argument as 
to whether these attributes are in fact present in the problem. To return to the example 
provided above. It would not be possible to justify a classificafion that the fizzy cola 
drink and the sports-drink do or do not compete. This is subsumed within the attribute 
'PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANTS PRODUCTS COMPETE.' As discussed above 
however, the attribute 'PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANTS PRODUCTS COMPETE' 
itself masks choices about the classification of facts. To completely justify an analogy 
those choices must be justified. Current systems cannot justify those choices. 
Just as it is necessary to justify the classification of particular problems within the 
attributes used in a system, it is necessary to justify the use of those attributes 
themselves. For example, consider another example from the area of trade secrets 
misappropriafion. Hypothesise a plaintiff claiming for trade secrets misappropriation. 
Assume that the employee in this case was paid to change employment. Indeed, the 
plaintiff cites a precedent where an employee was paid to change employment and where 
the court found trade secrets misappropriafion. Assume however, that the defendant cites 
a precedent in which an employee was paid to change employment but the court found 
there was no trade secrets misappropriation.3i^ This second precedent undermines the 
importance of the attribute 'EMPLOYEE RECEIVED SOMETHING OF VALUE TO 
SWITCH EMPLOYMENT'. Justifying the analogy with the initial precedent requires 
justifying why this attribute is itself important. Systems that simulate legal analogising do 
not provide such justifications. 
Proposals to incorporate reasoning with legal theories and legal principles would address 
the problem of jusfifying the importance of particular attributes. However, these 
proposals do not address the justification of the choices that occur during the perception 
31^ Refer to the discussion of HYPO's processing of the hypothetical Amexxco case: Ashley, above n 3, 
appendix H. 
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of legal analogies. Providing justification for these choices requires an understanding of 
the influence on the way situations are perceived during legal analogising. Research on 
analogy has not completely uncovered what drives such choices. However research on 
analogy, as does legal theory, emphasises the important influence of principles in the 
perception of analogies. 
Reasoning with the principles that underlie the law is clearly necessary. No research in 
artificial inteUigence and law fully addresses the importance of legal principles in legal 
analogical reasoning. While the use of legal principles has been investigated to improved 
justification, such proposals do not address the influence of principles on the very 
perception of analogies. Moreover these proposals ignore an important aspect of the 
interaction between principles and analogising. During analogising, principles themselves 
change. Systems that simulate the interaction between legal principles and analogising 
must accommodate this change. 
7.2 Fluid principles and analogising 
As explored in chapter 4 while it can be said that legal principles underlie legal analogies, 
legal analogising is itself an important way in which the scope of legal principles are 
themselves demarcated. Systems that simulate legal analogising must accommodate the 
influence of analogising on changing legal principles. Current proposals for utilising 
knowledge of legal principles in simulating legal analogising do not accommodate change 
within these principles. For example Berman and Hafner note that the 'level of 
abstractness' at which principles and policies are represented must be arbitrarily 
chosen,3i9 According to jurists legal principles exist at varying levels of abstraction.32o A 
complete system for simulating legal analogising would involve reasoning with principles 
at various levels of abstraction and would simulate the way in which the scope of 
principles is itself demarcated during legal analogising. 
319 Berman and Hafher 'Representing Teleological Structure', above 278, 57. 
320 Sunstein discusses this in the context of analogical reasoning: Sunstein Cass R., 'Incompletely 
Theorized Agreements' (1995) 108 Harvard Law Review 1733. 
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As Bratley et al discuss, accommodating change in the law is a highly neglected aspect of 
artificial intelligence and law research.^ i^ Bratley's et al comments were made in the 
context of accommodating changes in statute law based legal expert systems. To an 
extent the development of systems that simulate legal analogising itself addresses some 
of the problems originally raised by Bratley et al. However, an examination of analogical 
reasoning emphasises that during analogising subtle changes in legal concepts and 
principles can occur. Berman and Hafner acknowledge that their proposals for 
incorporating legal principles into legal analogical reasoning systems face problems when 
the legal principles originally incorporated into the system themselves change.322 
However, the type of change to legal principles apparently envisaged by Berman and 
Hafner is unsubtle. This examination of legal analogising demonstrates that legal 
principles undergo subtle changes as part of the process of legal analogical reasoning 
itself Berman and Hafner appear unaware of this aspect of change to legal principles. 
Change in legal knowledge is still a highly neglected aspect of research in artificial 
intelligence and law. 
7.3 Future directions in simulating legal analogising 
Commentators have raised several criticisms with systems that simulate legal analogising. 
Berman and Hafner argue for the need to account for the procedural context in which 
cases are decided.Bratley et al highlight the crucial need to be able to handle changes 
in the law.324 Berman has raised several objections to current systems.^ s^ However, while 
each of these criticisms is valid, none of them is necessarily insurmountable. Berman and 
Hafher themselves propose an approach to accounting for the procedural context of 
cases.Brately's et al observation about the need to deal with change in the law was 
made in reference to rule -based systems. One of the claimed attractions of case-based 
reasoning is its ability to accommodate change simply through the addition of new cases. 
Bratley Paul, Fremont Jacques, Mackaay Ejan and Poulin Daniel, 'Coping with change' p.69, in 
The Third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law: Proceedings of the Conference 
(1991) ACM Press. 
Berman and Hafner 'Representing Teleological Structure', above 278, 57. 
323 Berman Donald H. and Hafner Carole D., 'Incorporating Procedural Context into a Model of Case-
Based Legal Reasoning' p. 12, in The Tliird International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and 
Law: Proceedings of tlie Conference (1991) ACM Press hereafter 'Incorporating Procedural Context'. 
324 Bratley et al, above n 321. 
325 Berman Donald H., 'Developer's Choice in the Legal Domain: The Sisyphean Journey with CBR or 
Down Hill with Rules' p.307, in The Third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and 
Law: Proceedings of the Conference (1991) ACM Press, 307-8. 
326 Bennan and Hafner 'Incorporating Procedural Context', above n 323. 
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Berman's criticisms have been discussed by Hunter,^ ^? While each of the criticisms raised 
by commentators is important, it is argued that the two greatest difficulties facing 
attempts to simulate legal analogising stem from difficulties simulating the processes by 
which analogies are created and the processes by which analogies are justified. 
Limitations related to the creation of analogies and limitations related to the justification 
of analogies are the two largest problems confronting simulations of legal analogising. A 
large step towards addressing these limitations requires fially acknowledge the role of 
legal principles in legal analogising. In this context, Branting has argued for the need to 
model the role of 'purposes and policies and social justice in case matching'. 
According to Branting a 
preliminary step towards incorporating purposes, policies, and principles into 
precedent-based reasoning was taken by Berman and Hafner, who showed ... 
how to associate purposes with dimensions in a manner that permits much 
more idiomatic and persuasive legal arguments. 
However, as argued above, Berman and Hafner's proposals do not address central issues 
in the role of purposes in legal analogising. Simulating the influence of legal principles on 
legal analogising must account for the influence of legal principles on the perception of 
similarity in legal analogising and the change in legal principles themselves that can occur 
Hunter, above n 314, 151-7 
Branting L.Karl, 'Four Challenges for a Computational Model of Legal Precedent' (1994) 3 Think 
hereafter 'Four Challenges'. Branting discusses four specific challenges for computational models of 
legal reasoning: 
• relating case representation to precedent use 
• single-precedent and multiple-precedent arguments 
• purposes, policies and models of justice in case-matching 
• extending the applicability of precedents. 
The second challenge Branting raises relates to the dual necessities of being able to reason with portions 
of precedents and of being able to detect and reason with trends displayed by a group of precedents. Each 
of these abilities is undoubtedly necessary in any simulations of the uses of precedents in argument. 
However, a pre-requisite to both of tliese uses of precedent is the ability to create legally justifiable 
analogies. Branting's fourth challenge argues for the need to develop models of tlie ways in which 
precedents are used in legal tasks that do not involve classification. Branting cites advising, negotiating, 
planning and document drafting as such tasks. It would be difficult to argue that tliese tasks do not 
involve any aspects of legal analogising. Branting has certainly not provided such argument. Thus to the 
extent that these tasks do involve legal analogising, the ability to simulate legal analogising is necessary. 
To tlie extent Branting was suggesting that tliese tasks do not involve legal analogising, while an 
interesting issue, how these tasks might be modelled is outside tlie scope of this examination. Wliile 
each of tliese challenges must be addressed in a complete simulation of legal analogising, neither of 
these challenges addresses the very problem with the simulation of the perception of similarities tliat 
occurs when simulating legal analogising. This discussion will thus focus on Branting's first and tliird 
challenges. 
Ibid citation omitted. 
108 
during legal analogising. Berman and Hafner's proposals do not address either of these 
issues. 
There are several issues that must be addressed in simulating the role of legal principle in 
legal analogising. Amongst other things it is necessary to better understand precisely how 
legal principles influence the perception of similarity in legal analogising. It is necessary 
to better understand how principles interact with and influence each other during this 
perception of similarity. It is necessary to better understand how principles are 
themselves altered during analogising. Such questions are questions concerning the 
information and knowledge that lawyers utilise during legal analogising and how that 
knowledge is utilised during analogising. As discussed in chapter 3 legal theoretical 
accounts of legal analogising are primarily concerned with discussing the 'rational force' 
of legal decisions. Legal theoretical accounts of legal reasoning regard issues such as 
these as uninteresting matters of psychology. Consequently legal theoretical accounts of 
legal analogising do not provide insight into these questions. Addressing these questions 
requires the tools and techniques of disciplines such as psychology and cognitive science. 
Once it is better understood precisely what is involved in legal analogising, especially the 
role of legal principles in legal analogising, the simulation of legal analogising can be 
better addressed. As discussed in chapter 5, a central issue here is how knowledge is to 
be expressed in computer manipulable form. The legal knowledge necessary for legal 
analogising must be represented in a form that is manipulable by a computer yet retains 
the real-world richness and flexibility of that knowledge. Ideally all knowledge would be 
represented, although as FARG argue it would still be necessary to know what to do 
with that knowledge.330 However, as a practicality this is unrealistic - it is too time and 
labour intensive. Consequently choices must be made as to what knowledge is 
represented. In this context, interesting wok has recently been performed that 
investigates the possibility of creating general, universally applicable representations of 
legal knowledge.331 However, this work is at an early stage and has not yet investigated 
the applicability of the proposed approaches to simulating legal analogising. 
330 Chalmers, French and Hofstadter, above n 183. 
331 See: Valente A., Legal Knowledge Engineering: A modelling approach (1995) lOS Press, Ohmsha; 
van Kranlingen Robert W., Frame-Based Conceptual Models of Statute Law (1995) Kluwer Law 
International; Visser, above n 207. The First International Conference on Legal Ontologies is the be 
held in July in Melbourne, Australia. 
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The inability to fully represent knowledge and the consequent need to choose what 
aspects of knowledge are represented inevitably restricts the reasoning abilities of any 
system using that knowledge. Hence there is a compromise. Deciding what knowledge to 
represent will depend in part on the use to be made of the system that is based upon that 
knowledge. As Branting states, the representation of precedents must be related to the 
use of those precedents.332 This means that for any system that simulates legal 
analogising, assessing the feasibility of the system requires careful assessment of the 
goals underlying the creation of the system. 
Simulations of legal analogising are limited to determining comparatively 
straightforward matches between situations. Simulations of legal analogising are not 
capable of simulating the more creative aspects of legal analogising. This imposes two 
criteria for the assessment of systems that simulate legal analogising; 
1. the proposed use of the system must be restricted to acting as a sophisticated 
aide memoir to the user of the system 
2, the system must operate in a comparatively settled area of law. 
Systems cannot simulate the less obvious and more creative aspects of legal analogising. 
Hence their applicability is inherently restricted essentially to reminding a user of possible 
analogies and possible lines of argument. That systems cannot simulate the more creative 
aspects of analogising means that their use should be restricted to areas of law that do 
not routinely require such creative analogising. These two criteria should inform the 
creation of practical systems that simulate legal analogising. 
Branting 'Four Challenges', above n 328, 
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The above examination of simulations of legal analogising also results in three guidelines 
for researchers in artificial intelligence and law to follow when attempting to improve the 
simulation of legal analogising: 
1. researchers must fully acknowledge the role of legal principles in legal 
analogising 
2. simulations of legal analogising must accommodate the influence of legal 
principles in the finding of similarity and the creation of analogies 
3. simulations of legal analogising must accommodate the role of analogising in 
shaping and demarcating the scope of legal principles 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter limitations of simulations of legal analogising were discussed in depth. It 
was argued that a key step in resolving limitations in these simulations requires the 
incorporation of an ability to reason with legal principles. Even the most sophisticated 
existing attempts to simulate legal analogising are only able to perform straightforward 
forms of matching. These systems are unable to simulate the more creative aspects of 
legal analogising. To create simulations of the more creative aspects of legal analogising 
researchers in artificial intelligence and law must fully address the importance of legal 
principles in legal analogising. The current inability to represent the full richness and 
flexibility of human knowledge in a computer manipulable form also restricts the scope 
of legal analogising that can be simulated. Simulating analogising is restricted to the less 
creative of analogies. Consequently designers of systems that simulate legal analogising 
must be clear about the goals a system is being designed to serve to ensure these goals 
are realistically achievable. 
Attempts to simulate legal analogising are also important for understanding legal 
analogising itself Legal theoretical accounts of legal analogising leave many unresolved 
questions. Attempts to simulate legal analogising help illuminate these questions. This is 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
I l l 
8 Jurisprudence and simulating legal analogical reasoning 
The field of artificial intelligence and law plays a symbiotic role with the study of legal 
reasoning. While theories of legal reasoning should be used to inform to simulate legal 
reasoning, attempts to simulate legal reasoning themselves inform on theories of legal 
reasoning. According to Hanneman computers and computer simulation are valuable 
tools which aid theorising in three general ways: 
• to test existing theory, 
• to make predictions, and 
• to propose new theory.333 
These benefits of computer simulation are echoed in the context of investigations of legal 
theory.334 in these ways attempts to simulate legal analogising provide insight into 
theoretical accounts of legal analogising themselves. 
In previous chapters it was argued that attempts to simulate legal analogising fail to 
account for two important aspects of legal analogising. Simulations of legal analogising 
fail to account for the importance of legal principles in legal analogising and the 
importance of legal analogising in shaping legal principles. Simulations of legal 
analogising ignore the interaction between processes of creation and processes of 
justification in legal analogising. Attempts to simulate legal analogical reasoning 
however, provide insight into the processes of legal analogising themselves. These 
insights have impUcations for legal theoretical accounts of legal analogising. In this 
chapter it is argued that addressing the failure of legal theory to explain the interaction 
that occurs between processes of creation and processes of justification in legal 
analogising requires a reconception of the content of those theories. 
8.1 Constructing analogies and legal theory 
As discussed in chapter 3, a common distinction drawn by jurists in theories of legal 
reasoning is between processes of creation and processes of justification. Theories of 
legal reasoning are almost exclusively concerned with providing 'rational 
333 Hanneman Robert A., Computer Assisted Theory Building (1988) Sage Publications, 85 
334 Nage! Stuart S., The Legal Process: Modelling the System (1977) Sage Publications, 9-19; Evan 
William M., Social Structure and Law: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives (1990) Sage 
Publications, 230. 
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reconstructions' of the formal processes by which legal results are justified. The 
processes by which legal results are created are regarded as unimportant matters of 
psychology. 
However, as examined in chapter 4, processes of creation and the processes of 
justification cannot be completely separated in legal analogising. Processes of 
justification affect processes of creation and processes of creation affect processes of 
justification. The legal principles that a reasoner adheres to influences the analogies that 
the reasoner constructs. Different reasoners, adhering to different principles or different 
conceptions of principles, can perceive different analogies when presented with the same 
'facts'. However, legal principles are also refined and compromised as they are applied. 
A reasoner's conception of principles is influenced by the application of those principles 
in concrete situations, the conception of principles changes as they are applied. 
Justifications ultimately rest on considerations of principle. Hence with a different 
conception of principles, a different justification will be required. However, i f the 
justification that is offered for a decision depends on analogies that are perceived and the 
perception of a situation depends on the principles that are adhered to, then the 
separation between processes of justification and processes of creation is undermined. In 
legal analogising processes of justification and processes of creation interact. This 
interaction requires a revised conception of legal analogising. 
A revised conception of legal analogising has several consequences. First, it becomes 
strikingly apparent that theories of legal analogising that focus solely on describing how 
decisions are justified are deficient. Providing a rational reconstruction for an analogy is 
insufficient to explain how decisions are justified. A rational reconstruction focuses on an 
analysis of the process of justification 'after the fact', that is, after an analogy has been 
created and justified. However, this does not explain how particular justifications 
themselves arise. Why is one justification provided for a decision rather than another 
justification? I f outcomes in law were rigidly determined, i f there were only one right 
answer to legal controversies, then the answer to this question would be straightforward. 
While it has been argued that there are single right answers to individual problems, it is 
conceded that these right answers are only attainable by the hypothetical Herculean 
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judge.335 Attaining right answers, or at least proving they have been attained, is beyond 
the power of human reasoning. Consequently, in the realm of human reasoning the 
question remains as to how and why one justification is chosen in preference to another. 
As discussed in chapter 3, while justification is a topic much examined in legal theory, 
legal theoretical examinations of justification focus on the formal reasons offered for 
decisions. However, i f all legal results cannot be proved 'right' or 'wrong' it becomes 
more interesting and more important to know why particular justifications are offered for 
particular decisions. This examination of legal analogy does not attempt to completely 
explain why particular justifications are offered for particular legal analogies. However, 
this examination argues that in seeking to understand why particular justifications are 
offered account must be taken of the processes by which analogies are created. 
Once it is realised that processes of creation affect processes of justification, and hence 
that processes of justification cannot be studied in isolation, a theory of creation becomes 
more interesting and more important. In focusing on providing rational reconstructions 
for analogies, theories of legal analogising leave totally unexplored the processes by 
which analogies are created. The interaction between processes of creation and processes 
of justification however, undermines the privileged place given to examinations of the 
processes of justification. Once the influence of creation is seen more clearly, the 
importance and possibility of a 'logic of creation' becomes more possible, more 
interesting and more important.336 For this reason, the value of descriptive theory that 
simply provides a rational reconstruction for analogies is questionable. 
Secondly, the value of normative theories of legal reasoning that ignore human cognitive 
processes and the limitations that these might impose on us must be questioned. To the 
extent that normative theory seeks to advocate what people should actually do, to the 
extent that such theory aims to provide guidance to those actually dealing with the law, 
then it must be based on what is cognitively possible. An examination of analogy and the 
development of a complete theory of legal analogising calls into question the value of 
some normative theories of legal reasoning. For example, McCormac has argued that 
legal reasoning should follow a deductive pattern.337 Cognifive theories of reasoning 
335 See tlie discussion of Dworkin: chapter 3. 
336 Golding has argued that it is possible and valuable to investigate a 'logic of creation' in law: Golding 
'A Note', above n 23. 
337 McCormac John W., 'Reason Comes Before Decision' (1994) 55 Ohio State Law Journal 161. 
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however strongly suggest that reasoning is not purely deductive. According to cognitive 
scientists human perception fijndamentally relies on processes akin to analogising. Since 
thinking and perception are not purely deductive, and cannot be purely deductive, legal 
theory that ignores this cognitive aspect of human reasoning and requires legal reasoning 
to be purely deductive is of questionable value. It might be argued that while the 
deductive model of reasoning is unobtainable it is nevertheless something to strive for. 
One response would be to question why is it something to strive for. What is the benefit 
of trying to force reasoning into an artificial mould? It is counter-intuitive to think 
artificially constraining reasoning will in some way lead to better reasoning than would 
acknowledging the role of analogy in legal reasoning and then with such an 
acknowledgement developing criteria for 'good' and 'bad', 'acceptable' and 
'unacceptable' legal reasoning. In any case, arguing that reasoning thus constrained will 
lead to 'better' outcomes is something that its proponents must demonstrate rather than 
simply assert. Dworkin is one theorist who has cautioned against rejecting a theory of 
adjudication on the ground that it is not humanly applicable.338 However, Dworkin's 
caution is based on a minimal argument of one paragraph, refuting two straw-arguments 
against his own theory of the Herculean decision.339 Dworkin fails to provide any 
substantial argument why acknowledging human limitations and developing theories of 
adjudication which account for these is inferior to an impossible to attain theory of 
perfect judgement. To the extent that normative accounts of legal analogising and legal 
reasoning ignore cognitive processes and the limitations these impose, these accounts are 
of questionable value. 
In other ways, a revised conception of legal analogising requires a revised conception of 
legal reasoning generally. This occurs in two ways which can be labelled the 'weak' and 
the 'strong'. According to the weak conception, theories of legal reasoning require 
revision because they do not fully account for the processes of analogising themselves 
nor the role of analogising in legal reasoning more widely. As argued above, theories of 
legal analogising focus on only a very small conception of legal analogising - namely the 
ex post facto provision of rational reconstructions for legal analogies. However this 
leaves unexplained many aspects of the process of justification themselves. Explaining 
these aspects of justification requires investigating the processes by which analogies are 
338 Dworkin, above n 46, 129-30. 
339 Ibid 130. 
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created. Ultimately, theories of legal analogising must adopt an altered conception of the 
processes of reasoning in which the processes of creation and justification are seen as 
intertwined. This requires investigating the processes by which analogies are created. 
However, once the distinction between processes of creation and justification is 
undermined in analogical reasoning, this implicitly undermines the value of the distinction 
in theories of legal reasoning more generally. Theories of legal reasoning have to at least 
account for the interaction that occurs between creation and justification in legal 
analogical reasoning. This requires some modification to the distinction in theories of 
legal reasoning. It may be the case that the modification required is minimal. Perhaps it 
could be argued that while processes of creation and process of justification interact in 
legal analogising, they do not do so in other aspects of legal reasoning. However, the 
ubiquity of analogical reasoning in human reasoning suggests otherwise. 
According to cognitive scientists analogical reasoning plays an extremely wide role in 
human reasoning. These cognitive models highlight how the knowledge that we reason 
with is interpreted, through analogy, as we reason. It is not a simply case of having static 
unchanging knowledge, which is then reasoned with. Rather knowledge itself evolves as 
it is reasoned with. This view of reasoning is perhaps best expressed and explored by 
Hofstadter and his colleagues. According to Hofstadter, when we reason about concepts 
the content we give to those concepts is determined by the analogies we draw between 
those concepts and other concepts. The very content of concepts is determined during 
analogising. The role of analogising thus changes from being a tool applied to knowledge 
to a flindamental and indispensable tool for the construction and use of that knowledge. 
This view of the ubiquity of analogising in human thinking argues for a revised view of 
the place of analogical reasoning in legal reasoning. According to this revised view the 
use of analogical reasoning is not limited simply to the creation of formally offered 
arguments when no other approach is open but actually occurs every time legal 
categories are constructed and applied. 
The ubiquity of analogical reasoning in human reasoning also impliedly undermines the 
place given to legal analogising within a framework of legal reasoning. It is sometimes 
argued that legal reasoning is a technique resorted to only as a last resort - once the rules 
have run out. However, work by psychologists and cognitive scientists suggests that 
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analogising cannot be restricted solely to filling gaps. Such a view of the ubiquity of 
analogising in perception and reasoning requires an altered theory of legal reasoning - a 
theory in which analogising is moved from the periphery and regarded as central to legal 
reasoning. However, reconceiving the place of analogical reasoning within legal 
reasoning implies that the degree of reconception in the distinction between processes of 
creation and processes of justification in theories of legal reasoning is not minimal. 
In contrast to the above outlined weak form of reconception of theories of legal 
reasoning, a 'strong' form of reconception can be envisaged. Such a strong reconception 
would argue that the arguments that apply to undermine the distinction between process 
of creation and processes of justification in theories of legal analogising apply, with 
modification, to undermine the distinction between processes of creation and processes 
of justification in theories of legal reasoning more generally. Such a reconception would 
argue that just as processes of creation interact with processes of justification in legal 
analogising, processes of creation interact with processes of justification in legal 
reasoning more widely. Such an argument thereby questions the privileged place 
currently given to theories of legal justification in theories of legal reasoning generally. 
Providing an argument for such a re-conception is well beyond the scope of this 
discussion. However, it is hoped that the value of such an examination has been 
demonstrated. 
With a new conception of the processes of legal analogising, and to an extent of legal 
reasoning more generally, a new conception of various legal concepts is required. For 
instance, 'objectivity' is valued in legal reasoning. The relation between objectivity and 
law is a topic that is too wide to enter into here. However, two observations can be 
made. One argument by which law is argued to be objective is that the process of 
justification is argued to be objective. However, the process of justification is affected by 
the values a reasoner adheres to. Any notion of objectivity must take this into account. I f 
law is to be regarded as objective it thus cannot be founded on a linear separation of an 
separation between processes of creation and justification. Once the process of 
justification is demonstrated to be influenced by the process of creation, the link between 
justification, justifiability and objectivity requires reconception. Secondly, in noting that 
multiple analogies and multiple justifications are possible, is not to suggest that any 
analogy and any justification is possible. That processes of creation interact with 
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processes of justification is not to suggest that legal reasoning is totally unconstrained. 
Reports by judges of judging indicate the constraints that the requirement of justification 
imposes. Further, there are likely to be psychological constraints on analogising. What 
we perceive and classify together do not range unconstrained.340 This would provide an 
area for fertile empirical testing. To the extent that people do not, and cannot 
consciously make themselves, perceive situations as analogous, the claim of unrestrained 
subjectivity would be undermined. Such investigations would allow a more solid 
conception of what objectivity involves and perhaps a form of quantification of the 
concept. With a better understanding of the actual cognitive processes that occur in legal 
analogising we can make more informed and intelligent comment on and analysis of what 
judges and lawyers do. Cognitive insights into how thinking and analogising actually 
occur will force reconsideration of what it means to think 'rationally', what it means for 
the law to be 'objective', what it means to 'apply the law', to 'think like a lawyer', to 
'uphold the law', and what 'good' and 'bad' reasoning might involve. 
This discussion has highlighted why theories of legal analogising are currently deficient 
and why a detailed examination of the processes of creation of analogies is interesting 
and valuable. In this respect, theories of analogising developed in artificial intelligence do 
not provide a comprehensive answer. Such theories do not provide a comprehensive 
theory as to when situations will be regarded as similar and why they will be regarded as 
similar. However, in testing and examining the processes by which people actually 
decide, they provide insight into these processes. These insights are important for 
theories of legal analogising and for theories of legal reasoning. 
8.2 Conclusion 
Legal theoretical accounts of legal analogising are insufficient in that they leave 
mysterious what is involved in the key step in analogising - the finding of similarity or 
difference between situations. This is a result of the accepted distinction between 
creation and justification. However this distinction is not absolute. Examining how the 
finding of similarity occurs will inform about legal reasoning in general and legal 
analogising in particular. Central to such an examination is an understanding of the 
cognitive processes involved in reasoning and analogical reasoning in particular. 
340 For discussion of psychological data suggesting constraints on analogising, see the collections of 
works cited above n 8. 
118 
Conclusion 
In an article entitled 'The potential of artificial intelligence to help solve the crisis in our 
legal system' Berman and Hafner optimistically argued that the application of artificial 
intelligence in law would release the strain experienced by legal services.34i This is a 
theme recently returned to by Susskind who argues that the application of computer 
technology in law will help tackle fundamental problems in the legal system. 3'»2 More 
radically, Susskind argues that this application of technology will result in an underiying 
change in the model by which legal services are delivered. However, there are many 
obstacles before such changes can be realised. As Susskind argues, significant advances 
are required in legal knowledge processing techniques before artificial intelligence can be 
widely appHed in law. 
This research has investigated ways of improving legal knowledge processing techniques. 
An examination of legal reasoning highlights the importance of analogical reasoning in 
legal reasoning. In common law countries, the law develops on a case by case basis -
lawyers refer to precedents when confronted with novel problems and it is a fundamental 
principle of justice that 'like case be decided alike.'. This necessarily involves analogical 
reasoning. Thus any attempt to simulate the tasks that lawyers perform must simulate the 
processes of legal analogising that lawyers engage in. 
Much research has been conducted in the field of artificial intelligence and law on 
simulating legal analogising. Numerous programs have been created that attempt to 
simulate the processes involved when lawyers reason analogically. In these attempts to 
simulate legal analogising, researchers in artificial intelligence and law have drawn from 
numerous techniques in artificial inteUigence. However, all these techniques, and all 
attempts to simulate legal analogising fall far short of simulating all that is involved in 
human legal analogising. 
Using theoretical accounts of legal reasoning as a basis, this research investigated the 
processes involved in legal analogising. Despite themselves leaving various questions 
341 Berman Donald H. and Hafner Carole D., 'The potential of artificial intelligence to help solve tlie 
crisis in our legal system' (1989) 32 Communications of tlie ACM 928. 
3'*2 Susskind ' The Future of Law', above n 1. 
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surrounding legal analogising unexplored, legal theoretical accounts of legal analogising 
emphasise the importance of legal principles in legal analogising. Legal principles 
influence the way situations are perceived and the way analogies are constructed. 
However, research on simulating legal analogising undertaken in artificial intelligence 
and law almost completely ignores the importance of legal principles in legal analogising. 
Consequently, attempts to simulate legal analogising provide a shallow simulacrum of 
human analogising. Attempts to simulate legal analogising are unable to simulate 
anything other than the straightforward finding of predefined matches between situations. 
This is a far cry from the creative analysis that lawyers engage in during legal analogical 
reasoning. Attempts to simulate legal analogising also face diflScult issues about how to 
represent knowledge in computers. These issues must be addressed before simulations of 
legal analogical reasoning can be improved. Until the role of legal principles in legal 
analogising is flilly acknowledged and until knowledge representation strategies and 
guidelines are improved, the kind of legal analogising that can be simulated will remain 
limited. 
An examination of attempts to simulate legal analogising also informs about legal theory. 
Legal theoretical accounts of legal analogising almost exclusively focus on one narrow 
aspect of legal analogising - the rational reconstruction of legal analogies. This leaves 
numerous aspects of legal analogical reasoning unexplored. Legal theorists justify the 
focus on rational reconstruction by reference to the distinction between process of 
creation and process of justification. However, examinations of legal analogising show 
that during legal analogising, processes of creation and process of justification interact. 
Hence the exclusive focus on processes of justification in theories of legal analogising 
cannot itself be justified. To understand how analogies are justified it is necessary to 
understand the processes by which analogies are created. However, while the detailed 
examination of legal theory required by attempts to simulate legal analogising highlight 
deficiencies in legal theory itself, attempts to simulate legal analogising do not provide a 
complete answer to these deficiencies.. 
Until our understanding of ourselves and of our own thought processes improves, 
attempts to simulate legal analogical reasoning will be limited. This in turn limits our 
ability to create computer systems that engage in legal knowledge processing. The time 
may have arrived for a cognitive theory of law. 
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